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 This project examines J. Edgar Hoover’s rhetorical leadership of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation during the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman 
administrations (1933-1953). Hoover launched and sustained a concerted domestic 
propaganda program that helped enhance his own political power and invented the 
FBI as a central force in domestic and international matters. In the process, he re-
envisioned conceptions of U.S. citizenship by promoting notions of idealized 
citizenship. Hoover entered law enforcement and U.S. politics during the early 
decades of the twentieth century—a time of increased use of public campaigns 
sponsored by the U.S. government and presidential administrations to alter public 
opinion on important policy matters. This period witnessed, for example, the 
country’s experimentation with domestic propaganda during World War I.  
 While the Soviet Union and Germany used disease, vermin, parasite, and body 
metaphors to organize their own domestic propaganda campaigns in the following 
  
decades, Hoover used these same metaphors to advance the need to purify America 
and exterminate its social pariah. Through his public campaigns against vermin 
(1933-1939), the Fifth Column (1939-1945), and Red Fascism (1945-1953), Hoover 
constructed a reality in which corruption and subversion were immutable elements of 
democratic life. Increasingly, Hoover’s tactics of threat and intimidation began to 
mimic the tactics of threat practiced by America’s enemies, moving the country 
closer to what many at the time called a police state. Hoover’s coupling of 
propaganda and coercive tactics ultimately helped him to rapidly expand the FBI and 
undermine his superiors and counterparts in the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government. Whereas Roosevelt benefited politically from building up a 
secret police force, Truman inherited a cunning FBI director eager to use his power to 
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 J. Edgar Hoover formalized a counter-intelligence apparatus to neutralize the 
communist threat as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) years 
before Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI) first warned of a domestic communist 
conspiracy in 1950.1 The communist problem of Russian spy cells operating in 
Washington, D.C. from the 1920s through the 1940s became the communist 
“menace” once the problem was strategically politicized following the Truman 
Doctrine address in March 1947.2 Regardless of the veracity of its claims, anti-
communism had blossomed into a powerful ideological movement that disrupted the 
New Deal political era and beyond. 
 Despite common conceptions, Senator McCarthy was not the father of 
“McCarthyism.” His brand of anti-communism, rather, was visible in hearings 
conducted by Americanist committees in Congress during the late 1930s.3 Scholars of 
international relations and members of the U.S. Congress, the intelligence 
establishment, and the business community alike were bolstered by an anti-
communist coalition propped up by Director Hoover and many others at the time.4 
And, although these parties sought different ends, they contributed to a campaign that 
targeted the Kremlin and New Deal policies.5  
These anti-communist opinion leaders expressed the ideological commitments 
of political realism, which assumed that the international arena was governed by 
anarchy. National stability, therefore, necessitated perpetual preparedness against 
international threats, especially manifestations of espionage, sabotage, and 




relationship with the FBI—a civilian agency that was charged with protecting the 
nation from a vast array of threats. For example, Tom Wicker wrote in an April 1971 
Life magazine article that Director Hoover and any “president” were “almost 
inevitably . . . linked” more “directly” because “no attorney general [could] interpose 
himself between them, if they do not want him to.” Wicker enumerated that 
“[w]iretapping and bugging, leaking derogatory information, planting or destroying 
evidence and testimony, unwarranted surveillance, and undercover penetration of 
organizations—these [were] only a few of the weapons an FBI director who wanted 
to use them could deploy on his own, or on a president’s behalf.”6 Presidents from 
both parties had questionable relationships with Hoover’s FBI. Even though President 
Harry S Truman referred to the FBI as a “Gestapo,” he also accepted political 
intelligence from the Bureau about his rivals in the Democratic Party.7  
 Though the FBI was created under the supervision of the attorney general in 
1908, Director Hoover ultimately expanded the power of the position in ways that 
helped him circumvent constitutional checks and allowed him to report directly to 
presidents.8 Such actions extended presidential influence and his own political stature. 
Hoover thus made available such questionable political tools to the eight presidents 
that he served from 1924 until his death in 1972. During this time, he helped enhance 
the scope and authority of the FBI. Under his leadership, the Bureau’s annual 
appropriations grew from $2.2 million to $336.1 million. This growth was continuous 
during the Great Depression, and accelerated during World War II and the Cold War.9  
This project explores the rhetorical imagination that Hoover utilized to 




gangsters (1933-1939), German and Soviet espionage (1939-1945), and communist 
penetration of the national security apparatus (1945-1953). These movements 
established Hoover’s rhetorical and political trajectory. In his December 1969 New 
York Times review of Hoover’s career, Wicker concluded that Hoover possibly 
wielded “more power longer than any other man in American history.”10 The 
director’s rhetorical campaigns were key components of his nefarious triumph.  
Utilizing the international relations perspectives of political idealism and political 
realism, this study examines the public campaigns and the behind-the-scenes 
rhetorical maneuvering that helped give rise to Hoover’s own public image and 
political influence. This study also examines the normalization of an omnipotent and 
militarized FBI. Before discussing the specific scope of this project, a history of the 
FBI and J. Edgar Hoover will first be offered, followed by a discussion of the 
rhetorical presidency, domestic propaganda, and international relations paradigms. 
 
The Historical Rise of the FBI and Director Hoover 
 The early twentieth century represented a pivotal era for federal law 
enforcement. The Department of Justice (DOJ) was still in its formative years during 
the Theodore Roosevelt Presidency (1901-1909) when it developed an investigative 
agency that would become the FBI. From 1933 to 1953, the Bureau experienced an 
unprecedented expansion under the leadership of the director. The FBI’s public 
relations department—the Crime Records Division (CRD)—promoted Hoover’s 
leadership as a means for expanding the agency. The FBI was understood in many 




unknown federal agency and helped develop it into a major political and legal force in 
U.S. political culture. 
Expanding the FBI, 1933-1953 
 The succession of presidential administrations following Theodore Roosevelt 
brought with them the issuance of new executive orders, directives, and legislation 
that expanded the FBI’s jurisdiction, and consequently, its annual appropriations. The 
Bureau was born in a spirit of progressive reform, but was wielded at times as a tool 
of social control.11 From its inception in 1908 to the Harry S Truman administration 
and beyond, the FBI was frequently an undemocratic arm of the executive. The FBI 
developed rhetorical processes that adapted the agency’s public reputation to 
changing rhetorical contexts.  
 Attorney General S. Homer Cummings declared a War on Crime in 1933 that 
targeted Depression era gangsters. In 1934, Congress passed a series of legislation 
known as the Omnibus Crime Bill. Among many other powers, this legislation gave 
Bureau agents the jurisdiction to serve warrants and subpoenas, to make seizures and 
arrests, and to carry firearms.12 This legislation gave the Bureau jurisdiction over 
interstate crime, which began its rapid expansion of power. The War on Crime 
established the modern Federal Bureau of Investigation.13 The Bureau’s 
appropriations expanded from $2.77 million for 1933 to $6.57 million for 1939.14 
Though molded to fight gangsters in the early 1930s, the FBI soon became a weapon 
for fighting fascists and communists in the middle and later part of the decade.  
 The FDR administration built up the FBI through a series of directives, orders, 




and cultural crises. Hoover began cuttingback and concealing his intelligence 
gathering activities in 1924 after Attorney General Harlan F. Stone forbade the newly 
appointed FBI Director from engaging in such work. Though it had certainly never 
fully halted its activities, the Bureau’s intelligence operations reemerged and began 
expanding again in the mid-1930s.15 After making smaller—and sometimes 
political—requests, President Roosevelt ordered Hoover to trace-out a “broad 
picture” of the “general movement” of “Communists” and “Fascism” in “the country 
as a whole” in August 1936.16  The president circumvented congressional oversight 
by having Secretary of State Cordell Hull issue this request for him during that same 
month.17 Roosevelt believed that the secretary had such authority under a World War 
I era statute that was designed to give the State Department a quick response to 
German espionage.18 It was through this secret directive that the Bureau had 
jurisdiction to engage in domestic intelligence gathering for the next four decades. 
Yet, as Richard Gid Power observes, “that authorization was considerably augmented 
by additional presidential directives over the next few years.”19 For example, 
Roosevelt issued a directive on June 26, 1939, that centralized “all espionage, 
counterespionage, and sabotage matters” between the FBI, the Office of Military 
Intelligence (OMI), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).20 This increased the 
Bureau’s jurisdiction and appropriations as World War II and the subsequent Cold 
War commenced. 
The Bureau’s anti-communist mission treated social cleavages as evidence of 
an international conspiracy that was designed to pull apart the American fabric, 




suspected where instabilities were most visible, which created political implications 
for civil liberties, civil rights, organized labor, and anti-war activism.21 In 1941, the 
president expanded the Bureau’s operations to secure the entire Western hemisphere 
from fascist influences during the Second World War.22 This move militarized the 
agency and offered it an international focus for the Cold War era and beyond.23 
 Congress participated in increasing the FBI’s power as well. The legislature 
passed a series of wartime legislation to protect against military invasion and the 
possible development of Fifth Columns in the homeland. The term Fifth Column was 
coined during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) to discuss the movement of 
Nationalist forces. In this metaphor, external troop regiments represented “four 
columns” while secret subversive cells hiding inside society represented the “fifth 
column.”24 The sinister nature of Fifth Column subversion was accented by their 
secret coordination with external military forces. Accordingly, anti-subversive 
legislation called for the registration of foreign agents, 25 forbade federal employees 
from participating in “any political organization which advocate[d] the overthrow of 
our constitutional form of government,”26 outlawed advocating the overthrow of “the 
Government of the United States” by “force or violence,”27 and instituted a wartime 
draft.28 In addition to protecting the government from Nazi and communist infiltration 
and preparing it for war, Congress also authorized the seizure of industries threatened 
by strikes, and forbade labor unions from contributing to political campaigns for 
federal office.29 These laws, orders, and directives expanded the FBI’s jurisdiction. Its 




Remarkably, this growth represented a small fraction of the Bureau’s development 
under Hoover’s tenure. 
 The FBI expanded at an even faster rate in the post-war era. Because 
communist infiltration was believed to thrive in places that exhibited un-American 
tendencies, government planners sought to seal the American perimeter from such 
outside threats. And, because social change and protest were often perceived as un-
patriotic, the FBI was charged with controlling, dissolving, or containing counter-
cultural ideologies and reform movements. For this task, the FBI was offered wide 
jurisdiction over American life and received appropriations to match.  
 America’s prime perception of international threat transitioned from fascism 
to international communism, or “red fascism,” in the post-war years. Fears of 
subversion that were previously associated with academia, religion, labor, the media, 
the federal government, and the defense establishment transferred from the fascist 
Fifth Column to its communist successor after the commencement  of World War II. 
Labor unions operating in defense plants were especially suspected of harboring 
foreign loyalties, which aligned anti-communists in government and in industry. This 
view assumed that organized labor was a powerful Fifth Column that was sometimes 
controlled by either Berlin or Moscow, and other times controlled by both. Anti-
communists, therefore, feared that foreign propagandists were “duping” Americans 
into leaving the nation vulnerable to military invasion.31          
 Increased perceptions of threat were accompanied by legislation that further 
directed the FBI to contain domestic communism. The predominant fear in the late 




commissioned the FBI to investigate all military contractors involved in atomic 
intelligence,32 and the president ordered a “loyalty investigation of every person 
entering the civilian employment of any department or agency of the executive 
branch of the federal government.”33 Union leaders were required by law to file 
affidavits declaring that they were not communists; unions were also prohibited from 
engaging in strikes that affected commerce; this legislation also authorized 
government strikebreaking.34 Concurrently, the federal government issued policies to 
promote U.S. interests worldwide through force and diplomacy, including the 
containment of international Soviet expansionism.35 Federal planners established the 
National Security Council (NSC) in 1947, which included an advisory role for the 
DOJ and the FBI by 1949.36  
 Furthermore, the government weakened constitutional commitments to civil 
liberties and civil rights. It mandated registration of communist organizations and 
commissioned government investigations of un-American activities; its scope also 
included the investigations of alleged homosexuality among government workers.37 
Passed months after the country’s entrance into the Korean conflict, the Internal 
Security Act (ISA) of September 23, 1950, amalgamated “scores of anti-communist 
bills . . . [and] gave the government unprecedented authority to restrict civil liberties, 
including the authority to round up people and detain them in camps in a national 
emergency,” observes Albert Fried.38  
 The Emergency Detention Act was a component part of the ISA, which 
authorized the apprehension and detention of communists in event of an “Internal 




who “probably [would] conspire with others to engage in . . . acts of espionage or of 
sabotage.” A president could do so in the event of an invasion by a foreign entity, 
declaration of war by the U.S. Congress, or insurrection “within the United States in 
aid of a foreign enemy.” The act also relieved the government from having to reveal 
the “identity or evidence of Government agents” in proceedings against 
“detainees.”39 This latitude, of course, followed the pattern of round-ups and 
internment that was characteristic of both world wars.  
 The legislative context of the early 1950s represented the zenith of the FBI’s 
statute authority under Director Hoover. The Bureau’s annual appropriation expanded 
from $44.19 million for 1945 to $84.40 million for 1953.40 Additionally, the FBI’s 
public support was near its twentieth-century peak as the country’s attention centered 
on international communism, domestic subversion, and nuclear war.  
The scope of this project centers on Director Hoover’s service under 
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman from 1933 to 1953. The role of the FBI during 
these two presidencies offers a striking contrast. Hoover enhanced FDR’s public 
support, but challenged the credibility and patriotism of Truman and his 
administration. The ever- expanding role of the FBI was linked to the evolution of 
Hoover’s own career as the country’s chief law enforcement agent. 
The Director 
J. Edgar Hoover nurtured relationships with the press. Such support 
represented an integral strategy in the rise of the FBI after Hoover was its appointed 
director in 1924.  He negotiated a mutually beneficial arrangement with Washington 




the Bureau gained positive press coverage in return.41  These relationships prepared 
the director for the 1930s, when the modern FBI began its operation. Hoover used the 
press to champion his role in combating what he called a “crime army” that composed 
the “underworld.”42   
 Attorney General Cummings’s War on Crime offered Hoover a pretext for 
expanding the FBI’s information system. The Publications Section was created in 
1935. It gave Assistant Director Clyde Tolson his own assistant who would focus 
primarily upon the FBI’s mass media coordination. This section quickly expanded. It 
originally included correspondence, library, publications, and publicity units when it 
was combined with the Research Division in July 1936; the section then gained 
control of the crime statistics unit. This entity officially became the Crime Records 
Division (CRD) in September 1938. This infrastructure accelerated a domestic 
propaganda operation that began in 1930.43  
  The director appointed Assistant Director Louis B. Nichols to head the 
division in 1936; it was his job to transform the FBI’s law enforcement movements 
into a series of interconnected rhetorical campaigns that celebrated Hoover’s 
leadership.44 Nichols promoted the Bureau and its director through networking with 
journalists, public relations counselors, and press agents. The FBI relentlessly 
coordinated with mass media representatives to  help in the production of films, radio 
and television programs, and books as well as newspaper, magazine, and scholarly 
journal articles and more. The CRD ghost wrote articles that carried Hoover's 
signature, leaked material to the press, and granted Bureau access to privileged 




then publicized Hoover’s subsequent campaigns. These texts were approved by 
Hoover and sought to champion his leadership, law enforcement activities, and his 
own political views.   
 While Hoover would use the CRD to promote his professional stature, he also 
used radio personality and columnist Walter Winchell to invent and circulate a 
heterosexual identity for him in the mid-1930s. Because Hoover lacked a known 
romantic relationship (with a woman) and lived with his mother, rumors circulated 
that he was homosexual. Winchell helped Hoover and Clyde Tolson, his Assistant 
Director (1930-1936), Assistant to the Director (1936-1947), and Associate Director 
(1947-1972), who was speculated to be his partner, pass as straight by presenting 
them as committed bachelors in the 1930s.46 On this stage, Winchell hinted at 
romantic liaisons with starlets they met and with whom they were photographed.47 
The director bolstered this heterosexual image by declaring a campaign against 
homosexuals or “sex-fiends,” which “placed him in the spotlight, but, ironically, and 
strategically, beyond the pale of speculation,” observes Charles E. Morris.48 Hoover’s 
relationship with Tolson was only one of his many secret arrangements. 
 President Roosevelt welcomed Hoover into his inner sanctum in the mid-
1930s when he first invited Hoover to collect political intelligence for the 
administration. FDR requested information on American Nazis in 1934, on his critics 
in 1935, and on subversive movements more generally in 1936.49 In 1940, Hoover 
instituted the Custodial Detention Program, which was a system for rounding-up and 
detaining Americans who were allegedly subversive in the event of an emergency.50 




Index; rather than canceling the list, the director renamed it the “Internal Security 
Index.”51 The existence of the Index would remain illegal until the passage of the 
Emergency Detention Act in 1950, which legalized the warrantless apprehension and 
detention of communists in event of a security crisis.52 FDR drastically expanded the 
power of Hoover and the FBI through secret directives that were unmonitored by 
Congress. This power was further complemented by the director’s public promotion 
of his wartime agency.    
  The Crime Record Division publicized the FBI’s role in the Roosevelt 
administration as combating the Axis powers at home. Powers suggests that the 
director’s “primary goal during the war was to prevent the kind of mass hysteria that 
had blighted the home front during World War I.” Beyond this more narrow mission, 
Hoover used this opportunity to advertise his militaristic leadership in wartime. He 
strategically targeted his audiences with messages through various channels of 
communication in which he celebrated the Bureau’s triumphs.53  
In addition to building public support through propaganda, he also built 
budgetary support for the Bureau through an illegal relationship with his 
congressional overseers.54 In 1943, for example, Representative Clarence Cannon (D-
MS), the Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, requested that 
Hoover lend FBI agents to the committee to investigate the needs of departments 
requesting appropriations. Though President Roosevelt and Attorney General Francis 
Biddle forbade this relationship, Hoover and Cannon established an operational 
interdependence between the Bureau and one of its few oversight committees. In the 




AZ), followed Cannon’s lead and also began borrowing agents from Hoover to 
investigate other departments.55 This practice would last at least until the end of 
Hoover’s career in 1972. The director developed friendly relations with members of 
Congress at a time when his relationship with President Truman was deteriorating. 
 Hoover had to operate under a president who rejected the democratic 
legitimacy of the FBI following the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945. In the 
early years of the Cold War, and during a series of high profile Soviet spy 
investigations that revealed government penetration and theft of atomic secrets, the 
Bureau assumed that armed (and possibly nuclear) conflict with the Soviet Union was 
inevitable.56 President Truman, however, calculated threat levels differently and 
largely ignored the Bureau’s many warnings of espionage and sabotage in the defense 
industry and the State Department.57  
 The director responded to this slight by transferring his support from the 
president to HUAC, and fueled an anti-communist coalition in Washington that 
included members of the Democratic and Republican parties, business community, 
and the military establishment who were inside and outside of the administration.58 
Though they sought different ends, they worked together to usher in a post-war anti-
communist worldview in Washington59  
The split between Truman and Hoover was symbolic of the growing 
ideological division between idealists and realists, as some academics, minority 
groups, and New Dealers championed civil liberties, civil rights, and the 
redistribution of wealth as ends in themselves.60 Hoover’s coalition paid dividends as 




president and prioritized security measures over civil liberties. Under the advice of 
Navy Secretary James Forrestal and National War College Lecturer George F. 
Kennan, and under pressure from Congress and the FBI, the president’s 
administration formulated the Truman Doctrine and initiated the Loyalty Program. 
These policies signaled a clear position on international communism which ultimately 
weakened Truman’s control over domestic security planning. Truman’s own policy 
decisions helped build public opinion against his former commitment to idealism in 
foreign affairs strategizing and undermined his movement against Hoover’s coercive 
tactics.  
The director’s long list of formidable political opponents illustrates not just 
his power, but also his adeptness at rhetorical adaptation. During the War on Crime, 
Hoover focused his rhetorical strategizing against Sanford Bates, Director of the 
Bureau of Prisons. Hoover used the vermin metaphor—which had already been 
popularized by pulp fiction writers—to discredit Bates and other opponents.  While 
maintaining rhetorical continuity between his campaigns, the director continuously 
evolved his emphases and adapted to various situations. Hoover, Tolson, and Nichols 
strategically packaged the FBI for a number of Washington elites, including members 
of the U.S. Congress and the executive, who in turn used the FBI to strengthen their 
own rhetorical standing. The FBI’s planning reinforced FDR’s rhetorical presidency 
during the Depression and World War II. In the post-war era, however, Truman’s 
rhetorical leadership was complicated by the FBI’s efforts to help create an 




Many of Hoover’s contemporaries identified his belief system as a form of 
American fascism. Prominent civil liberties activist Alan Barth, for example, coined 
the term “Americanist” in 1951 to identify members of a “group” that was “guilty” of 
the “gravest and most dangerous form of disloyalty to the United States.” According 
to Barth, Americanists were “disloyal to the principles and purposes” that composed 
the “genius of the American society.” He suggested that their “disloyalty” impaired 
“national security more seriously than the comparable disloyalty of the Communists.” 
He feared that their vision of Americanism was “more deeply subversive” and struck 
“more injuriously at the real roots of loyalty and of American strength.” He warned 
that the Americanists “would meet the threat of communism” by substituting the 
“Communist techniques for the techniques of freedom” in America. Barth concluded 
that the “Americanists,” intentionally or otherwise, aimed at “overthrowing the 
essential values which that government was instituted to secure.”61 The term implied 
that Hoover’s militant strand of super-patriotism became subversive when it turned 
against democratic values—strategies with deep roots in the history of U.S. 
propaganda. The ideological threat posed by Americanists was compounded by the 
Americanists’ combinations of rhetorical and institutional strategizing.   
  
Domestic Propaganda and International Relations 
 President Woodrow Wilson refashioned the rhetorical presidency beyond the 
scope set by President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s practice of the rhetorical 
presidency would also be an extension of an earlier project launched by President 




Princeton University, Wilson invited his academic colleagues to prepare the nation 
for battle and design a post-war international environment that moved America 
beyond its isolationist traditions. As a leading intellectual during the progressive era, 
Wilson recognized the rhetorical opportunities made available through the spread of 
mass media and the growing field of public relations, which aligned theoretical 
research with the communication strategies of the U.S. government. Public opinion 
scholarship helped develop tactics for governments, democratic and otherwise, to 
build and maintain consensus through what Walter Lippmann labeled “the 
manufacture of consent,” more controversially known as propaganda.62 President 
Wilson’s pursuit of internationalism also pushed the academy to examine 
international relations (IR), which established further connections between 
government planners and academicians.  
Though IR was born in a progressive spirit, it would ultimately become a 
domain of thought that attacked progressivism as a communist plot. Hoover and the 
FBI benefited from both the growth of public relations and international relations 
strategizing. The FBI director developed expertise in public relations and opinion 
formation, learning how to package the FBI as a solution to international threats. This 
bolstered the influence of the director and his institution in an era of propaganda 
development and research.  
Domestic Propaganda 
 The post-World War I era witnessed a boom in the sophistication of 
propaganda techniques that elevated the role of the political science discipline in the 




academic community. Writing in the wake of the Red Scare and the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI), intellectuals rethought the contours of government and 
industry in a political environment susceptible to organized persuasion.63  
Walter Lippmann helped lead the discussion with his writing on the nature of 
propaganda and democracy. He argued that leaders had learned to manipulate 
symbols to deliberately misrepresent the social world through mass communication, 
which placed a “premium upon the manufacture of what is usually called consent.” 
He first discussed the failure of the press to protect the nation from government 
propaganda during the war, noting that this failure was a part of the executive’s 
expansion of power. In an early reflection upon the enhanced power of the 
presidency, he stated that “decisions in the modern state tend to be made by the 
interaction, not of Congress and the executive, but of public opinion and the 
executive . . . Government tends to operate by the impact of controlled opinion upon 
[policy] administration.”64 His contributions to social psychology in terms of crowd 
opinion formation, however, were more far reaching. 
Lippmann articulated a theoretical design by which government planners 
could manipulate public opinion based on censorship and propaganda.65 While 
censorship blocked the transmission of undesirable meaning by oppositional forces, 
propaganda was designed to infuse publics with beliefs, attitudes, and emotions 
helpful to political agendas. Lippmann’s assumptions were grounded in a hierarchical 
understanding of public influence, as he believed “symbols” were “planted in 
people’s minds by another human being whom we recognize as authoritative.”66 He 




revolution. Lippmann’s theoretical discussion was expanded by the father of public 
relations, Edward L Bernays, who was interested in formalizing systems of public 
opinion management. 
Bernays was a former press agent and veteran of the CPI’s Foreign Press 
Bureau. Sigmund Freud was his uncle. The nephew applied Freud’s work to shape 
mass opinion.67 Bernays was an anti-communist committed to serving business 
interests and was troubled by social reformers who demanded accountability from 
business and government.68 As an atheist who believed the nation was turning from 
its religious heritage, he feared societal collapse and chaos. Therefore, he saw the role 
of public relations counsels as “creating man-made gods who could assert subtle 
social control and prevent disaster,” observes Marvin N. Olasky .69 He advocated 
consolidating the existing power of those who already held leadership positions in 
business and politics through covertly manipulating the perceptions of publics 
without their consent.70 
 Writing from this unabashed perspective, Bernays’ major works became 
resources for leaders interested in maintaining and expanding their power.71 He 
explained that in an age of greater heterogeneity, public relations counsels were 
necessary for building agreement among dissimilar groups.72 Bernays suggested that 
those who manipulated opinions in a democratic society represented “an invisible 
government which [was] the true ruling power of our country . . . It [was] they who 
pull the wires which control the public mind, who harness old social forces and 
contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.”73 He advised and organized front 




Hoover in 1932; his work would become a resource for J. Edgar Hoover’s own FBI 
campaigns.74 Similar perspectives were championed by Bernays’ contemporaries who 
shared his commitments to rhetorics of social control.  
The assistance of public relations counselors was obviously valued by 
presidential administrations throughout the 1920s and 1930s. President Hoover 
instituted the Office of White House Press Secretary in 1929. Will Irwin, former CPI 
member turned public relations counselor turned propaganda analyst, observed in 
1936 that FDR established press offices in each of his executive agencies. These 
offices propelled New Deal federal expansionism by advertising FDR’s leadership to 
targeted audiences. Henry Suydam, another CPI veteran, and Irwin were hired to 
promote the DOJ.75  
President Roosevelt’s move to publicize the executive branch created further 
dilemmas for the democratic nation. Suydam would become both an ally and 
competitor of Assistant Director Louis Nichols as Hoover vied with the attorney 
general over credit for the War on Crime. Roosevelt’s interest in securing consent for 
his expanding federal Bureaucracy led James L. McCamy to warn in 1939 that 
publicity seeking offered political leaders the opportunity to enhance and secure their 
prestige as they proclaimed their own virtue and concealed their mistakes from public 
view. McCamy charged that such covert practices would enslave the citizenry to petty 
bureaucrats who would control their own media coverage, helping them to secure the 
consent of the U.S. people on both domestic and international issues.76 In this era of 
public opinion formation, the proliferation of international relations paradigms also 




Idealism and the International Community 
 In addition to his experimentation with public opinion management, President 
Wilson’s ties to academia also helped infuse America’s earliest internationalist 
policies with progressive ideals. Shortly after he led the nation in the “war to end all 
wars,” the president commissioned a group of leading intellectuals known as the 
“Inquiry” to explore how lasting peace might be achieved.77 Wilson valued them as 
his personal staff of international advisors.78 This esteemed group helped lay the 
foundation for his Fourteen Points, which became the blueprint for the idealist 
consensus. 
 The Inquiry’s prestige was perhaps most noticeable at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919. Group members assisted in drafting the Treaty of Versailles and 
in formulating the League of Nations. In the wake of communist revolutions across 
Eastern Europe, it was then charged with highlighting international democracy as a 
preferred alternative to Vladimir Lenin’s international communism. The necessities of 
the international popularity contest pressed the Inquiry to envision a perspective that 
was far more embracing of cultural pluralism than was America writ large. 
Additionally, the Inquiry weakened the control of industrialists when it pressed for 
the creation of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to protect workers.79 
Among other initiatives, the ILO outlawed child labor and established the eight hour 
work day.80 The organization’s mission faced resistance, however, because such 
regulations were viewed as state (rather than federal) issues. Government connections 
with unions were feared to serve as gateways to socialism, and labor protections and 




After the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the League of 
Nations, influential idealist coalitions rallied to build public opinion in favor of the 
League while working to discredit isolationist commitments.82 Wealthy peace 
organizations globally championed the cause.83 They published books, articles, 
bulletins, and magazines (e.g., Foreign Affairs) that discussed issues of war and 
peace.  
The organizations also used academia. They created universities, academic 
departments, centers, and clubs devoted to the exploration of IR based on 
international law. Academics, however, gave little attention to “whatever scant 
theoretical work [that] may have appeared, nor to what may be called disciplinary 
development. The object was to educate the business, financial, and legal elites, not 
academics,” observes William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom.84 Ultimately, their goal 
was to build public opinion in favor of the League of Nations, the World Court, the 
arbitration of international disputes, free trade, peace treaties, and collective 
security.85 
 Specific strands of progressive thought permeated idealism. William T.R. Fox 
explains that progressives associated peace with government and war with power 
politics. They also believed that an “underlying harmony of interest” between nations 
could be established through education and good will.86 Michael Joseph Smith 
explains that intellectual activists like Idealist IR scholar James T. Shotwell assumed 
“that the danger facing the world required scholars to take the lead in applying sound 
academic and scientific principles to recurring problems of national and international 




International public opinion making was supposed to prevent further outbreaks of 
war.     
 Idealists inside and out of government pushed for American involvement in 
non-aggression pacts. This outlawry of war reinforced an international “covenant” 
between nations that was championed by President Wilson and realized by the 
League of Nations. In 1926, Secretary of State Frank Billings Kellogg accepted an 
invitation to participate in the League Council’s Preparatory Commission to discuss 
international disarmament; Congress appropriated $50,000 for the commission and 
President Coolidge appointed Allen W. Dulles to head the delegation.88 Further, in 
1928, the Secretary of State signed the Pact of Paris, which renounced war as an 
instrument of national policy.89 The Senate ratified the Pact in January 1929, which 
was widely popular at the time.90 And, on July 25, President Hoover activated the 
Pact. That same day, the American and British navies announced the slowdown of 
war-vessel production. The New York Times called this turn of events “the most 
embracing world agreement to abolish war.”91 
 Idealism rested upon progressive assumptions that borrowed from nineteenth-
century liberal political theory. As an enlightenment project, idealism had faith in the 
rationality and basic goodness of peoples, the existence of an underlying harmony of 
interests operating between nations, and that of an absolute form of justice.92 These 
ideas comprised the cornerstone of IR during the interwar period, and they invited 
conclusions that called for unifying communities on domestic and international 




 Idealism’s faith in human rationality and fundamental goodness placed a 
premium on public opinion and democracy. It suggested that proper authority 
depended on the informed consent of the governed. Educated citizens of the world 
were seen as using reason to define their local community’s interests in accord with 
the world community’s common interests.93 This belief, then, viewed informed public 
opinion as a power that could direct foreign policies and actions of nation-states that 
existed in an otherwise anarchic global arena.94 Idealism equated the spread of 
democracy with the spread of peace, because informed citizens were thought to elect 
leaders who prioritized peacekeeping.95  
  Idealism sought to make government more accessible to the citizenry so that 
rationality and public opinion could influence nation-states at the domestic and 
international levels. The ideology’s insistence on democracy influenced the internal 
order of nation-states themselves. Idealism called for “democratic domestic 
institutions” that would be responsive to public opinion, explains Charles W. Kegley 
and Eugene R. Wittkopf .96  
 Idealism was undergirded by eighteenth century presuppositions. E.H. Carr, 
for example, suggested that this perspective rested upon “the doctrine of the harmony 
of interests.” Idealism conceptualized the harmony in morality terms, and claimed 
that cooperative society was more secure than competitive society. Such harmony 
was also envisioned by idealism as a means to promote the interest of good and 
rational peoples in peace. Believing that there were no major conflicts of interest 
between states or within domestic society, idealism understood the harmony of 




lens, all peoples were seen as having a rational and common interest that formed a 
peaceful community and which could “be established under the proper conditions.”98 
This made criminal justice philosophy an interest of idealism, which would soon 
thereafter also be a concern for realism as the course of IR developed.99 
 Searching for these conditions intertwined notions of democracy and 
idealism’s faith in justice, as the local and global communities were to become 
inclusive of all.100 According to Trevor Taylor, idealism accepted morality as “not 
something bound by culture or time but [was] thought to be absolute and 
universal.”101 This implied “breaking down distinctions between in-groups and out-
groups,” and creating relationships based on reciprocal obligations, mutual self-
interest, loyalty, and moral obligation, explains Ken Booth.102 Under this principle, 
the CPUSA had gained sixty-six thousand registered members and possible more than 
half a million sympathizers by 1939.103   
   The underlying value of idealism was progress, which was the 
enlightenment’s faith in “advancing civilization” through reason.104 Advancement 
was defined in terms of peace and was thought to come about through the goodness 
of human nature and the scientific study of war and peace. Idealism sought to 
refashion values and relationships between the citizen and the state as well as 
between the state and the international community. Shotwell observed in 1929 that 
political idealism sought to “substitute for ruthless competition some measure of 
cooperation, so that each member of the community of nations may have a larger 
share in an increasing common good.”105 The Wilsonian political vision included a 




the re-conceptualization of geo-political borders to coincide with nationalities, and 
the formation of a “general association of nations” to draw “covenants for the purpose 
of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to 
great and small states alike.”106 His vision, however, did not emphasize enforcement 
mechanisms for ensuring international stability.  
 The rise of fascism eclipsed that of idealism. After the League found Japan 
guilty of aggression for invading Manchuria in 1933, the Japanese government 
withdrew from the League rather than agreeing to arbitration.  Shotwell described this 
movement as “the twilight of the long day that began with the Paris Peace 
Conference. It was also the ominous foreshadowing of World War II.” Germany 
withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League seven months later; Italy 
openly moved toward war with Ethiopia. Instead of engaging in collective security, 
the U.S. Congress strengthened neutrality laws and Great Britain supplied Italy with 
resources for war.107 Such isolationism and appeasement would later be blamed for 
the rise of the Axis powers. A new international relations paradigm was sought after 
to better capture the “reality” of foreign affairs.  
Realism and the International Threat 
The general failure of the League and international law to maintain order 
raised skepticism about the feasibility of idealism.108 The philosophy was shunned by 
many because of its inability to subdue the early rise of the Axis powers.109 E.H. Carr 
suggested that in the idealist vision of IR, “wishing prevailed over thinking” and that 
the outbreak of war “revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration” as the foundation of 




to correct the “wish-dreams of [its] initial stage.” As an alternative, he explained that 
realism emphasized the “irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable 
character of existing tendencies,” and insisted on the adaptation of oneself to “those 
forces and their tendencies.”110 In short, Carr encouraged a “realist” philosophy of IR 
that engaged the existing international environment on its own terms, rather than 
trying to improve upon it.111 In contrast to idealism, realism posited that “power 
politics” was “rooted in the lust for power which [was] common to all men” and was 
therefore “inseparable from social life itself,” observed Hans J. Morgenthau.112 This 
placed the accumulation and maintenance of power at the center of international 
politics and government affairs, trumping even constitutional order when necessary.   
The progression of realism from an IR perspective to an academic paradigm 
that dominated U.S. foreign policy following World War II was in large measure a 
response to the international Soviet challenge to capitalism. In February 1946, a 
virtually unknown State Department employee stationed in Moscow named George F. 
Kennan delivered an interpretive essay on Joseph Stalin’s “February Election 
Speech.” The premier’s address hailed the superiority of the socialist system to that of 
the capitalist, and predicted the eventual victory of socialism over capitalism.113 
Known as the Long Telegram, Kennan’s report was excitedly received by officials in 
Washington.114  
President Truman took office during the Soviet Union’s hostile acquisition of 
Eastern Europe, and at a time of nuclear espionage in the United States. In this 
context, explains Paul A. Chilton, the Truman administration sought to “construct a 




planning.” The administration’s thinking was guided by the presumed failure of 
appeasement, and was thus predisposed to promote an appearance of toughness and a 
desire for international trade.115 Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko conclude that the 
“United States’ ultimate objective at the end of World War II was both to sustain and 
reform world capitalism.” A part of the reconstruction effort was to make trading 
partnerships throughout the global community and thereby prevent another world-
wide depression. Somewhat idealistically, the administration believed that a strong 
international economy would make for a more peaceful world order.116   
Kennan’s report gained prominence and momentum as it circulated through a 
communication network that sought to define the post-war national and international 
orders. The diplomat’s response to Stalin “called for an open declaration of separate 
spheres of influence,” suggests Walter L. Hixson .117 In this containment logic, 
capitalism and socialism would dominate their respective spheres, rather than having 
to compete within a single economic system.  Kennan’s justification created a new 
rhetorical vision of international life based upon a Nazi-Soviet analogy. Keith L. 
Shimko explains that a “Munich analogy was invoked” by many “policymakers” 
because of a “belief that Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany shared some basic 
characteristics—such as an undemocratic domestic political structure, an anti-liberal 
ideology, a desire to expand their influence, and substantial military power.”118 
Facing a threat as terrifying as Hitler, again, justified militarizing U.S. foreign policy 
in peacetime. This rational was manifest in the growing Washington worldview.   
 Twentieth century notions of realism rested upon assumptions of state power 




sought “power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends,” and they were 
seen as “the key units of action.”119 These assumptions had lasting ramifications for 
domestic law enforcement.  
 Realism was predominantly concerned with the role of power in international 
relations, which was considered the “national interest.”120  This focus underscored an 
agreement with idealism that the international scene was marked by anarchy; at the 
same time, however, it concluded that order could only be maintained through 
balancing international powers. Contrasting the belief that human nature was 
ultimately good, realism assumed human nature to be evil or self-destructive, thus in 
need of control.121 Maintaining domestic and international order through restraint was 
sought through military preparedness. 
 The national interest, then, was defined in terms of national security, which 
was secured through force.122 Political realist Hans J. Morgenthau suggested that the 
protection of the nation-state’s interior and exterior was considered “the last word in 
world politics,” and was thus the paramount objective of national policy. Power was 
used to promote the national interest in the “face of possible usurpation” from “ethnic 
and economic” citizen groups, by spies and traitors working on behalf of foreign 
governments, and by “religious bodies and international organizations.”123 The FBI 
was responsible for monitoring these groups to ensure their loyalty and to contain 
potentially disloyal influences over the system. 
 Order was thus preserved by maximizing military capabilities and 
efficiency.124 Realism integrated notions of security, preparedness, and peace. The 




of retaliation, thus centralizing deterrence as the central component of national 
security policy. Maximizing military strength then became the duty of the 
commander-in-chief.125 In this militarization of domestic life, all government 
agencies at all levels were expected to help maintain law and order.126 For the FBI, 
this meant consensus making and social control.  
 Preventing the world from falling into chaos was seen as the highest moral 
purpose of power by realists.127 Order depended on force, which made the application 
of force more of an amoral phenomenon. That is, the morality of coercion then 
depended on the intent behind the force.128 Realists viewed moral rules as culturally 
bound. This meant that morality was not a universally definable or applicable concept 
in IR; consequently, a nation’s moral structure could be refashioned as conditions 
warranted.129 According to the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, these ideas led the 
post-war FBI to maintain what Assistant Director William C. Sullivan called a “‘war 
psychology’” that discounted questions of legality, lawfulness, or ethics during the 
Cold War.130     
 Power in policy formation was actualized in terms of access and influence. 
Realists concurred with Harold D. Lasswell’s 1930 assessment that members of the 
general public were “poor judges of their own interests” and, therefore, needed to be 
governed by an elite governing class.131 The citizenry was conceptualized as, in 
Walter Lippmann’s terminology, a “bewildered herd” that ought to be treated as 
“spectators” rather than “actors” in public affairs.132 Because the “average man” was 




illusion” that the state was democratically controlled, posited Reinhold Niebuhr.133 
The state presumably best understood the nexus of military and economic interests, 
and made decisions based on expanding both. Such assumptions minimized the role 
of the citizen in governing and further marginalized the potential of dissent.      
 Realism’s state-centrism transformed the role of justice to the maintenance of 
order. Unlike idealism, realism understood justice as subjectively constructed, and 
thus impossible to obtain absolutely in a heterogeneous society or in an international 
environment. Thus, it valued order instead, which was a tangible goal for government 
institutions that also reinforced the primacy of the state.134 Realism held that the role 
of the criminal justice system, then, was ultimately to preserve the state’s political 
institutions, which placed law enforcement institutions above the very code of law 
they were entrusted to enforce.   
 The state, therefore, was expected to promote its interests by abandoning 
values (e.g., civil liberties) that constrained its power. Herz observed, for example, 
that realism frequently found “itself unable to advocate over-all principles that [were] 
applicable everywhere, but [had to] modify its policies according to concrete 
situations.” Realists recognized that the national interest may sometimes have to take 
precedent over the established rule of law, as strict observance could allow for 
“corrupt purposes or to further the aims of political groups.”135 Under this 
assumption, American liberals and progressives lacked sufficient representation as 
most Democrats and Republicans alike abandoned commitments to constitutional 




overlooked covert FBI programs that engaged in illegal bugging, wiretapping, mail 
opening, and surreptitious entry.136    
 Unlike idealism’s faith in criminal rehabilitation, realism recognized law 
enforcement institutions as a means to neutralize oppositional groups. It was thus 
“inclined to advocate the readoption of the ‘classical’ system of dealing with the 
criminal by way of repression, utilizing punishment as a means of general 
deterrence,” explained Herz.137 In this manner, “political groups” were expected to be 
silenced by state institutions through the use of force as necessary. This mission was 
evident in the FBI’s consistent position against probation, parole, and pardon. Instead, 
the FBI championed modes of containment, including imprisonment, blacklisting, 
torture, and execution. 
Post-war realism thus viewed the world as a bipolar struggle between super 
powers. Both blocs, realism suggested, sought to expand their power to maximize 
their security. As such, they organized the nation-state to make offensive and 
defensive measures more efficient. This arrangement promoted institutions and values 
to keep the domestic sphere safe from internal and external infiltration.    
The post-war international economy planned by Roosevelt and Truman 
assumed new implications in the Cold War context. Specifically, both the economy 
and the military needed to be as strong as possible to maintain or expand the Western 
bloc’s perimeter.138 If the exterior failed, the Eastern bloc could spread into the West, 
which could limit economic and military potential. This raised doubt about various 




Americanists in government worked to break labor union strength, cut New 
Deal social programs (including public infrastructure initiatives), and subsidized both 
military and industry instead. To accomplish this feat, government planners 
coordinated with business leaders to build public support for more realistic 
international strategizing.139 This commodification of foreign policy brought the role 
of media, propaganda, and censorship to the forefront of the Cold War.140 Noam 
Chomsky suggests that the FBI served as a “national political police” force that 
suppressed “independent politics and free speech, on the principle that the state [was] 
entitled to prevent improper thought and its expression.”141 Hoover coupled 
censorship strategizing with propaganda programs that mimicked totalitarian rhetoric. 
Tricia Starks observes that Lenin (1870-1924) relied on disease, vermin, parasite, and 
body metaphors to articulate the importance of purging capitalism and religion from 
Russian society for the purpose of purification. Additionally, German and “American 
elites” shortly thereafter “reified entire groups as cancers, vermin, or parasites,” 
Starks argues.142 Hoover’s rhetorical strategizing relied heavily upon this 
metaphorical blueprint to frame issues of citizenship and to promote political realism 
and anti-communism.   
The rhetorical presidency and public opinion management, therefore, 
represented an important combination of forces that popularized the competing 
international relations perspectives. Over time, idealism’s theory of an informed and 
engaged citizenry was balanced by realism’s theory of the “spectator” citizenry by 
Washington and Wall Street elites. J. Edgar Hoover came to power in this volatile 




opinion management. In such an explosive political environment, he worked within 
his institution to rhetorically adapt the FBI to keep it centered in the changing 
rhetorical contexts of the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold War.  
 
The Rhetorical Rise of Hoover’s FBI 
This project examines the rhetorical adaptation of Hoover and the FBI during 
this turbulent time at home and abroad, featuring the FBI’s public campaigns against 
crime (1933-1939), the axis powers (1939-1945), and communism (1945-1953). The 
War on Crime is contextualized within the progressive era, which included idealist 
notions of scientific progress that sought the rehabilitation of criminals and the 
curtailment of criminal activity through proactive social programming. The domestic 
campaign against the Fifth Column is situated in World War II, when idealists and 
realists competed over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. And, the movement 
against Red Fascism is located in the post-war period, which promoted the 
prioritization of the nation’s security over the civil rights of its citizens.    
 This project functions as a public address study that places the FBI’s public 
campaigns from 1933-1953 in their complex domestic and international contexts. 
This post-realist study examines the rhetorical rise of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI. 
Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman observe that the post-realism perspective begins 
“with the investigation of realism as a language and end[s] with judgments in terms of 
any of the ideological, ethical, or other considerations that the realist would rule 
out.”143 Accordingly, the study concludes with such judgments about Hoover’s rise to 




More specifically, the project seeks to answer two research questions 
regarding Hoover’s elevation through his use of public campaigns. First, the study 
will examine how the IR paradigms of idealism and realism were manifest in 
Hoover’s and the FBI’s public campaigns from 1933 to 1953, with a focus on the role 
of language, power, and public opinion management in the pursuit of rhetorical 
adaptation and control. Second, this project seeks to understand how Hoover used the 
FBI to at once bolster one presidential administration’s rhetorical presidency 
(Franklin D. Roosevelt’s) through the War on Crime and the wartime campaign 
against Fifth Columns, while manipulating the rhetorical presidency of another 
(Harry Truman) by inhibiting its commitment to civil liberties and by pressuring the 
administration to strengthen its anti-communist sentiments.  
 To address these questions, primary source material from a variety of archives 
was examined. This research assessed the behind-the-scenes strategies that 
accompanied the public discourse of Director Hoover and Presidents Roosevelt and 
Truman. Such private papers help to offer a broader understanding of the motives and 
collusions of power that were instrumental to the public campaigns involving 
Hoover’s FBI. Ronald H. Carpenter suggests that such archival research helps 
“explain what happened as a prelude to [public] discourse,” and it grounds “probable 
claims about rhetorical strategies and tactics . . . in more certain evidences,” observes 
Davis W. Houck .144 In surveying the archival documents, this project  examines 
correspondence between FBI leadership and Roosevelt and Truman, their attorneys 
general, and their press secretaries. More specifically, correspondences between the 




examined in conjunction with their more public statements.145 The project focuses on 
Hoover’s speeches before Congress and the press, as well as key presidential 
speeches from Roosevelt, Truman, and their predecessors that contributed to the 
rhetorical contexts in which Hoover operated. These contexts inform Hoover’s 
rhetorical selections as well as his meanings.   
This study utilizes metaphor and narrative theories to study the rhetoric of 
Hoover's public campaigns.146 In the process, the study recognizes discourse as a 
constitutive force of politics and political ideas, and examines the rhetorical strategies 
at work in the evolution of political meaning and political change.147 The study of 
discourse asks questions about “intent (understood as the rhetor’s motive for speaking 
or writing in a particular way), or strategy (understood as the match between the 
rhetor’s intent and the artistry displayed in the speech or message),” observes Martin 
J. Medhurst. It asks questions about “style (understood more as an aspect of argument 
than as a literary device; metaphors argue, they do not merely adorn), or argument,” 
which is understood as “inventional resources.” This discursive view acknowledges 
that “the ability to use symbols carries with it the power both to build and destroy.”148 
In assuming such a perspective, the study examines the manner in which symbols are 
deployed by government leaders to help shape the political landscape as it analyzes 
notions of language, ideology, and power. 
Propaganda scholarship also provides a framework for interpreting the FBI’s 
public campaigns. In his review of rhetorical studies on domestic propaganda, James 
J. Kimble identifies a “rough consensus” that accepts propaganda as possessing “three 




from an institutional source”— “mass distribution, and multiple iteration.” Kimble 
couples these features with an observation that the “primary animating force in 
domestic propaganda” is the portrayal of an “agonistic struggle” that pits an “an 
internal protagonist” against “an external antagonist” which creates an “antithetical 
view of the world.” These characteristics prescribe mindsets, norms, and behaviors 
that venerate national symbols and dehumanize alleged enemies as “some form of a 
threatening entity.” Kimble concludes that these “two tasks of domestic propaganda” 
work together to invite national audiences to “become part of the protagonist’s image 
and simultaneously” invites them to “repudiate the antagonist’s image.”149 The 
generative power of such symbolic arrangements compels the use of force in armed 
conflict because isolationism, neutrality, or appeasement is then considered a betrayal 
of the hero’s identity. 
Presidents, of course, typically possess unmatched power in the political 
decision making process—power that was enhanced with the rise of the rhetorical 
presidency. The historical rise of the rhetorical presidency was originally understood 
as a new doctrine of presidential leadership born in the early twentieth century, and 
credited to Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.150 Whereas 
Roosevelt was recognized for manipulating the national press to build public support 
for his initiatives, Wilson was celebrated for his use of oratory to create and maintain 
public opinion to pressure Congress into supporting his programs. Speaking directly 
to voting publics was a move away from the typical nineteenth-century practice of 
limiting presidential rhetoric to the governmental sphere and commissioning 




explains that nineteenth-century presidents did not seek or decline the office, and 
seldom “went public to mobilize public opinion in the manner we have come to 
expect of presidents.”152   
 Scholars disagree about the origins of the rhetorical presidency. Some argue 
that the presidency has always been rhetorical, and others suggest that President 
William McKinley was a pioneer of this rhetorical move to target the American 
people as a strategy of electoral politics and policy promotion.153 Further, current 
scholarship tends to focus on the public messages of presidents and fails to recognize 
the role of covert rhetorical practices by presidents and the U.S. media. This trend 
simultaneously celebrates the more democratic mode of direct appeal and ignores the 
less democratic means of propaganda. Shawn J. Parry-Giles suggests that “America’s 
commitment to a government-sponsored propaganda program not surprisingly 
parallels the rise of the rhetorical presidency,” both of which, she observes, “are 
traceable to the Wilson presidency.” Parry-Giles calls for expanding the traditional 
notions of the rhetorical presidency to include covert “discourse controlled by the 
executive branch” and disseminated by surrogates. She ultimately concludes that 
divorcing “covert messages from the rhetorical presidency is naïve and misreads the 
practice of presidential communication in this ‘age of secondary orality.’”154  
Also lacking in such scholarship is how the rhetorical presidency can be 
influenced and/or manipulated by subordinate government officials. Typically 
ignored are the behind-the-scenes political wrangling that help produce the public 
messages of the country's presidents. Presidents, thus, can be pressured by hostile 




public pronouncements that are counter to the president’s own political agenda. Such 
force carries the potential of wielding presidential authority against itself, as a 
president may be pressured to build public opinion against his own objectives. 
 Assumptions of the rhetorical presidency, thus, will help guide the 
examination of Hoover’s campaigns against crime and the axis powers, which 
ultimately reinforced Roosevelt’s handling of international relations during a period 
of heightened idealism and its subsequent decline. Conversely, understandings of the 
rhetorical presidency will help explore the ways in which Hoover worked publicly 
and privately to undermine the Truman administration’s handling of foreign affairs in 
the post-war years. Hoover then pressured the presidency to promulgate more hard-
line Americanist policies. The importance of foreign affairs to such domestic policy 
planning, however, necessitates the expansion of the critical lens beyond the 
rhetorical presidency to include prevalent paradigms of IR thought. Thus, this study 
also assumes a post-realist perspective as a means for understanding the U.S. 
government’s historical and competing commitments to idealism and realism.  
 
Précis of Chapters 
 J. Edgar Hoover launched and sustained a concerted domestic propaganda 
program that helped enhance his own political power and that adapted the FBI to 
changing domestic and international matters in a manner that mirrored the 
transitioning of U.S. foreign policy from idealism to realism. In the process, he 
promoted idealized conceptions of U.S. citizenship.  Hoover grounded his rhetoric of 




individualism, militarism, industrial capitalism, religious orthodoxy, and white 
supremacy with patriotism. Conversely, Hoover associated the New Deal’s emphasis 
on cooperation and progressivism with Un-Americanism, encouraging Americanists 
to view New Deal proponents as enemies of democracy.  
 Hoover entered law enforcement and U.S. politics during the early decades of 
the twentieth century—a time of increased use of public campaigns sponsored by the 
U.S. government and presidential administrations to alter public opinion on important 
policy matters. This period witnessed, for example, the country’s experimentation 
with domestic propaganda during World War I. Like Lenin before and Hitler 
concurrently, Hoover’s use of metaphor was predicated on a conspiratorial outlook 
that constructed the nation’s enemies as vermin, parasites, cancers, and termites to 
advance the need for their extermination and the homeland’s purification. Through 
his public campaigns, Hoover constructed a reality in which corruption and 
subversion were immutable elements of democratic life. Increasingly, Hoover’s 
tactics of threat and intimidation began to mimic the tactics of threat practiced by 
America’s enemies, moving the country closer to what many at the time conceived of 
as a police state. Hoover’s coupling of propaganda and coercive tactics ultimately 
helped him to rapidly expand the FBI and undermine his superiors and counterparts in 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.     
 Hoover’s public campaigns and the language that he employed reveal a long-
term movement to militarize American culture that ultimately helped to normalize the 





Hoover’s use of domestic propaganda, forms of censorship, and coercion coupled 
public persuasion campaigns with behind-the-scenes strategizing to associate his 
political opposition with the alleged enemy from inside and outside of the nation’s 
borders. He accomplished such ends by establishing a cooperative network between 
law enforcement and mass communication industries, especially film, radio, and the 
press.  In addition, he developed persuasive strategies for gaining acceptance of a 
federal law enforcement apparatus that used what many viewed, then as now, as 
unlawful methods to contain the spread of allegedly corrupt and subversive ideas. 
And, when necessary, Hoover would resort to censuring those who espoused what he 
viewed as incendiary ideas. In practice, this meant defining liberals, progressives, and 
political rivals as gangsters, Nazis, and communists in order to discredit and blacklist 
them and their ideas in very public ways.  
 In the process, Hoover mimicked and ultimately usurped the power of the 
bully pulpit during a period when the importance of propaganda and the role of public 
persuasion took on heightened importance. He aligned his own leadership of the FBI 
with President Roosevelt’s and President Truman’s public messages on crime control 
and domestic security. Hoover’s tactics were supported by Roosevelt and helped 
equip the presidency with a carefully orchestrated system for discrediting its 
opposition with accusations of public corruption and treason. While FDR benefited 
politically from building-up a secret police force that could discredit his 
administration’s opposition, Truman inherited a seasoned and cunning FBI director 
eager to use his entrenched power as head of the nation’s top law enforcement agency 




Hoover exploited the rise of political propaganda in WWI and its coupling with the 
expansiveness of the rhetorical presidency. He seemed to mimic both as he debuted 
his rhetorical strategies during the War on Crime, which also drew on a Nazi theme of 
extermination. 
 The long-term impact of Hoover’s protracted propaganda campaigns can be 
understood on multiple levels. First, his campaigns contributed to the balancing of 
realism for idealism as a key undercurrent of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold 
War. Hoover used the rhetorical context of the changing IR perspectives to build 
support for law and order as well as to present the FBI as the foremost cure for 
domestic crime, subversion, and social protest in the United States. Second, Hoover’s 
public campaigns built upon the framework established by President Woodrow 
Wilson for undermining the civil liberties of dissenting groups and extended such 
practices, at least, until the Nixon presidency. Finally, Hoover’s use of public 
campaigns and behind-the-scenes coercive actions helped cement his power as the 
FBI Director until his death in May 1972.  
 Chapter One first situates Hoover’s directorship within the context of the 
various statutes and directives that established the Office of the Attorney General at 
the nation’s founding, the creation of the Department of Justice in the Reconstruction 
era, and the formation of Bureau of Investigation in Progressive era. Throughout U.S. 
history, federal law enforcement had been charged with enforcing the boundaries of 
social protest as well as the nation’s racial composition. The DOJ’s authority to act in 
such regard emanated from specific pieces of federal legislation. This chapter also 




outgrowth of the movement toward scientific management in the federal government. 
Following World War I, propaganda would become a key tool utilized by Hoover and 
the DOJ to instigate Red Scares and to generate support for repressive tactics.  
 Chapter Two focuses on the formative stages of the FBI’s “propaganda” arm, 
the Crime Records Division, which was responsible for coordinating the Bureau’s 
rhetorical strategizing during the New Deal and for the remainder of Hoover’s career. 
Hoover staffed this office with journalists like Rex Collier and pulp fiction writers 
like Courtney Ryley Cooper. He also appointed an Assistant Director to administer 
the public campaign operations during the War on Crime. While American audiences 
were introduced to media-hyped outlaws, the CRD worked behind-the-scenes to 
associate Hoover’s opposition inside the DOJ with the high profile criminals that the 
department pursued. Specifically, the FBI used the vermin metaphor to envision a 
vast political-criminal conspiracy that maligned Bureau of Prisons Director Sanford 
Bates and his idealistic vision for criminal rehabilitation. Hoover’s domestic 
propaganda campaign helped coerce the DOJ to elevate the FBI over the Prison 
Bureau and to privilege militarism over more rehabilitative means of crime control.  
 Within this campaign, Hoover mimicked FDR’s rhetorical presidency, in part, 
by aligning his realist vision with the president’s own discourses on crime control. 
The CRD framed Hoover’s leadership style during the New Deal in terms of 
scientific management. In the backdrop of the Great Depression, the value of efficient 
public administration in the federal government was sometimes elevated above 
constitutional norms of governing. FDR provided Hoover with a rhetorical model to 




Federal Government Wage War on Crime and Gangsters,” for example, the president 
directed the DOJ to develop the necessary “public opinion” to make “gangster 
extermination” more “effective” and to make the corruption of “public officers” a 
more serious offense.155 Hoover used the vermin metaphor and the president’s own 
language to advance his realist vision over Bates’ more idealistic worldview. The 
metaphor helped Hoover to interpret and execute the president’s order in a more 
literal and militant manner, and to align prison reformers with the problem of public 
corruption. Hoover accented the vermin metaphor with the contagion metaphor. The 
practice of using notions of disease to inform more commonly used metaphors 
worked to maintain rhetorical continuity between Hoover’s public campaigns 
throughout his long career. Ultimately, the War on Crime functioned as Hoover's first 
major domestic propaganda program that he would subsequently remodel and perfect 
as the United States became embroiled in what would become the country’s battle 
against fascism during the Second World War and against communism in the Cold 
War. 
 Chapter Three focuses on Hoover’s increased militarization of the FBI during 
World War II. His domestic propaganda campaign during this war experienced 
drastic reformation. Hoover largely abandoned the War on Crime’s theme of 
scientific administration, and adopted, instead, a religious emphasis. Specifically, he 
used the metaphor of Americanism to re-envision the nation’s religious landscape by 
traversing the boundary between civil religion and the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Hoover divided conservative members of Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism 




as “un-American.” His strategizing largely replicated the divisions that emerged in 
American Protestantism during the 1920s between Fundamentalists and Modernists. 
Hoover revived a culture war that was first waged by Christian Fundamentalists to 
pursue control of America’s public and private institutions, as well as to more 
narrowly define the meaning of Christianity. Hoover helped to resuscitate and redirect 
the conflict so that it would then be fought over the meaning of U.S. citizenship. 
Ultimately, Hoover’s wartime domestic propaganda campaign helped place pressure 
on the executive branch to identify Roosevelt’s supporters among the many groups 
that constituted the Fifth Column threat.       
 The CRD, once again, mimicked Roosevelt’s rhetorical presidency to 
neutralize the president’s anti-interventionist opposition and, more importantly, 
Hoover’s political rivals. FDR proclaimed in July 1940 that “national unity” was 
“essential” for the “preservation of democratic rights” and represented the “test” of 
“Americanism.” Such cohesion was allegedly necessary for combating the enemies 
within America’s borders, which he labeled the “Fifth Columns.”156 The president 
used the ambiguity of this metaphor to conflate his foreign policy critics with Nazis. 
Hoover’s wartime domestic propaganda campaign replicated the president’s 
juxtaposition between Americanism and the Fifth Column, but did so in a manner that 
encouraged more conservative—and anti-New Deal—meanings of American unity. 
Hoover wrote in an August 1940 issue of the Los Angeles Times, for example, that 
“America’s machinery for defeating the Fifth Column within our gates” required the 
mobilization of “Americans to fight for Americanism.” Such combat required a 




inimical to the welfare of the land” and the “industries” that “supply” the “materials 
of national defense.”157 Hoover’s plan to protect industry, however, aligned labor, 
civil rights, and civil liberties organizations, as well as their liberal Christian and 
Jewish supporters, with Nazi and Soviet espionage networks. In this manner, Hoover 
used the president’s own linguistic framework to discredit key constituencies of the 
New Deal. Hoover elaborated upon the Fifth Column metaphor with contagion 
metaphors, and presented the FBI as a bulwark to prevent the spread of subversive 
peoples and ideas (i.e., New Dealers and idealism) inside the nation’s borders.  
 Chapter Four examines Hoover’s more overt movement away from serving 
the presidency to aiding the administration’s political opposition in the legislative 
branch during the early years of the Cold War. While Hoover continued to militarize 
the FBI, and further develop a program for organized thought control, he formalized 
the FBI’s domestic propaganda strategizing with a campaign to associate New Deal 
policies and ideals with clandestine Soviet operations in America. This plan, 
ultimately, discredited labor organizers, civil rights activists, and civil liberties 
proponents by helping to instigate the second Red Scare. The hysteria began in 1947 
and provided the dominant rhetorical context of Truman’s presidency. The scare 
pressed the executive branch to intermix its foreign and domestic policy planning to 
resist communism. This kept public life militarized in peacetime. The FBI conflated 
the presence of reformers in government, religion, the media, and higher education 
with a wide-scale Russian conspiracy to overthrow the federal government with 
revolutionary force and violence. Hoover worked behind the scenes with members of 




President Truman into establishing his loyalty program. This infrastructure was then 
used to censure liberals, blacklist them from public employment, and promote his 
Americanist worldview in the federal government.      
 Hoover’s rhetorical framing of this era was marked by the Red Fascism 
analogy. Four months after he first used the analogy in a September 1946 speech to 
the American Legion, the New York Times reported on the circulation of a “Munich 
analogy.” According to the Times, this analogy reasoned that the “only way to tame 
Hitler was by rearmament and collective security. The Second World War was not 
averted by appeasement but merely prolonged. Russia, like Nazi Germany, [was] a 
totalitarian state.” Therefore, the “lesson of Munich” should be learned and a 
“collective security system” should be established to curb Joseph Stalin’s 
expansionism.158 The president adopted such reasoning after he delivered the Truman 
Doctrine address in March 1947. Hoover first helped the president to arrive at this 
international perspective, and then used this rhetorical context to suggest that 
America’s internal security was again threatened by traitors who actively coordinated 
with external military forces. Hoover used notions of communist Fifth Columns to 
exploit the rhetorical presidency in the area of domestic security. As Truman drew 
analogies between communism and fascism, he further empowered Hoover’s 
worldview and the solutions that it encouraged. 
 The FBI director established rhetorical continuity between the vermin, Fifth 
Column, and Red Fascism campaigns through his perennial use of contagion 
metaphors to illustrate the national and international menaces that the FBI policed. 




interconnected threats envisioned by Hoover adapted the FBI to a post-war rhetorical 
context that was in many ways encouraged by Hoover’s propaganda strategizing and 
which limited Truman’s ability to constrain his FBI director.  
 In the process, Hoover mimicked many of the rhetorical strategies and police 
power tactics of the Nazis and the communists not only for the Red Fascism 
campaign, but also the previous Fifth Column movement as well. With the 
commencement of WWII, Hoover’s propaganda strategies took on more of an 
appearance of the Nazi propaganda machine as he worked to militarize the FBI. The 
metaphors he used reflected such militarization in the wartime and post-war eras. 
Hoover denounced the enemy (Nazis and communists) through metaphors that 
delegitimized them. Simultaneously, he also mimicked their totalitarian rhetorical 
strategizing and use of police power tactics. These strategies emboldened the FBI and 
Hoover’s own political power. Obviously, he didn’t exterminate large groups of 
people or engage in widespread genocide. But, he did practice other coercive acts that 
were justified through a rhetoric of crisis that relied on militarized metaphors 
targeting American citizens. In so doing, he reconstituted notions of Americanism 
and helped reconstitute U.S. foreign policy according to his own realist vision. This 
study, therefore, examines the rhetorical and coercive means of Hoover’s domestic 
propaganda programs that were bolstered by one American president in ways that 
undercut the bully pulpit of another. 
  Overall, this project aims to deepen our understanding of the rhetorical 
strategies exercised by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as he helped expand the power 




during a period of heightened advancements in public opinion management. In the 
process, Hoover's FBI intervened into presidential politics, facilitating and 
manipulating the power of the rhetorical presidency. Time magazine anonymously 
suggested after Hoover’s death that “the fact” that Hoover “could acquire and keep 
that kind of power raises disturbing questions not merely about the role of a national 
police in a democracy, but also about the political system that tolerated him for so 
long.”159 This study grapples with such complexities of this powerful figure’s public 
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Chapter 1: The Evolution of Justice 
The Pan-American Exposition was hosted by Buffalo, New York in 
September 1901. Eric Rauchway observes that the Expo “paid tribute to the 
international reach of American power” following the annexations of Cuba, Guam, 
and the Philippines during the Spanish-American War (1898).1 President William 
McKinley was among its many visitors and he used the event to champion his 
administration’s expansion of the Monroe Doctrine. Because “modern inventions 
ha[d] brought into close relation widely separated peoples and made them better 
acquainted,” he proclaimed, “isolation [was] no longer possible or desirable.” The 
president suggested that “geographic and political divisions [would] continue to 
exist,” however, he also pointed out that the “world’s products” were then being 
“exchanged” quicker than ever before. McKinley further observed that the advent of 
“rapid transit” and “telegraphy” strengthened America’s military. Accordingly, this 
made “the expansion” of America’s “trade and commerce” a more “pressing 
problem” than staying out of foreign entanglements.2 Scientific advancement was 
changing U.S. political culture and was adapting public life to international 
capitalism. McKinley’s statement, however, represented the final words of his public 
career. 
 The president addressed a general audience of visitors to the Expo from near 
and far. H. Wayne Morgan describes his venue as “flag draped platform” from which 
McKinley spoke on a Tuesday afternoon “for perhaps the most important speech of 
his career.”3 A natural born American named Leon Czolgosz was among his listeners, 




McKinley or the Secret Service agents guarding him, an assassin was stalking the 
president. In the crowd, Czolgosz was pushed around by a current of bodies which 
obstructed his ability to aim. The next day, however, there would be no such obstacle.   
 The president was scheduled to appear at the Exposition’s Temple of Music 
on September 6th around 4:00 p.m. to greet visitors in a receiving line. Czolgosz used 
this moment to commit America’s third presidential assassination. He lined up 
outside of the Temple a few hours before the president’s arrival to ensure his 
opportunity to approach McKinley.4 Having concealed his pistol under a bandage 
wrapped around his right hand, he neared the president fifteen minutes after doors 
opened.5 When McKinley greeted the assassin, Czolgosz shot his victim twice in the 
torso from a distance of two feet.6 The killer was immediately tackled by a U.S. Coast 
Artilleryman, who was soon assisted by Secret Service agents.7 Though doctors were 
initially optimistic about the president’s recovery, he died eight days later from a 
gangrene infection.8      
 The assassin’s motive was possibly more troubling to the nation than the 
murder itself.  In a jail-cell confession hours after the shooting, Czolgosz calmly 
claimed to be carrying out his duty.9 He described himself as an enthusiastic 
anarchist, inspired by the writings and lectures of Emma Goldman. The New York 
Times reported that she influenced him “to decide that the present form of 
government in this country was all wrong, and he thought the best way to end it was 
by the killing of the President.”10 Goldman had argued that while the “rich increase 
their wealth year by year, battering on the toil of the people by an organized system 




sinking year by year, lower and lower into poverty and distress.”11 She concluded, 
therefore, that the government and capitalist orders should be dissolved by force and 
violence to better perfect society.12 
Goldman’s incendiary rhetoric was perceived as alien to the United States, 
brought over from the old world. Her audience predominantly included eastern 
European immigrants who filled urban centers in record numbers. They worked under 
harsh industrial conditions for meager wages, and were blamed for importing 
subversive ideologies that sought change in the class structure. Frightening to many 
of their natural born counterparts, these newly naturalized citizens joined political 
parties and labor unions. The majority of their agitation was protected by the U.S. 
Constitution, which further helped them to challenge the American ideal of private 
property.13 
  Although Anarchism and its commitment to violence were not new to the 
nation, never before had its members engaged in such a high-profile crime in the 
United States. 14 The shooting of McKinley was similar to the assassinations of a 
Spanish prime minister, a French president, a Hapsburg empress, and an Italian King 
by anarchists in the previous ten years.15 While the American president led the nation 
away from its nineteenth century commitments to isolationism, his death illustrated 
the dangers of internationalism and the radical forms of citizenship that it 
engendered.16 
 Though most of the country discussed the assassination as a tragedy, many 
radicals publicly celebrated the terrorist act. Anarchist groups denied knowing the 




news stories circulated in the press of anarchists “rejoicing” with “happiness” and 
wishing Czolgosz a “long life and more power.”17 Anarchists gathered in public 
meeting places, where speeches celebrating the shooting were delivered in German to 
the cheers of immigrant audiences.18 Such news left some to question the 
government’s resolve in protecting the nation. 
 Existing federal law was seen by many as too weak to deal with the new 
international challenges facing America. The Department of Justice (DOJ) lacked an 
investigative force and the assassination of public officials was beyond any federal 
jurisdiction. Minutes before the state of New York executed Czolgosz in October 
1901, the Times quoted him as saying “‘I killed the President because he was an 
enemy of the good people—of the working people . . . I am not sorry for my 
crime.’”19 Czolgosz’s murder of President McKinley and the federal government’s 
failure to sufficiently respond to it alarmed many Americans who supported 
industrial-capitalism and the broader economic order that it established. The 
government’s law enforcement and judicial powers, they suggested, would need 
further expansion in order to control what President Theodore Roosevelt dubbed 
“undesirable citizens.”20          
From America’s beginning, the idea of hostile outsiders plotting a bloody 
revolt against U.S. institutions was imbedded in the nation’s political thought. This 
fear invited enhanced measures of control that ensured greater stability. The rise of 
American radicalism included the use of force to obtain its objectives. Its campaigns 
more often targeted property, and its members often included native-born citizens.21 




workers against industrialists and government. Labor's momentum was often curbed 
by new federal policies that were advanced by industrialists and attorneys general. 
Federal law enforcement officials and business leaders often used propaganda to 
perpetuate the idea that union activity represented an insurgent conspiracy. The 
institutions, ideologies, and strategizing that created such dynamics are examined 
below.   
This chapter outlines the expansion of federal law enforcement. It first 
examines the Office of the Attorney General (OAG, 1789-1870), tracing its 
development from an institutionally limited and part-time office to a role in 
preserving the union during the Civil War. The second phase of federal law 
enforcement (1870-1908) is marked by the establishment of the DOJ. The 
Department represented an extension of the president’s institutional authority and an 
apparatus for securing his constituencies’ interests. The final period under review 
(1908-1933) studies the rise of the Bureau of Investigation (BI) and the entrance of J. 
Edgar Hoover into law enforcement. He gained experience in propaganda as a means 
of control during the Great War, which would assist his leadership of the Bureau once 
he became director in 1924. Hoover’s arrival in the DOJ is then situated in the 
historical backdrop of a fundamentalist-modernist culture war that informed the 
ideologies of the federal government. Relying on the principles of scientific 
management to demonstrate his professionalism, Hoover mastered techniques of self-






The Expansion of Federal Law Enforcement 
The succession of presidential administrations brought with them the issuance 
of new executive orders, directives, and legislation expanding the DOJ, its 
jurisdiction, and consequently, its annual appropriations. Though the OAG did not 
begin its rapid expansion until after the Civil War, precedent for dealing with 
immigrant dissent was established during the earliest years of the republic.22 The 
growth of American federal law enforcement occurred in spurts. Control was 
exercised when internal pressures destabilized the political and economic order. 
Definitions of citizenship were often at the center of such forays. Leaders of religion, 
industry, and government vehemently defended the status quo to promote the interests 
of their constituencies, while marginalized members vocalized dissent to expand the 
political and economic franchises.23 Of course, the issue of control represented a tool 
of partisanship and xenophobia at times, rather than a reaction to political activism.  
Federal law enforcement power was rooted in the nation’s founding 
documents. The U.S. Constitution charged the president to “take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.”24 Accordingly, the Judiciary Act of 1789 called for an “attorney-
general” to “prosecute” suits and “give his advice and opinion upon questions of the 
law when required” by the “President” or “by the heads of any of the departments, 
touching any matters that may concern their departments.”25 According to the DOJ, 
the attorney general’s duties and powers “were few and vaguely defined and reflected 
the legislators’ concern lest the office become a center of federal power that would 
infringe upon the prerogatives of the state.” Congress intended a “legal counselor for 




whose long arm would reach out to punish those who transgressed the law.”26 Cornell 
W. Clayton observes that the office’s “conventional inclusion in the cabinet 
institutionalized its role as a political advisor.”27 Nevertheless, the prosecution of 
federal crimes became a function of the presidency and the broader executive branch, 
which quickly became embroiled in controversy.   
President George Washington warned against the divisive influence of 
political parties in his 1796 Farewell Address.28 Such division was evident in shouts 
of treason just two years later. On the verge of war with revolutionary France, the 
empowered Federalist Party passed legislation in the name of security, but often used 
the acts to help obstruct Democratic-Republicans. According to John C. Miller, 
Federalists accused Republicans of conspiring with the French Executive Directory to 
overthrow the republic. The “purpose of the opposition party was made to appear to 
be the advancement not of American interests but of those of France; it became 
axiomatic that no Republican could be a true American.”29  This particular 
conspiratorial vision of traitors coordinating with external military forces 
foreshadowed similar spy scares during the world wars.  
Government leaders attempted to maintain power by wielding authority 
against their opposition. Because French and Irish immigrants were drawn to the 
Republican Party, Federalists delayed the naturalization process to prevent 
enfranchisement.30 Furthermore, the Department of State was given authority to fine, 
imprison, and deport those who expressed dissent through the Alien and Sedition 
Acts.31 The Alien Friends Act (1798) authorized the president to deport resident 




being involved in “any treasonable or secret machinations against the government.”32 
The Alien Enemies Act (1798) authorized him to apprehend and deport resident 
aliens if their home countries were at war with the United States.33 Lastly, the 
Sedition Act (1798) criminalized “writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, 
scandalous and malicious” statements against “the government” or to bring officials 
“into contempt or disrepute.”34 There is no record of enforcement for the Alien Acts. 
Miller notes, however, that the Sedition Act was used by Federalists to arrest 
“approximately twenty-five well known Republicans . . . Fifteen of these arrests led 
to indictments. Ten cases went to trial, all resulting in convictions.”35 Although most 
of this legislation expired or was repealed by 1802, the Alien Enemies Act became 
permanent law.  
 The first half of the nineteenth century was relatively quiet for the attorney 
general, mainly because of institutional design. Clayton explains that the position 
earned less than half of that which was “received by heads of the executive 
departments.” The post was conceived of as a “part-time position” and the “low pay 
was interpreted as authorization for the occupant to maintain private practice.”36 The 
attorney general was expected to “pay his own rent, buy his own stamps and 
stationary, and furnish his own heat and light,” observes Luther A. Huston, Arthur 
Selwyn Miller, Samuel Krislov, and Robert G. Dixon.37 The DOJ further notes that 
the Judiciary Act “perpetuated the colonial system of county attorneys and deputy 
attorneys general.” This meant “the real law enforcement power rested in lesser 
officials whom the attorney general, in theory the government’s top lawyer, had 




 The office witnessed its first expansion under the leadership of Attorney 
General William Wirt, who remarkably held the post throughout the presidencies of 
James Monroe and John Quincy Adams (1817-1829). According to Huston et al., 
Congress only “reluctantly agreed” to provide Wirt in 1819 with “office space (in the 
Treasury Department), a $1,000-a-year clerk and a contingent fund of $500 a year to 
pay for stationery, stamps, fuel and a ‘boy to attend to menial duties.’”39 This marked 
the beginning of an expansion that would continue indefinitely.     
 President Andrew Jackson would soon begin negotiations on what would 
become the Department of Justice. In his First Annual Message of December 1829, 
he recommended to Congress that the “superintendence and management of legal 
proceedings” be “transferred” from the Treasury Department to the “Attorney-
General.” The president suggested that “this officer be placed on the same footing in 
all respects as the heads of the other Departments, receiving like compensation and 
having such subordinate officers provided for his Department as may be requisite for 
the discharge of these additional duties.”40 Senator Daniel Webster (Anti-Jacksonian 
Party-MA)—a member of the Judiciary Committee—however, reflected “earlier fears 
of a strong law enforcement agency” and he created instead a “solicitor of the 
Treasury who would advise with the Attorney General, but who would instruct the 
district attorneys, marshals, and clerks of the lower courts in all matters,” explains the 
DOJ.41 In 1831, Congress did increase the attorney general’s salary, and appropriated 
funds for his own office and for law books. 
 Attorney General Caleb Cushing (1853-1857) was responsible for the office’s 




member of President Franklin Pierce’s cabinet. He transformed the Attorney 
General’s office into a full-time position, and he condemned any admixture of public 
office and private practice.” The attorney general “increased the office’s political 
power and linked it more firmly to the President’s administration.” He took 
responsibility for “advising the President on pardons” and judicial nominations were 
“transferred from the State Department. The Interior Department surrendered the duty 
of handling accounts for the federal courts. Routine legal correspondence, formerly 
handled by lawyers scattered throughout the executive departments, became 
centralized in the Attorney General’s office.”42 This expansion was further 
accelerated by the Civil War. 
Combating Southern Radicalism 
Attorney General Edward Bates (1861-1864) played a key role in preserving 
the union. President Abraham Lincoln asked him to find legal justifications for 
wartime policies. Bates defended the president’s suspension of habeas corpus without 
congressional authorization through a “curious opinion.”43 According to Clayton, the 
attorney general argued that the president could suspend the writ “by refusing to 
release those held for rebellious acts.” In other words, the president could not prevent 
the Supreme Court from ordering the release of untried prisoners, but the “executive 
could lawfully refuse to obey.”44 This maneuver marked a new reach of executive 
authority. 
The post-war years witnessed a rapid expansion of federal law enforcement. 
The passage of constitutional amendments following the Civil War represented 




made “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” illegal, the Fourteenth Amendment made 
former male slaves full citizens of the United States, and the Fifteenth Amendment 
forbade federal, state, and local government from restricting the right to vote for 
reasons of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”45 In response to this 
assertion of federal power, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) organized a campaign of terror 
against freed blacks and others who sought to change the South.46 Radical 
Republicans in Congress countered with the Enforcement Act (1870) to provide 
punishment for those who would obstruct the right to vote.47 Thus began a political 
and controversial tradition that justified the use of force by federal agents to protect 
the rights of specified citizen groups from violent extremists. Though this perspective 
was formulated by Radical Republicans to control white-supremacists, it would soon 
become one of the most powerful tools wielded by racial elites and other power 
brokers who sought to control various minority groups. For the Reconstruction era 
(1865–1877), however, federal law enforcement would remain an instrument of 
liberal reform.         
Rebuilding the union and expanding the franchise was a huge endeavor. 
Attorney General Homer S. Cummings and Special Assistant to the Attorney General 
Carl McFarland observed in Federal Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice and 
the Federal Executive (1937) that the Civil War brought “political, economic, and 
social change” to the government and country. 48 In a move to improve efficiency and 
decrease cost in the federal government, the Department of Justice Act was passed on 
June 22, 1870, to better coordinate a backlog of “legal business.” Cummings and 




render all services requiring the skills of persons learned in the law necessary to 
enable the President, departments, and bureaus to discharge their respective duties.” 
As head of the DOJ, the attorney general was given supervision over the “district 
attorneys and all other law officers in the government.” Among many other duties, 
the Justice Department then oversaw criminal law and civil regulations, immigration 
and naturalization, and “the enforcement and protection of the rights and property of 
the United States.”49 Also, the attorney general was to report annually to Congress on 
the affairs of the Department, which constitutionally connected the officer to all three 
branches of government.  
Combating southern radicals in the Klan became the Justice Department’s first 
major campaign.50 The Ku Klux Act (1871) amended the Enforcement Act.51 
According to Cummings and McFarland, the act “created civil and criminal liability 
for violence against individuals. It authorized the President both to employ the army 
and navy for the suppression of disturbances and to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus.”52 Two months later, Congress appropriated funds to the DOJ for the 
“detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States.”53 Instead of creating 
its own investigative division, however, the attorney general began the practice of 
outsourcing detective work to Secret Service agents borrowed from the Treasury 
Department and contracted from the Pinkerton Detective Agency.54 These 
investigators were used to infiltrate and prosecute the Klan. The ideological 
perspectives advanced by Radical Republicans called the DOJ into existence and 




replacement by Republican industrialists, however, refocused the institution’s 
ideological mission.   
The attorneys general grew disinterested with Reconstruction along with 
many other government leaders by the mid 1870s. The DOJ was compromised by 
partisan politics as Republicans then used the Department in various ways to win 
elections.55  Perhaps even more damaging to Reconstruction was a series of Supreme 
Court rulings that weakened the power of the Enforcement Acts. In U.S. v. Reese 
(1875), the Court held that the sections of the Enforcement Act of 1870, which 
protected voting rights, were worded too broadly to be constitutional.56 This ruling 
would make future disenfranchisement possible with the advent of literacy, character, 
and other forms of citizenship tests.  In U.S. v. Cruikshank (1875), the Court decided 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution pertained to 
government restrictions and did not protect citizens from repressive actions 
committed by individuals; thus they could not be used to prosecute the Klan.57 
Southern Democrats used this ruling to create further voting restrictions at the state 
level. Cummings and McFarland observed that “the colored race did not lose 
everything sought for it by the federal government. The theoretical right of suffrage 
remained, even though limited by extra-legal techniques in each locality; and the right 
to serve on juries was enforced in some cases.”58 As the DOJ slowed its pursuit of the 
Klan in the South, it located a new breed of radicals to pursue in northern cities.   
Combating Labor Radicalism 
Beyond the social disruption associated with Reconstruction, a series of 




management in industrial settings. Immigrants were hardest hit, forced to endure 
“degradation and misery” in the “slums,” observes John Higham, while the “upper 
classes” continued to enjoy opulent lifestyles.59 After the Paris Commune of 1871, 
red scares emerged every decade in the United States until the 1920s.60 These scares 
paralleled times of economic crisis, during which Marxist parties and unions first 
emerged and then subsequently flourished. They organized immigrants and laborers 
to make demands on government regulators and property owners. These anarchists, 
communists, nihilists, and socialists sometimes operated by legal means, but they also 
lobbied with illegal strikes, sabotage, force, and violence.61 Though management 
killed and maimed to a far greater degree than did labor activists, the government’s 
response consistently favored industrialists. This was, in part, because of conflicting 
interests. A number of attorneys general were employed by industry following their 
full-time stints in public office in the post-Reconstruction era. Attorney General 
Richard Olney (1893-1895) went the furthest in disregarding perceptions of 
impropriety. He served President Grover Cleveland while under retainer by the 
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Company.62 This raised concerns about his 
impartiality. The power of the attorney general was vastly expanded by federal 
legislation in this time, mostly for the purpose of centralizing power in the hands of 
industry. 
The government attempted to control labor unrest by regulating immigration, 
passing legislation that outlawed unions as illegal organizations, and treating strikes 
as illegal forms of assembly. M.J. Heale explains that “acts of collective resistance by 




assaults on the law, private property, and social order.”63 Because the unskilled 
workforce was dominated by immigrants, issues of labor radicalism and immigration 
were treated almost synonymously; the U.S. government passed legislation aimed at 
calming labor agitation by keeping immigrants out. 
The earliest labor legislation was marked by xenophobia and conceived of 
immigrants as the cause of labor’s unrest. Cummings and McFarland observed that 
after Chinese laborers “toiled at building railroads” and “performed other menial 
labor at low rates of pay,” their “effective competition in the labor market brought 
upon them the hostility of white laborers.”64 In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act 
suspended “the coming of Chinese laborers” for ten years in an attempt to keep wages 
for white laborers up.65 Similarly, the Immigration Act of 1882 excluded any 
“convict, lunatic, idiot, or any other person unable to take care of himself or herself 
without becoming a public charge” from naturalization.66 Robert Justin Goldstein 
observes that this law was passed to “combat the pernicious influences of 
communism and labor radicalism.”67   
 The federal government soon complicated naturalization further. In addition to 
the previously excluded groups, the Immigration Act of 1891 precluded polygamists, 
“persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease,” and “any 
person whose ticket or passage [for cross-Atlantic voyage] was paid for with the 
money of another” or was otherwise assisted.68 Beyond barring poor Europeans from 
citizenship, this act placed a Bureau of Immigration in the Treasury Department and 
granted it jurisdiction over most immigration laws. Equally important, notes Higham, 




at the company’s expense, this law “contained the first effective provision for 
deporting aliens already in the United States.”69 The animus of xenophobic legislation 
was only beginning. 
 The assassination of President McKinley by the anarchist and natural born 
Leon Czolgosz ignited a wrath against outsiders. The Immigration Act of 1903 (or the 
Anarchist Exclusion Act) made the “unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer . . . 
of the Government of the United States” a federal crime. It excluded from 
naturalization any person “who disbelieves in or who [was] opposed to all organized 
government, or who [was] a member of or affiliated with any organization 
entertaining and teaching such disbelief.”70 William Preston suggests that the act 
“created a criterion of thought and conduct” for aliens and naturalized citizens “that 
was unknown to native-born Americans.”71 The anarchist law ended America’s 
history as an asylum for all peoples, regardless of their beliefs, and began federal law 
enforcement along a path of concerted thought surveillance.72 Concurrently, the 
actions of natural-born citizens were also regulated.   
 The federal government began intervening in the affairs of business to lend 
industrialists powerful backing in the 1880s.  Though anti-trust legislation was passed 
by Congress to provide some protections to consumers, the courts purposefully 
interpreted various laws as a strategy for breaking strikes and outlawing labor 
organizing. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was passed to implement a 
“reasonable and just” charge for “services rendered” in the “transportation of 
passengers or property.”73 However, the courts used this legislation to issue labor 




commerce.74 Likewise, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 outlawed “every 
contract, combination, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several states.”75 Cummings and McFarland noted, however, that the law was 
“applied broadly to include combinations of labor as well as of capital. Workingmen 
were astounded to learn that the Sherman Act was to be applied to them when it had 
not yet been enforced against industrial organizations.”76 
 Eugene V. Debs was used as a test case by Attorney General Olney in 1895. 
In In re Debs, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of the socialist leader of the 
American Railway Union for violating a strike injunction under the Sherman and 
Interstate Commerce Acts.77 Goldstein observes that the Court placed “the stamp of 
the nation’s highest legal authority upon the doctrine that labor unions were illegal 
and enjoinable conspiracies” in certain circumstances. He explains that through this 
application of justice, “labor faced arrests, jailings, and frequent beatings and 
shootings at the hands of the courts, the police and federal and state troops” when it 
struck or boycotted industry.78  
 Though the DOJ played a key role in the prosecution of labor laws, it was still 
without its own investigative force at the turn of the century. The practice of 
outsourcing work to the Pinkerton Detective Agency that began after the Civil War 
was outlawed in 1893 when Pinkerton men were hired to break the Homestead strike 
and “gunned down striking workers,” observes Joan M. Jensen.79 Complicating 
matters further, Congress outlawed the transfer of Secret Service agents to the Justice 




President Theodore Roosevelt’s response to this restriction of power extensively 
expanded federal law enforcement and reshaped the Department.   
 
The Force of Special Agents 
The development of the DOJ’s own investigative force offered it a mechanism 
for much more than the detection and prosecution of crime. The training of agents 
who worked in federal districts and at local levels across the country allowed for 
specialized relationships with various publics. Advancements in technology helped 
agents monitor and undermine suspicious groups and hostile congressmen alike. They 
could coordinate nationwide dragnets and roundups, and cultivate friendly 
relationships with members of the local and national press. Indeed, the advent of 
rapid transportation and mass media also ushered in the rise of technocratic control. 
Whereas brute coercion sometimes led to unfavorable court decisions and public 
outcry, the use of public opinion management turned sympathies toward federal 
control.    
 President Roosevelt expanded the power of the executive as he used the DOJ 
to investigate anti-trust issues implicating members of the legislature. This inspection 
was a part of a broader movement that would ultimately help tip the balance of power 
in Washington toward the presidency. In 1906, he appointed Charles J. Bonaparte as 
attorney general, and directed him to lobby Congress for an investigative force.81 
Suspicious congressmen resisted the request, and suggested that Roosevelt was 
defying constitutional limits placed upon his office by attempting to locate spies in 




dependent upon Congress, and Bonaparte ordered the formation of a “force of special 
agents” in July 1908.83 Bonaparte’s successor in the Taft administration, Attorney 
General George W. Wickersham, formally established the force in March 1909, with 
the issuance of an order that recognized it as the Bureau of Investigation.84 
  President Roosevelt’s reform effort through the DOJ would be short lived. 
Richard Gid Powers suggests that the creation of the BI reflected a “progressive spirit 
of idealism and reform” that began with the “Reconstruction-era crusade for the civil 
rights of freed slaves.” The Bureau’s mission would shortly thereafter reorient “from 
the investigation of high-level crime by the politically powerful and well connected, 
to the punishment of high-profile offenses by politically powerless outcasts who 
challenged American values.”85 This reorientation was partially caused by the politics 
and pragmatics of law enforcement.       
 The BI was a part of the federal bureaucracy and was likewise subject to 
bureaucratic order. As laws requiring federal enforcement were established, specific 
government agencies were given jurisdiction for investigation and prosecution. Once 
jurisdiction was established, an agency’s appropriation was adjusted to fund operating 
costs. As long as a particular law required enforcement, the chosen agency’s 
appropriation would annually renew itself if Congress, the president, and cabinet 
heads were satisfied with an agency’s performance.86 This design pitted agencies in 
competition with one another as their budgets and livelihoods depended upon 
jurisdictional authority. It also encouraged agency directors to find new ways to 




 The Bureau would illustrate its effectiveness by quantifying its operations. 
That is, the Bureau reported to House and Senate appropriations committees the 
number of cases it investigated in a given year. This method placed a premium on 
volume, which created a tension with the Bureau’s mission. Low-level crimes were 
easier and politically safer to investigate than high-level crimes, which could 
implicate captains of industry and government. The latter cases, however, were 
exactly the ones that President Roosevelt and Attorney General Bonaparte envisioned 
for the Bureau.88 The next sixty years would be marked by voluminous caseloads of 
low-level crime that offered a pass to high-level offenders. Bureau statistics were 
used by chiefs and directors to demonstrate their success at law enforcement.89 Of 
course, these claims consequently bolstered arguments for expanded budgets.  
 The Bureau’s rapid growth was supported by its expansion of jurisdictional 
authority and annual appropriations. In its first decade of operations, DOJ leadership 
discovered that it could expand the Department by publicizing the BI’s campaigns 
against domestic threats.  Accordingly, leadership also learned that it could accelerate 
its rate of expansion by targeting foreign threats to American nationalism and 
ideology.90 
  The Bureau was first charged to enforce the White Slave Traffic Act (1910) 
and the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act (1914). The former outlawed “interstate and 
foreign commerce” of white “women and girls . . . for immoral purposes.”91 The latter 
taxed the recreational opiate trade.92 Together, these acts raised the BI’s annual 




Among other duties, the Bureau would soon also engage in systematic propaganda 
and censorship to build support for America’s entry into World War I. 
Public Opinion Management 
Preparations for U.S. intervention in the Great War further expanded the 
military. The Bureau was responsible for enforcing the Selective Service Act (1917), 
which authorized President Woodrow Wilson to raise a draft and imprison draft 
dodgers or “slackers.”94 Understaffed and in competition with the Secret Service for 
jurisdiction of federal law enforcement statutes, Attorney General Thomas W. 
Gregory ordered BI Chief Bruce Bielaski to deputize members of a volunteer spy 
hunting organization called the American Protective League (APL).95  
The League was originally created to work undercover in industries and 
public facilities to keep aliens under surveillance. It was subsidized by industrialists 
who appointed trusted employees to spy on labor organizations. Industrialists feared 
that unions harbored German spies and saboteurs who sought to disrupt the U.S. war 
effort. Factory owners, however, manipulated this arrangement and called upon the 
DOJ and federal troops to break strikes as a means of labor control.96 
 Together, the BI and APL enforced conscription through the Slacker Raids. 
Dressed in plain clothes, they arrested seventy-five thousand suspects around 
“saloons, pool halls, bus stops, dance halls, and street corners” for failing to produce 
draft cards or birth certificates to prove they were not draft-dodgers. Jensen explains 
that some went “without food or working toilets for days or weeks. Many were 




the end, less than 1 in 200 was an actual slacker.”97 With the APL’s help, the BI 
became a powerful national secret police force.     
The Bureau enlisted the vigilante organization to enforce other wartime 
legislation—especially acts that sought to suppress labor and dissent. The Espionage 
Act (1917) authorized the BI to target “subversives” and “radicals” guilty of 
“obtaining information for injury to the United States.”98 Similarly, the Immigration 
Act of 1918 stated that “anarchists” or other “aliens who are members of or affiliated 
with any organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow 
by force or violence of the Government of the United States” shall be “taken into 
custody and deported” to their home country.99 This authority was given to the 
Department of Labor, which then controlled the Bureau of Immigration. By authority 
of the president and his attorney general, the BI and the Labor Department relied 
chiefly upon the services of the APL and its two hundred and fifty thousand members 
to carry out these orders against immigrants, anarchists, and members of labor 
alike.100   
Along with this coercive power, the Bureau was offered a key role in wartime 
censorship and propaganda. It arrested Americans who uttered “disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States government, flag, or the 
armed forces during war under the Sedition Act of 1918.101 Supreme Court challenges 
to the arrests of vocal radicals under this law limited the First Amendment.102 In U.S. 
v. Schenck (1919), political speech that created a “clear and present danger” of 
“substantive evils” was declared unprotected.103 Accordingly, that same Court 




leadership during wartime represented a criminal offense.104 Harvard law professor 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. criticized this ruling in the Harvard Law Review (1919). J. 
Edgar Hoover then opened a dossier on Chaffee for “Harvard’s Board of Overseers to 
determine if he was fit to continue teaching,” notes Michael Linfield.105 This 
movement against speech was not an isolated restriction.     
 President Wilson ordered the federal government and the military to monitor 
dissent. On April 13, 1917, he established the Committee on Public Information (CPI) 
based upon recommendations made by his Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. 106 
The Committee was “charged with encouraging and then consolidating the revolution 
of opinion which changed the United States from an anti-militaristic democracy to an 
organized war machine,” observes James R. Mock and Cedric Larson.107 According 
to its chairman, newspaperman George Creel, “there was no part of the great war 
machinery that we did not touch, no medium of appeal that we did not employ.”108 In 
addition to paid advertisements, the CPI produced pamphlets, posters, speakers, 
educational films, and news columns. It influenced scholarship, commercial films, 
novels, public and private school curriculums, church sermons, and newspaper 
reporting. Though some materials were marked as originating from the CPI, its 
influence over other materials was hidden, thus masking its strategic purposes.109 
 Of course, Creel also was granted the power to censor. He forged relationships 
with the DOJ and the Military Intelligence Division (MID) through the Censorship 
Board. Creel used these institutions to investigate various individuals and 
publications that were possibly in violation of the Espionage and Sedition Acts.110 




personally with BI Chief Bruce Bielaski, who in turn directed APL leadership to 
investigate the loyalty of writers, editors, publishers, and producers.111 They blocked 
the release of books, movies, and news reports. Creel and Bielaski even monitored 
popular music and foreign language periodicals for German sympathies.112 Among 
their many concerns, they feared that the writings of Leon Trotzky would trigger an 
“anarchist” revolution in America, akin to the Russian Revolution, at a time when the 
military was preoccupied with Germany.113 Again, fears of revolutionary forces 
emerged in wartime. This was an early indicator of the first major Red Scare of the 
twentieth century.  
 Chairman Creel also worked closely with Attorney General Gregory to build 
support for the war. In a series of correspondences, the attorney general proposed the 
use of “educational propaganda” to stimulate “loyalty among foreign-born workmen 
in industrial plants doing government work, and [to block] enemy intrigue.”114 
Gregory also used the CPI to capture “the widest possible publicity” for the 
government’s position on war-related matters concerning the Justice Department.115 
The CPI, DOJ, and BI were thus instruments of the Wilson administration's attempts 
to round up dissidents and to issue official statements regarding the nature of their 
work. In this sense, the BI helped censor the president’s opponents and propagated 
the executive branch’s political agenda. This arrangement led to allegations that the 
CPI served the president’s own political interests.116 It was in this context of politics 
and propaganda that J. Edgar Hoover was socialized in both the Department of Justice 





The Director’s Early Years   
 Hoover’s diligence in the war effort was rewarded with a rapid expansion of 
responsibility and quick promotion.117 According to the DOJ’s Appointment Letter 
Books, he abbreviated his name and was appointed to the dual titles of “Special 
Employee” and “clerk” of the DOJ in July 1917;  both of these positions were 
“payable from the appropriation for ‘National Security & Defense.’”118 Reporting to 
the Department’s War Emergency Division, he was assigned to work with the 
Department of Labor and Bureau of Immigration.119 This duty involved Hoover with 
enforcement of the Espionage, Sedition, and Immigration Acts during and after the 
war, which introduced him to the task of combating American radicalism. His work 
soon included silencing dissent and championing coercive methods of law 
enforcement. 
Together, jurisdiction over these laws increased the Bureau’s appropriation to 
$2.27 million by 1919.120 These acts militarized the DOJ and coordinated it with the 
Office of Military Intelligence (OMI) to protect industry from labor.121 More 
specifically, these federal agencies moved against the 3,600 strikes that occurred 
between 1919 and 1920 for their interference with defense planning and for their 
challenge to private property.122 In such capacities, the distinction of the BI as a 
military or civilian agency—or as a public or private security agency—frequently 
blurred; the Bureau found support in military and business communities as it broke 






The Red Scare and the Palmer Raids 
  The CPI and APL were dissolved after the armistice was signed in 
November, 1918. Shortly thereafter, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer found a 
new application for their methods. More than thirty bombs were mailed by anarchists 
to the homes and offices of business and government leaders in the spring of 1919, 
which sparked the first major Red Scare (1919-1921) of the twentieth century.123 The 
attorney general “declared war on the radicals, [and] warned of an eminent 
revolutionary uprising” after his house was bombed on June 2nd, observes Regit 
Schmidt.124 Palmer added the General Intelligence Division (GID) to the Department 
of Justice, which Hoover was selected to direct as the attorney general’s “Special 
Assistant” in July.125  
Hoover reported to Congress on the work of the GID. He asserted that its 
activities were “at first confined solely to the investigations of the ultraradical 
movement,” but he expanded it to include “the study of matters of an international 
nature, as well as economic and industrial disturbances incident thereto.”126 Hoover’s 
GID was thus an early precursor to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which 
conceived of organized labor as a conflation of subversion and international threats.  
Kenneth D. Ackerman asserts that as head of the GID, Hoover answered to the 
“Bureau of Investigation Chief Bill Flynn. And as special assistant to the attorney 
general, Edgar [reported] directly to Mitchell Palmer, Flynn’s boss.”127 Wearing both 
hats placed Hoover in the BI and the OAG.  
The GID began a widespread surveillance system. According to Ronald 




newspapers for information on the radical movement, indiscriminately entering on 
each card a mix of hearsay, rumor, and fact.”128 Powers notes that by November 
1919, the GID “had completed a classification of over 60,000 ‘radically inclined’ 
individuals in the ‘ultraradical movement’ . . . Hoover had turned himself into the 
government’s first resident authority on communism, a reputation he jealously 
guarded for the rest of his long life.”129 
Unsure of where the anarchists’ bombs came from, the Justice Department 
turned its attention to American communists. In January 1919, Vladimir Lenin called 
for an American working-class uprising.130 The organizational activities of American 
communists would further heighten anxieties across the nation. In August of that 
year, Socialists were divided over forming a communist party in line with the 
international call. This division caused the formation of two separate U.S. communist 
parties—the Communist Party and Communist Labor Party—before Moscow 
demanded that they unite into a single Communist Party of the United States of 
America (CPUSA). However, as Albert Fried explains, this period marked the time 
when “the red scare went into its most virulent stage.” He notes that this scare was 
“marked by thousands of Gestapo-like arrests and detainments and expulsions from 
the country, as well as the establishment of police apparatuses at federal, state, and 
local levels charged with investigating, identifying, and punishing radicals, no matter 
what their persuasion.”131 
 Together, Hoover and Palmer created an atmosphere that was toxic to 
reformers. The Interchurch World Movement and the Federal Trade Commission 




industry and the DOJ. They also surmised that the scare was manufactured, at least in 
part, to break strikes and discredit proponents of labor and business regulation.132 
Though state power was used in this capacity before, this time the undesirable 
citizens were exiled.  
The Palmer Raids targeted immigrant and labor organizations in November 
1919 and January 1920.133 The first raids rounded up at least 465 alleged “radicals” 
by November 14. The attorney general directed Hoover to prepare these cases for 
trial. Three hundred of these detainees were deported to Russia on December 21, 
1920, including Emma Goldman and her anarchist comrade, Alexander Berkman.134 
The speed of the government in deciding these cases was a testament to the 
momentum against immigrants and communists in America following the war.  
The second roundup commenced shortly thereafter and was accompanied by 
DOJ propaganda. On December 31, 1919, the attorney general announced that 
Bolsheviks were “‘composed chiefly of criminal, mistaken idealists, social bigots, 
and many unfortunate men and women suffering with varying forms of 
hyperesthesia.’”135 Two days later, the Department of Justice coordinated the seizure 
of another 2,600 suspected communists.136 In a January 27, 1920, interview with the 
New York Times, Hoover boasted that 3,000 of 3,600 radicals taken into custody that 
month were “‘perfect’” deportation cases.137 According to Claire Bond Potter, 
however, “Hoover's first celebrity career as a red hunter came to a crashing halt . . . 
when many of the deportation cases were reversed on appeal and the methods of the 




  Stories circulated of civil liberties violations and inhumane treatment of 
suspects in the spring of 1920, which implicated the GID and brought attention to the 
attorney general’s methods.139 The Justice Department argued that Communist Party 
membership was a deportable offense according to the recent Immigration Act; 
consequently, it rounded up suspected communists wherever and however it could 
find them—in party rallies, on party rolls, and in newspaper accounts.140 Assistant 
Secretary of Labor Louis Post, who was charged with reviewing the deportation 
cases, as well as many leaders of the legal community, challenged the Justice 
Department’s evidence and procedure.141 The National Popular Government League 
emphasized its disapproval of “propaganda by the Department of Justice,” and 
claimed that Palmer worked with “magazines and editors throughout the country” to 
“affect public opinion in advance of court decisions and prepared in the manner of an 
advertising campaign in favor of repression.”142 Cultivating public opinion to ensure 
favorable court decisions would later become the cornerstone of Hoover’s power and 
the FBI’s stature.  
Bureau leadership discovered that intelligence work and roundups were 
politically safer during times of war and hysteria. Labor Department officials and 
federal judges reversed thousands of Justice Department deportation rulings soon 
after the war.143 And, Congress took action against the executive branch as both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate investigated the Justice Department for 
misconduct, ruling that the Bureau did not have the constitutional authority to engage 




revealed the power of civil liberties claims as well as the constitutional challenges 
that surrounded domestic intelligence gathering. 
 Palmer responded to his opposition by claiming that they were communist 
sympathizers and “‘liars’” who were deliberately assisting the impending communist 
revolution.145 Palmer’s red-baiting tactics failed when the Federal Court ruled on June 
23, 1920, that the attorney general’s procedures violated civil liberties statutes and 
that Communist Party membership alone did not qualify aliens for deportation.146 The 
revolution never materialized and the attorney general spent the rest of his term under 
congressional investigation.147 
The Palmer Raids taught Hoover a lesson about state power and control. A 
nation that feared attack supported stricter law enforcement measures against 
marginal groups when the enforcers were reputable. Therefore, a threat could be used 
to generate and maintain enhanced power for law enforcement officials as long as the 
perception of threat persisted and the sense of scandal did not become a major public 
issue. This formula included silencing civil liberties proponents who brought 
attention to constitutional violations. A role for public opinion management was thus 
crystallized in the field of law enforcement.   
As the Bureau became embroiled in even more scandal following the Palmer 
era, its appropriations and jurisdiction continued to diminish along with its reputation. 
Aside for the Dyer Act (1919), which outlawed the transportation of stolen motor 
vehicles across state lines, the Bureau’s utility as a law enforcement apparatus waned. 
148 Instead of keeping the BI out of trouble, however, Rhodri Jeffery-Jones suggests 




activities.”149 Under the leadership of Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty (1921-
1924), the DOJ once again became entangled in partisan conflicts. Labor wars 
erupted as the nation settled into a peacetime economy. Coal mine and railroad 
owners rolled their workers’ wages back to pre-war levels, leading to bloody strikes 
as union members clashed with strike breakers.150 President Warren G. Harding 
addressed Congress on this matter in August 1922. He declared that he was 
committed to using “the power of government to maintain transportation and sustain 
the right of men to work.”151 Daugherty did his part, the New York Times reported, by 
obtaining a federal injunction that prohibited strikers from “interfering in any way 
with the operations of the railroads of the nation.”152 Using the Bureau to enforce this 
ruling, the attorney general effectively ended the strike on management’s terms. 
  However, Daughtery was less successful in managing the Teapot Dome 
Scandal. He attempted to use his power to protect the Interior Secretary from an 
investigation led by Democratic Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Thomas J. Walsh of 
Montana. Instead of investigating the Interior Department for accepting illegal gifts 
from oil companies, the Bureau tapped the senators’ phones, “opened their mail, and 
broke into their offices and homes. They even attempted to lure Wheeler into a 
compromising sexual liaison,”153 Athan G. Theoharis claims. Senator Wheeler was 
indicted by a grand jury, but won acquittal as witnesses admitted perjuring their 
testimony; the Justice Department also was caught manufacturing evidence to 
discredit the senator. The Teapot Dome Scandal was possibly more offensive than 
others because it occurred during a time of government reform and the attorney 




like Hoover, Palmer, and Daughtery who first emerged during the wartime and Red 
Scare eras. Conflict in federal institutions was preceded by growing cleavages in 
American religion and Americanism. Protestant churches across the country were 
embroiled in an embittered battle over the future of the faith and, with it, the nation’s 
public institutions. 
 
“Americanism” and the Federal Government 
Notions of “Americanism” have spanned the nation’s history. Robert 
Shalhope explains that this concept was narrowly defined in the late eighteenth 
century as an “allegiance to the nation-state rather than a pervasive loyalty to a 
distinctive set of ideological principles.”154 The symbol branched-off in the mid-
nineteenth century to represent two separate ideological currents running through the 
Republican Party. “Americanism” was adopted by exiled German revolutionary Carl 
Schurz (R-WI) whose activism pressed the Republican Party against slavery in the 
buildup to war. It was thereafter claimed by the Party’s industrialists to advance 
corporate interests.   
First, President Lincoln provided an outlet to immigrants who advocated an 
ideology of republicanism. Elliott Shore, Ken Fones-Wolf, and James Philip Danky 
explain that the failed German revolution (1848-49) was a liberal uprising for artisan 
republicanism—an ideology that promoted the welfare of independent workers—and 
for “free thought” against clericalism.155 Many revolutionaries like Schurz fled to 
America to avoid reprisal for their participation in the rebellion. John Higham 




this group writ large agitated against slavery and joined the radical Republicans.156 
German-American activists joined the Party to make abolition its central focus. 
Schurz delivered his “True Americanism” address (1859) as a member of the 
Lincoln campaign.157 Republicans were anxious to calm tensions in the Party between 
German-Americans and the Know-Nothings who sought to restrict the voting rights 
of foreign-born citizens.158 Higham explains that anti-radicalism, anti-Catholicism, 
and Anglo-Saxonism led more established Protestant Americans to suspect internal 
minorities of subversion for their allegedly “foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) 
connections.”159 Schurz’s brand of Americanism rebuffed this impulse with values 
evident in the German revolution. At a time when anti-abolitionists argued that slaves 
were dangerously unprepared for democratic participation, he described “true 
Americanism” as the belief that “liberty” was the “best school for liberty, and that 
self-government” could not be “learned but by practicing it.” This perspective 
encouraged “toleration,” rather than religious “fanaticism,” and “freedom of inquiry” 
to “engender . . . mutual respect of true convictions,” which made “inquiry earnest, 
and discussion fair.” Accordingly, he surmised that the American “Revolutionary 
Fathers derived their claim to independence” from the “principle” that “‘all men are 
created free and equal, and are endowed with certain inalienable rights”’ in the 
promotion of universal freedoms.160 Such logic captures the principles that future 
liberals would ascribe to “Americanism.” This tradition, however, competed for 
ascendancy against the Republican Party’s other commitments to nationalism, 





Americanism, Militarism, and Industrialism 
President McKinley promoted Henry Clay’s “American system” as he 
advanced the interest of industrial-capitalists. Quentin R. Skrabec, Jr. explains that 
Clay spent his long career in public life (1806-1852) advocating a strong central bank 
to “assure capital for investment” and protectionism via tariffs to develop American 
industries. The role of government under this system was to “promote, monitor, and 
maintain industrial growth.”162 This was consistent with Alexander Hamilton’s 
“Report on Manufacturers” (1791), which recommended “leaving Industry to its own 
direction” but also encouraged the “incitement and patronage of government.”163 
McKinley’s era was accented by monopolies and court rulings that offered more civil 
rights to corporations than to women, African Americans, or marginal immigrant 
groups.164 Correspondingly, the president announced in his first Inaugural Address 
(1897) that “Congress” should give “ample protection and encouragement” to 
“industries” because “[n]o portion of our population” was more “entitled” to the 
federal government’s “wide and liberal care” than the owners of industry. In his 
successful attempt to further subsidize corporations, McKinley concluded that 
“Friendly legislation” to “producers” in the “American name” was “beneficial to 
all.”165 The president, thus, derived the nation’s identity from the welfare of elite 
economic interests. This belief was further refined by his vice president. 
Theodore Roosevelt bolstered notions of Americanism through Christian 
benevolence and militarism with his “Strenuous Life” address (1899).166 As Governor 
of New York, he suggested that which was “most American in the American 




of success” went to “the man who [did] not shrink from danger.” He encouraged 
“every self-respecting American” who was “manly and adventurous” to engage in 
wars for wealth in “Hawaii, Cuba, Porto Rico (sic), and the Philippines.” Pointing to 
religious differences, he advocated belligerence against “warlike Moslems, and wild 
pagans” who were “utterly unfit for self-government” and who showed “no signs of 
becoming fit.”167 Roosevelt’s Americanism, thus, used issues of race and religion to 
discern which types of people were intellectually equipped or ill-suited for 
democratic governance.168 His internationalism elevated the spread of Christianity 
above liberalism. He suggested, for example, that real “men” were disinterested in 
notions of “‘liberty and the ‘consent of the governed’” if Christian “salvation” could 
be achieved through force.169 Statements like these articulated the conservative vision 
of “Americanism,” which also encouraged the expansion of U.S. security and 
economic interests well beyond the Americas.170 Roosevelt’s extensive articulation of 
“Americanism” was influential in shaping political culture.     
Some of his ideas were further championed by Woodrow Wilson. Having 
articulated various pronouncements of Americanism since at least 1894, Roosevelt 
popularized “100% Americanism” to denounce “‘hyphenated”’ Americans (e.g., 
German-Americans) during his 1916 bid for the Republican nomination. John F. 
McClymer explains that Wilson then embraced “100% Americanism” upon reelection 
to the presidency in 1916 as a part of his program of intervention into World War I. 
This made the “Americanization” of immigrants a nationwide effort sponsored by the 
federal government.171 The American “flag” was a symbol of conformity, suggested 




nation.”172 Such cohesion was a goal of his administration while it built support for a 
monolithic perspective that worked to drown out dissenting views.     
The Wilson administration’s campaign for unity coerced immigrant groups 
into accepting Clay’s system. Wilson worked with industrialists to build public 
opinion in favor of the war effort, which allegedly defined a singular national interest. 
McClymer explains that the Bureau of Education launched an Americanization 
program that was financed by the National Americanization Committee (NAC) from 
1914 until the private subsidization of government programs was outlawed in 1919. 
The NAC was a “business group” that viewed “Americanization” as an effort to 
Americanize the immigrant workforce for “American industry” during an era 
punctuated by labor radicalism. Its leadership “overlapped almost completely with the 
Immigration Committee, formed in 1917, of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce.” The Education Bureau, explains McClymer, “became a subsidiary” of 
the NAC which “coordinated all the manifold Americanization programs in the 
country.” The committee transformed from a business lobby into a federal agency as 
it “effectively became the War Work Extension of the Bureau of Education.”173 
The NAC developed curriculum to teach the “‘American Way”’ for the 
Treasury, War, and Navy Departments, the Bureaus of Education and Naturalization, 
the Committee on Public Information (CPI), and the Council of National Defense, as 
well as for education, business, publishing, and labor organizations. According to 
McClymer, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, the DOJ, and the Bureau of 
Investigation used this momentum to press for “Congressional authorization to deal 




ultimately passed the Espionage and Sedition Acts in 1917 and 1918 respectively. 
The Americanization campaign consummately heightened tensions in a period 
marked by the Red Scare (1919-1921). Numerous civic associations formed their own 
Americanism campaigns during the interwar period.174       
Americanism and Christian Fundamentalism 
In the 1920s, one-hundred percent Americanism was espoused by such 
organizations as the Ku Klux Klan, National Security League, Freemasons, and 
American Legion, among others as a moral code.175 This movement, John Kane 
asserts, was an “ultraconservative brand of isolationism” that rejected “any foreign 
influence whatsoever on American life, most especially any that might affect 
economic liberty or racial purity.”176  Martin E. Marty explains that it attracted many 
“self-described original-stock Protestant Americans” who celebrated both Anglo-
Saxon and Puritan traditions.177 Anglo-Saxonism was expanded at this time to imply, 
more generally, that Northern and Western European immigrants embodied superior 
lineages, which according to Higham, reinforced a more homogenized white 
supremacy as the “American Way.”178 Marty suggests that more hard-lined 
conservatives were “conscious of a covenant that gave them a privileged relationship 
with God,” based partially on their Anglo-Saxon heritage and spiritual devotion to an 
allegedly God-given “economic system.” He explains that the potency of the Red 
Scare, Yellow Peril, and KKK all evidenced a power struggle in America “over the 
soul and mission of the nation.”179 Conservative notions of Americanism, thus, 




The conservative tendencies of Americanism were further strengthened by the 
wider circulation of millenarianist beliefs in the early twentieth century. Religious 
revivalists turned to mass media to promote premillenial dispensationalism. This led 
to the publication of an influential series of pamphlets titled The Fundamentals 
(1910-1915). These short essays expounded upon five fundamental beliefs that were 
allegedly necessary for Christian adherence, and which amplified the supernatural 
mythos of Jesus Christ rather than the values that he prescribed.181 Undergirded by 
America’s traditional commitment to isolationism, the eschatology was intended to 
counter allegedly foreign influences—especially scientific and other intellectual 
advancements proffered by Darwinism, progressivism, and Marxism—and to help the 
nation remain homogenous, or ideologically pure. It held that Jesus would literally 
return in human form to lead Protestant armies in a war against those of the anti-christ 
before ushering in one thousand years, or a millennium, of harmony. Though largely 
anti-Semitic, fundamentalists were also passionately Zionistic as they awaited the 
prophesized emergence of a New Israel from which Christ would rein. Because only 
this redeemer could end corruption in an otherwise imminently unsalvageable world, 
fundamentalists opposed peace-making “between nations, management and labor, 
men and women, or religious groups” as a waste of energy. These conservative 
Protestants opposed social services and economic reform, championing instead law 
and order, private sector commercialism, white supremacy, and a structure of smaller 
government.182 Such a perspective aligned laissez faire industrial-capitalism with 




fundamentalism were infused into Americanism and were done so with a reactionary 
zeal against the CPUSA.  
Civic groups enacted fundamentalist religious principles in public policy 
through law enforcement ventures. Volunteer organizations like the American Legion 
cooperated with J. Edgar Hoover’s General Intelligence Division (GID)—before it 
was dismantled in 1924—to promote what Powers calls “countersubversive 
anticommunism.” This perspective was prone to conspiracy theories and conflated 
attempts made by Moscow to co-opt American reform movements through the 
CPUSA as evidence of actual Soviet control. Accordingly, it perceived Soviet 
involvement wherever and whenever fundamentalism was challenged, implicating 
“labor organizations, pacifist groups, the universities, the women’s clubs, the 
churches, and the schools” in such subversive activities; some quarters of the 
American Legion even blamed radicalism writ large on Catholicism and Judaism. 
Powers concludes that Hoover and the other Americanists of this era “chased 
chimerical conspiracies though paranoid labyrinths” not recognizing their own 
misperceptions of American political activity.184 Some of the very groups that they 
denounced included the most outspoken anti-communists.          
Whereas Americanists habitually mistook the American left more generally as 
instruments of Moscow, many Catholics, Jews, civil rights and labor activists, as well 
as members of the American Socialist Party provided a far more credible renunciation 
of the Communist Party. Rome’s anti-communist policy was established by Pope Pius 
IX’s Qui Pluribus (1846), which condemned the threat to “laws, government, 




America documented the brutal religious oppression that accompanied the Bolshevik 
Revolution and used their research to discourage the official recognition of the Soviet 
Union. While the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and B’nai B’rith’s Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) promoted anti-communism in response to religious 
persecution in the Soviet Union as well, more atheistic Jews in the Socialist Party 
turned to anti-communism to protest the Bolshevik’s gross violations of human rights 
more generally. Similarly, many black Socialists like A. Philip Randolph—then 
editor of the Messenger—advocated anti-communism on the grounds that the Party’s 
interests diverged from their own and resented its attacks on black churches and civil 
rights organizations. Catholic labor unions were obviously anti-communist, and 
Socialist labor organizations like the Harlem Labor Committee shared the perspective 
that white communists would abandon black unionists if necessary to promote Soviet 
foreign policy.186 These perspectives clashed with each other at numerous points, but 
were also allowed to compete in American thought because of the very intellectual 
tolerance that was advocated by Carl Schurz.  
Strong tensions between the two visions of Americanism ultimately evolved 
into a complex matrix of ideological polarization. The post-war world combined 
religion and politics in ways that heightened political divisions within Protestantism. 
The editor of the Baptist Watchman-Examiner coined the term “Fundamentalist” in 
1920 to represent an organized religious movement that cut across Protestant 
denominations and consequently established “permanent party lines” against a more 
liberal grouping that was called “Modernist.” These were two poles in an ideological 




Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., and other Protestant denominations.” The 
Fundamentalists were a hard-line faction of conservatives who mobilized to promote 
their beliefs. They were particularly drawn to the KKK, which was influential in 
organizing lawyers, judges, and civil officials with business groups like the Chamber 
of Commerce to undercut liberal reformers. Next were non-Fundamentalist 
conservatives who disagreed with the extremist nature of Fundamentalism, but also 
shared many of its beliefs about Christianity and U.S. civics. To their left were 
moderates—the largest group—who were viewed as occupying the central position of 
Christianity. They, in turn, were followed by liberals who leaned more toward Social 
Gospel Theology. To their left was a faction of liberals called Modernists; only some 
of whom self-identified with the term. Fundamentalists used the term “Modernism” to 
represent inflammatory departures from traditional Protestantism, and lumped 
together their opposition under its banner. This labeling sometimes even included 
conservative Protestants who worked in coalition with more moderate Christians. 
Modernists rejected dogmatism and challenged the supernatural mythos of 
Christianity. They encouraged, instead, the intellectual advancement of Darwinism 
and Marxism. Modernists privileged reason, progress, rationalism, and intellectual 
experimentation. Specifically, Modernists and Social Gospel Christians campaigned 
to build greater political and economic harmony among nations through rational 
discourse. Some of these idealists even strove to establish friendly relations with the 
U.S.S.R. by reforming capitalism with socialistic programming, outlawing war, and 




values encouraged by Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount through institution 
building.188  
Americanists worked in coalition to address the crisis posed by such 
liberalism to Fundamentalism. Reactionaries such as Blair Coan published books like 
The Red Web (1925) to assert the existence of covert Soviet intrigue behind the 
activities of these reformers.189 R.M. Whitney thanked “Mr. John Edgar Hoover” of 
the “Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice” for his “advice and 
friendly criticism” of Reds in America (1924), a book that Whitney dedicated to 
abiding “loyalty to American institutions” amidst the “trackless sea of ‘liberalism’ as 
now defined.”190 This fear mongering began a longer tradition of professional anti-
communist conspiracy theorizing that informed the World War II and Cold War era 
debates about communist subversion.  
A violent feud over the direction of Americanism emanated from Protestant 
churches throughout the 1920s that foreshadowed Hoover’s later anti-communist 
containment program. Fundamentalists blamed their Modernist counterparts for being 
too hospitable to Catholicism, Judaism, communism, secularism, and radicalism, 
which represented apostasy for many. Conservatives attempted to remove liberals 
from common denominational ventures, including foreign missions, higher education, 
and religious institutions. This pressure mounted while intellectuals introduced 
concepts like “cultural pluralism” to rebuff Americanization programming. Philip 
Gleason explains that the concept was coined in 1924 to encourage tolerance. 
Pluralism promoted a more “democratic system of government,” respect for “equality 




First Amendment guarantees.191 Fundamentalists, however, believed that the 
“Protestant spirit,” and not civil liberties, “produced the moral and political character 
of the country,” explains Marty. Accordingly, the exclusion of pluralists from 
institutional participation was encouraged in order to protect American purity and 
strength from subversive threats.192 In an era of anti-communism that associated 
minority groups with the CPUSA, removing Modernists from positions of authority 
served both the religious and patriotic functions of Fundamentalism.  
Allegations of Soviet penetration of America’s public institutions 
complemented the Fundamentalist campaign against Modernism, and even helped 
Fundamentalists to strike against more secular and atheistic Modernists. In The War 
on Modern Science: A Short History of the Fundamentalist Attacks on Evolution and 
Modernism (1927), Maynard Shipley, President of the Science League of America, 
warned that “Fundamentalists” sought to “debar the teaching of evolution from all 
educational institutions supported in whole or in part by public funds.” He observed 
that “governors, state superintendents of public instruction, text-book commissioners, 
[and] city boards of education” of “many” states had begun restricting certain areas of 
teaching and learning. Specifically, he noted that such groups had taken “arbitrary 
action” against “many teachers” who had “either lost their positions” or had been “so 
intimidated by the general attitude of the local community” that they “voluntarily 
forfeited their supposed right of freedom in teaching.” Shipley concluded that 
scientists were in the “midst of a war on the method of science as a whole, though 




psychology, anthropology, sociology, and history.”193 Religious, government, and 
civic intuitions became battlegrounds for control over the nation’s future. 
The religious divisions caused by the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy 
formed two rival camps that punctuated American political culture. Promoting the 
rights of labor forged alliances between Catholics and Social Gospel Protestants who 
were more generally strong supporters of political idealism in foreign and domestic 
policy planning.194 This coalition clashed with business lobbies like the National 
Association of Manufacturers which charged that the Catholic Church’s social justice 
programming was, in fact, a form of radical unionism.195 Industrialists were joined by 
more conservative Protestants who equated the regulation of industry with 
communism. Conservative Christians were also more prone to isolationism because 
idealism, in their perspective, subordinated the American Christian nation to a secular 
world government. Instead, they preferred militarism to enforce their values on the 
world stage.  Markku Ruotsila explains that many conservative Christians feared the 
alignment of America with non-Christian nations because it would, they presumed, 
incur God’s wrath for abandoning America’s exceptional stature among nations.196 
Whereas Social Gospel theology rallied more liberal Catholics and Protestants 
together, anti-communism united religious conservatives and industrialists. 
The movements identified by the Watchman-Examiner as “Fundamentalist” 
and “Modernist” lost their momentum by the 1930s. Thereafter, the terms 
“fundamentalism” and “modernism” were used to describe the extreme ends of 
Christianity. Their clash, however, would have major religious, cultural, and political 




was at the core” of J. Edgar Hoover’s long-held “religious beliefs” and that it was 
“still so rock hard in Hoover” as of 1972 that he considered “any modernization of 
traditional church teachings tantamount to treason against the American people.”198 
The director proudly identified as a Fundamentalist at the end of his career. That said, 
when secularism dominated the federal government under the presidencies of Calvin 
Coolidge (1923-1929) and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933), as well as during the first 
two terms of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1941), Hoover portrayed himself as a 
scientific expert who was trained in criminology and disinterested in religion.        
 
Scientific Management and Organizational Reform in the DOJ  
 The rise of scientific administration in the federal government after World 
War I further shaped the Department of Justice and its Bureau of Investigation. 
Whereas departmental funds were appropriated with little oversight before the 1920s, 
post-war politics demanded greater accountability from executive officers. This 
policy shift encouraged the adoption of the same scientific professional standards that 
had already been widely accepted by industry. Social scientific perspectives set new 
standards of professionalism in public administration and reduced factionalism in the 
federal government. While Fundamentalists grumbled about atheistic communism in 
the homeland, officials in Washington embraced more secular approaches to 
governing. 
 The Harding administration pushed to decrease waste in the executive branch. 
The Budget and Accounting Act (1921) established the Bureau of the Budget to assist 




service,” especially in regards to the appropriations, services, “organization, 
activities, and methods of business” employed by “executive departments.” The 
legislation also created the General Accounting Office (GAO), which was given 
authority over all executive departments’ bookkeeping and balances. The Office was 
given further charge to investigate “all matters relating to the receipt of, 
disbursement, and application of public funds” and to “make recommendations 
looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures.”199 By Executive 
Order, the president commissioned the budget director to decrease “the estimates of 
the appropriations” by locating and eliminating “unnecessary activities.” The 
president instructed bureau chiefs to work with the director on this mission, which 
was aimed at the “reorganization” of the federal government.200          
 This downsizing was felt by the DOJ. According to the Justice Department’s 
Administrative Orders, Circulars, and Memorandums, the Bureau of Efficiency 
developed a rating system to ascertain the Justice Department’s and the Bureau of 
Investigation’s productivity and wastefulness.201 It also systematized their 
appropriations requests by making them account for past appropriations and the 
manner in which future appropriations would be spent.202 Justice Department officials 
limited telegraphs, telephones, and other office equipment to official use only.203 
Much of this movement for greater economy and efficiency was rooted in the broader 
adoption of scientific management operations by professional communities.  
 Frederick Winslow Taylor advocated a rhetoric of science to industrialists as a 
rubric for increasing efficiency, economy, productivity, and profitability. Taylor’s 




been first; in the future the system must be first.” He suggested that the “best 
management” was a “true science.” Managers should “gather together” traditional 
knowledge of “workmen” and then classify, tabulate, and reduce it to “rules, laws, 
and formulae.” Once “a science for each element of a man’s work” was developed, 
managers were encouraged to “scientifically select” and then “train, teach, and 
develop the workman.”204 This approach thus emphasized training workforces to 
adopt a systematic approach to task management. Of course, its implications stretched 
beyond the industrial setting. 
 Scientific management melded with the progressive idealism of the post-war 
years. It “took form in the United States” and spread across Europe and the Soviet 
Union while the study of International Relations spread throughout the academy, 
observes Judith A. Merkle.205 Taylor suggested that his principles were applicable to 
“governmental departments,” which contributed to the field of public 
administration.206 Progressive reformers envisioned “impartial administrative 
systems” that could be managed scientifically and apart from “‘politics”’ and “special 
interests.” In this proposition, “the idea of public efficiency became the core of a 
political program” that sought to remove sectarianism from government institutions. 
Scientific management encouraged the application of a method to the political 
problems of public administration, thus safeguarding democratic institutions from 
corruption, religious-political factions, and waste.207   
The movement to scientifically administer government operations occurred in 
a broader institutional context of secular reform. Christian Smith observes that the 




secularization of the institutions of American public life.” This movement largely 
spanned from 1870 to 1930 and represented a “struggle between contending groups 
with conflicting interests seeking to control social knowledge and institutions.” This 
trend balanced a previous movement to infuse Protestantism into American life. The 
Revolutionary era was “rather religiously derelict” and fostered an undercurrent of 
secular Enlightenment culture. Mass religious revivalism in the nineteenth century, 
however, helped Protestantism to rebound and to institutionalize Christian morality in 
social, cultural, and even legal codes of conduct. Specifically, mainline Protestantism 
praised “Christian virtue, free market capitalism, and civic republicanism” for 
advancing American civilization.208 
The FBI Director and Secular-Scientific Law Enforcement   
 J. Edgar Hoover downplayed his adherence to these values following the 
Palmer era, but he certainly continued to advance their cause. In particular, he 
highlighted the value of rugged individualism. To Hoover, these values represented 
the only authentic vision of American citizenship, which he erroneously suggested 
was monolithically shared by the nation’s founders. However, Hoover first recast 
himself as a scientific reformer in the mid-1920s. Smith observes that the decade 
represented a tipping point in the history of the secular transformation of America’s 
“core public institutions.” He concludes that the “old Protestant establishment 
moralizers and pastoral opinion makers were mostly swept aside in the 1920s by new 
cultural authorities in the social sciences, journalism, advertising and Hollywood” 




The rhetorics of science and secularism were not inherently hostile to 
Protestantism. Some members of the religious community welcomed the elevation of 
science in U.S. culture as well as the “secular” spaces that it helped to create. For 
example, Professor of Religious Education at Northwestern University, Norman E. 
Richardson, reported to the International Sunday School Convention in 1922 that the 
“Protestant religious educator” should accept the “findings of the devout scientist . . . 
without embarrassment” because there was “no conflict between science and 
religion.” Paraphrasing another educator, Richardson observed that “scientists and 
theologians who neither know nor stick to their own respective fields engage in 
frequent though harmless skirmishes.” He could dismiss the rivalry between these 
realms of belief because he foresaw no “basic cleavage between religious and secular 
education.” This envisioned unity was allegedly possible, according to Richardson, 
because not “all scientists” were “irreligious” and not “all religious leaders” were 
“unscientific.” Indicative of the secularization movement, he proclaimed that the 
“religious educator” who attacked the “scientific method” belonged to a “former 
age.”210 This statement identified the passing of an era in which Protestantism 
dominated U.S. culture.  
Many members of the religious and theological fields disagreed with 
Richardson’s optimism about such harmony. However, a common linguistic 
framework was established between these communities by the 1920s that associated 
notions of the “scientific” with those of the “secular.” This framework also 
disassociated such ideas from more religious notions. Because the Protestant 




corruption by political idealists, secularism and the scientific perspectives that it 
encouraged were viewed by such reformers as a virtue of honest government.        
The effort to eliminate sectarianism in government institutions was reified in 
the DOJ through a series of reform measures. The Administrative Orders, Circulars, 
and Memorandums of the DOJ reveal that the attorneys general took specific steps to 
reform and repair the reputations of the Department and the Bureau. Though 
Daugherty himself would be indicted for corruption, he ordered executive officers in 
a 1922 memorandum to refrain from displaying “such obtrusive partisanship as to 
cause public scandal.”211 Attorney General Harlan F. Stone limited Bureau 
investigations “exclusively to violations of the Federal Laws” and ordered the 
discontinuance of “unnecessary investigations” in a 1924 memorandum.212 And, 
Attorney General John G. Sargent stipulated that “all publicity” pertaining to “cases 
pending in this Department or to the ordinary administrative business of the 
Department” must be “authorized and given to the press through the Office of the 
Attorney General only, and not otherwise” in a 1925 memorandum. He prohibited the 
“imparting of confidential information to newspaper representatives and others 
outside the Department” by penalty of “disciplinary action.”213 He further forbade 
executive officers from using their “official authority or influence for the purpose of 
interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof” in a 1926 memorandum.214   
 According to the Appointment Letter Books, it was during this context of 
reform that J. Edgar Hoover was promoted from “Statutory Attorney” in the OAG to 
“Assistant Director of the Bureau of Investigation” in May 1924; he would be 




dismantle the GID and reduce the size of the Bureau.216 Hoover carried out his orders 
as his agency’s appropriation dropped to $2.15 million for fiscal year 1927.217 
According to the Bureau’s Classification 61 (Treason) - Index to Headquarters Case 
Files, 1921-1936, however, it quietly continued to monitor American communists and 
other alleged subversives who challenged Protestant traditions.218 Its appropriations 
would not begin to steadily increase again until the early 1930s. The middle and late 
1920s were relatively quiet years for the Bureau, yet foundational for Hoover’s 
agency.  
He spent this time structuring the Bureau’s culture. Under President Hoover, 
who was known as the “Great Engineer” for his expertise in organizational 
administration, the director gained a model of professionalism. This included turning 
“to research for solutions to the problems of social waste and inefficiency,” explains 
Powers.219 J. Edgar Hoover joined the ranks of scientific managers who studied 
public opinion management, used scientific strategies to solve problems, and relied 
on statistics to demonstrate results. Every year the director reported record 
accomplishments to the House Appropriations Committee, which far more often than 
not recommended that Hoover receive his full appropriation. The director pressured 
Special Agents in Charge of field offices (SACs) to annually increase their caseloads 
and then used those numbers as evidence of his successful leadership. This pushed 
agents to pursue “quantity” over “quality” cases and to misreport their work.220 
The Bureau also returned to the Justice Department’s progressive origins 
during the 1920s by targeting its efforts against the KKK. By authority of 




Klan which was “bullying and murdering its way across not just the South, but the 
nation as a whole, targeting blacks, political opponents, women accused of loose 
behavior, bootleggers, Catholics, and others who offended its [Protestant] moral and 
ethnic precepts.”221 Though this illegal movement was well within the BI’s 
jurisdiction, such work was not celebrated or awarded in terms of appropriations. 
Southern radicals were a far less popular target than their labor counterparts.   
 Perhaps more rewarding, the young director established a number of 
relationships that would influence the Bureau’s development. Clyde Tolson joined the 
agency in 1928 and quickly climbed the ranks. Hoover delegated him with the 
responsibility of maintaining internal order of the Bureau’s operations and 
personnel.222 Another notable relationship developed with Washington Star reporter, 
Rex Collier. In 1929, the reporter negotiated with Hoover a mutually beneficial 
arrangement as “friendly” reporters gained access to information and the Bureau 
gained positive press coverage.223 Indeed, Sargent’s prohibition of propaganda was 
soon dismissed.  
 Hoover systematized press relations by creating his own public relations 
department, which was closely related to his own approach to scientific management. 
The War on Crime of the 1930s was foreshadowed through Hoover’s relationship 
with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The IACP’s 
Committee on Uniform Crime Records successfully lobbied Congress for a Division 
of Identification and Information to be operated by the Bureau of Investigation in 
1924.224 Hoover suggested the following year that the Division was a “development 




to “centralize and crystallize” the work of the “chieftains of the army of law 
enforcement” in their “endless war against crime.”225 This effort expanded the 
Bureau’s international focus and established a linguistic framework for the DOJ’s 
later campaign.  
The director used his jurisdiction over the Division of Identification and 
Information to begin a campaign for authorization to compile and disperse data on 
crime trends.226 After five years of lobbying the House Appropriations Committee to 
fund this project, Congress commissioned the Bureau to collect crime statistics in 
1930. According to Powers, crime reporting offered the director “an excuse to put 
together a staff of researchers and writers that gave the Bureau a potential public 
relations capability.”227 Pulp crime writer and circus promoter Courtney Ryley 
Cooper joined Washington Evening Star reporter Rex Collier to assist the CRD in 
1933. Powers suggests that Cooper “convinced Hoover that public relations” was “the 
bureau’s most important job” and used “Crime Records” as the director’s “face to the 
world.”228 Ultimately, the CRD was a vehicle for disseminating the content of the 
FBI’s records in the press and popular entertainment. Its channels included 
newspapers, popular press books and elementary school textbooks, law reviews, 
academic journals, comic strips, speeches, news radio programs, radio dramas, 
newsreels, government and commercial films, and government, academic, civic, 
religious and business newsletters, reports, and bulletins. The Bureau’s receipt of 
cooperative media and the pursuit, capture, and killing of outlaws invited dramatic 




Tolson originally managed the FBI’s propaganda work. The assistant director 
was responsible for operating a propaganda mill that produced, according to Claire 
Bond Potter, “an unrelenting national lobbying campaign throughout 1933” that 
supported Hoover’s leadership.229   FBI propaganda responsibilities formalized with 
the establishment of the “Publications Division” (1935), which was subsumed by the 
“Research Division” (1936), and again by the “Crime Records Division” (1938).230 
Assistant Director Louis B. Nichols was hired on the recommendation of Rex Collier 
as a special agent in 1934.231 He joined the CRD in 1935 and was promoted to its lead 
position in 1937, after being evaluated as a “Bureau salesman.”232 He explained in an 
April 1936 memo that he segmented the director’s publics by demographics (i.e., sex, 
age, and religious affiliation) and spheres of influence. He targeted “civic 
organizations,” business groups, “police training classes,” “church groups,” 
“educational groups,” “teacher groups,” “high school [and] grammar school 
students,” “peace officers,” “accountants,” “college faculty,” and many others.233 
Upon his arrival, the CRD’s most pressing function was to research parole and 
probation systems to locate evidence of their failure to maintain order.234 This duty, 
along with scientific police work, crime prevention, foreign police systems, federal-
local police cooperation, political corruption, juvenile delinquency, sex crime (or 
homosexual predatory crime), and the organized crime menace all became major 
themes of its work in this era.235  
 The CRD’s first publications included Uniform Crime Reports and the Law 
Enforcement Bulletin. Paid for by the appropriation for collecting crime statistics in 




other identification information.236 It also included “articles” that, according to 
Hoover, were “of special interest to law-enforcement officials which would usually 
not otherwise be available to them.”237 The pieces included messages from the 
director and various articles reflecting the CRD’s emphasized themes, especially the 
advancements made by science in federal police work and the new professional 
standards that it set. The Bulletin was mailed to subscribers for free and circulated 
widely around the nation. The director explained in the 1937 Annual Report of the 
Attorney General that the “circulation of the bulletin [was] approximately 14,000 and 
[was] sent monthly to more than 10,400 law-enforcement agencies in the United 
States and 81 foreign countries and territorial possessions.”238 Members of the press 
and popular entertainment received much of the remaining copies.239 By 1938, the 
CRD’s publications also included an annual “pamphlet entitled ‘The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation,’” and another “annual publication” that was “entitled ‘Criminal 
Identification and the Functions of the Identification Division.’”240       
 Beyond writing its own material, the CRD was also responsible for cultivating 
relationships with members of local and national media. Assistant Director William 
C. Sullivan observed in 1979 that the “real job” of special agents in charge of each 
field office “was public relations. The SAC was out of the office a lot, visiting the 
‘right’ people, those who molded public opinion in his territory: newspaper publishers 
and editors, owners and managers of radio and television stations, corporate 
executives, and church officials, to name a few.” SACs were expected to plug “the 
bureau line” at “police headquarters, City Hall, Masonic Lodge meetings, Jaycee 




 Such promotional efforts encouraged friendly coverage and allowed for the 
disbursement of camouflaged material that masked its origin and strategic purposes. 
William Beverly notes that Hoover’s “working relationship” with Collier and Cooper 
included twenty-four articles in nationally syndicated magazines, four movies, three 
books, and a nationally syndicated radio program and comic strip.242 These were all 
commercial ventures; the CRD, however, closely shaped their storylines and those of 
many other commercial storylines in an attempt to enhance the Bureau’s crafted 
image.  
The director’s behind-the-scenes relationships with members of the print 
media created mutually beneficial arrangements. The CRD traded access to Bureau 
files in return for secret information and favorable coverage from journalists, 
columnists, editors, and cartoonists. Because the War on Crime generated stories that 
increased readership in newspapers, magazines, books, and journals, access to Bureau 
files was a commercially desirable commodity. Likewise, the blacklisting of 
individuals and publications from Bureau information was a detriment. This system 
allowed the CRD to cultivate a pool of friendly public opinion leaders, while 
insulating the FBI from those who were less cooperative. The former were added to 
the “special correspondents list,” which, according to Natalie Robins, included 
individuals that “could be counted on for a favor or two”; the latter, “whose attitudes 
ranged from ambivalent to hostile” were relegated to the “do not contact list.”243 
 Many newspaper reporters eventually became FBI surrogates. Sullivan 
observed that the “network of field offices” allowed Hoover to “place ‘news’ 




puff pieces for the FBI—in newspapers around the country.” He explained that the 
CRD’s strength “was in the small dailies and weeklies; and with hundreds of these 
papers behind him, Hoover didn’t give a damn about papers like the New York Times 
or the Washington Post.” However, Sullivan noted that “scores of Washington-based 
reporters printed stories [the CRD] gave them too, and they usually printed them 
under their own bylines. Some of them lived off us. It was an easy way to make a 
living. They were our press prostitutes.”244 The press was lured into a compromising 
relationship with the FBI in the early 1930s.  
 The Great Depression invited new expectations for the federal government. 
Beyond economic failure, Herbert Hoover’s administration was “ridiculed” for its 
“procedural,” rather than “retributive” response to organized crime; this was 
accentuated by Al Capone’s 1931 conviction for income tax evasion. Powers 
observes that the press taught “the public to see crime as a test of the government’s 
ability to meet violent challenges with violent force.” Instead of action, “President 
Hoover gave the country lectures about cooperation, states’ rights, and constitutional 
limits on federal jurisdiction.”245 The perceived crime threat facing the nation made 
such idealism seem unsatisfying.  
 The 1932 kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh, Jr. generated a groundswell of 
support for a national police force capable of curbing interstate gang activity. The 
two-and-a-half year manhunt for the infant kidnapper and murderer, Bruno Richard 
Hauptmann, was treated as a “national melodrama” by the press. 246 According to a 
March 1932 story in the New York Herald Tribune, President Hoover’s administration 




States” to search for the child and his kidnapper. Director Hoover kept close contact 
with the press, which brought him and his agency nation-wide attention. He used this 
opportunity to encourage the passage of a federal kidnapping law that would grant his 
agency jurisdiction over interstate crime.247 Hoover soon received the authority that 
he requested with the passage of the Federal Kidnapping Act. This law outlawed the 
transportation across national borders or state lines any person “unlawfully seized, 
confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away . . . and held for 
ransom or reward.”248 
The federal response to interstate problems was conceptualized in militarized 
language. The New York Herald Tribune suggested, for example, that an “army of 
desperate criminals” was “winning its battle against society.” It concluded that “the 
nation should resolve that the armies of lawlessness must be fought down and 
beaten.”249 This was an early instance of the “crime-army” metaphor that would 
capture front page headlines during President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first and 
second terms in office. The federal government was about to declare its first war on a 
domestic problem widened the scope of federal law enforcement.  
Cultural Pluralism and the Principles of Reform  
The movement to expand the DOJ into areas that had been previously 
governed by the states was a manifestation of a broader campaign to promote idealist 
programming in federal law enforcement. President Herbert Hoover appointed the 
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (chaired by former 
Attorney General Wickersham) and established the Federal Bureau of Prisons.250 The 




widest inquiry into the shortcomings of the administration of justice and into the 
causes and remedies for them.” President Hoover noted that improved law 
enforcement would require “a spirit in our people in support of law” because “the 
lawbreaker” was “the enemy of society.” 251 The commission released a fourteen 
volume report in 1931 that championed the greater inclusion of marginalized groups 
and blamed American culture for its failings during the prohibition era.  
The Wickersham Commission located the root of crime in societal factors and 
institutional corruption, especially in law enforcement. The commission wrote that 
the “social, political, and economic development of the country” was chiefly 
responsible for the “criminal situation.” Specifically, it noted that an “apparent 
inefficiency of democratic government to cope with modern problems, a long 
tradition of lawlessness, [and] a long history of violence” had created conditions 
where alliances between “politics” and “organized criminal activities” could 
flourish.252 The problem of public corruption, according to the report, was coupled 
with “demoralizing social influences” and “demoralizing institutional experiences,” 
which contributed to the “creation of the adult professional criminal.”253 
The failure of institutions and society to protect marginalized groups was a 
central theme of the commission’s reports on juvenile delinquency. It suggested that 
“any program for the prevention of crime must begin with the proper treatment of the 
child offender.” Large caseloads of juvenile crime had accumulated from “the 
prohibition acts, the immigration acts, the motor vehicle theft act, the antinarcotic act, 
the white slave act, and the postal laws;” however, they “were in no way more serious 




efforts. The commission blamed delinquency on the “invasion” of “industry or 
commerce” into “residential areas,” which created “‘slum ‘areas.” This criticism of 
U.S. culture reproached Henry Clay’s American system of government-subsidized 
lassie faire capitalism. The report recommended that the “Attorney General” should 
give “instructions” to “agents of the Bureau of Investigation” and other law 
enforcement officials “to investigate children’s cases by means of Federal probation 
officers or local juvenile courts.”254 This would diminish the appropriations and 
jurisdiction of the Bureau.    
The Wickersham Commission blamed Americanists for similar failings in the 
treatment of immigrants. It argued that for over a “century” there was “continuously 
in this country a clamorous group” who emphasized “only the difficulties connected 
with immigration” and “lost sight of all its beneficial effects.” It suggested that a 
“reason” for this “repetition” included the “easy theory that our social difficulties are 
not to be charged to our own mistakes and failures. It is easy to shift the responsibly 
for what is wrong by charging it upon the nationals of other countries.”255 The 
Wickersham Commission then “exonerated” the “foreign born” from the “charge” of 
causing a “disproportionate share of the crime current in the country.” The 
commission also reported that immigrants were apprehensive and suspicious of unjust 
and invisible deportation laws. It suggested that such procedures were an inexcusable 
use of force because they violated “guaranties to ‘persons,’” enumerated in the “Bill 
of Rights,” thus “making them rights of men and not privileges of citizenship.”256  




recommendations, the Wickersham Commission became a liberal vehicle of 
reform.257      
President Hoover also used his State of the Union Address to expand the 
prison system and to promote prisoner rehabilitation over containment—a core 
principle of idealism.258 He proclaimed that the country needed “new federal prisons 
and a reorganization of our probation and parole systems” to “prepare [prisoners] for 
return to duties of citizenship.” He suggested that there “should be established in the 
Department of Justice a Bureau of Prisons with a sufficient force to deal adequately 
with the growing activities of our prison institutions.” The president recommended 
that “authorization for improvements should be given speedily, with initial 
appropriations to allow the construction of the new institutions to be undertaken at 
once.”259 The Wickersham Commission estimated that by 1931 the “annual cost of 
administering” federal and state prisons was “nearly $30,000,000, and the actual 
investment in buildings, land and equipment [was] probably near $100,000,000.”260 
For 1933 alone, the BOP’s annual appropriation was $12.3 million, which was more 
than a quarter of the DOJ’s total appropriation and more than quadruple the Bureau of 
Investigation’s appropriation.261 In short, the nascent BOP overshadowed the twenty-
five-year-old investigation bureau. 
 The origin of the BOP was rooted in the Hoover administration; however, 
other legislation passed years earlier was also responsible for the Prison Bureau’s 
sizable appropriations. The Act to Reorganize the Administration of Federal Prisons 
was passed in May 1930, which “established in the Department of Justice a Bureau of 




under the Attorney General.” This act charged the BOP director with “the 
management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions” and the 
responsibility for the “safe-keeping, care, protection, instruction, and discipline” of all 
prisoners. In the event of overcrowding, the attorney general was given authority to 
build more institutions by submitting requests to Congress.262 The BOP had nineteen 
operating institutions by January 1934, excluding Alcatraz, which had not yet opened. 
These included penitentiaries, federal jails, reformatories for men, women, and 
juveniles, a drug addiction center, a hospital for “defective delinquents,” and 
reformatory, correctional, and prison work camps.263 These facilities were marked by 
decorative architecture, expansive libraries, quality furniture and food, sanitary living 
conditions, landscaped grounds, and staffs of social workers.264      
 Beyond establishing the Prison Bureau, Congress passed a number of laws 
reflecting the idealist spirit that drove up the cost of prison operations and expanded 
its jurisdiction. It created the Federal Parole Board, granted the Public Health Service 
access to federal prisoners, commissioned building projects, diversified prison 
employment to expand prisoner “training and schooling in trades and occupation,” 
and amended the Probation Act of 1925 to enlarge the probation system.265 Persons 
subject to probation remained in the custody of the court; though not confined, they 
were required to report to probation officers.266 These investigators would be assigned 
to counsel the many juvenile offenders, which challenged the FBI’s jurisdiction.    
 Amending the parole system was highly controversial. The Good Conduct Act 
of 1932 established a uniform clock for term deductions, which started “with the day 




parole as “a method by which prisoners who have served a portion of their sentences 
[were] released from penal institutions under the continued custody” of authorities.268 
The parole system was first established by the Good Conduct Act of 1902, which was 
amended by the Parole Act of 1910. The latter act set release at “one-third of the total 
of the term” for which the prisoner was sentenced if the parole board ruled that 
release was compatible “with the welfare of society.”269 Preparing citizens for society 
represented a far different ideological vision for federal law enforcement than Hoover 
proposed.  
Idealist fervor in the DOJ threatened the FBI’s potential for growth.  In an era 
marked by political division over expanding government programs, Hoover spent the 
1930s and beyond   coordinating with the press and popular media to package stories 
of an official War on Crime that excited Republicans and Democrats alike. Because 
the targets were seemingly of epic proportion and seemingly non-ideological, and 
because the Bureau had an accepted code of professionalism grounded in scientific 
management, its expansion was widely welcomed and publicized. Federal law 
enforcement had grown into something far different than Webster and other critics of 
centralized power had envisioned.     
 
The Expanding Executive 
The history of the Justice Department highlights some contours of the 
presidency’s expansion. The first Congress built institutional limitations to maintain 
the primacy of states’ rights. Federal law, however, eventually superseded regional 




from the constitutional framers’ vision came during the Civil War when President 
Lincoln commissioned his attorney general to undermine Congress and the Court; 
soon afterward the attorney general was given his own Department to enforce federal 
law. Establishing the Bureau of Investigation was another step, which President 
Theodore Roosevelt took to detect and prosecute high level crimes committed by 
captains of government and industry, especially members of Congress.  
 Institutionalized law enforcement power bolstered the presidency in two 
distinct ways. First, the ability to investigate, arrest, prosecute, imprison, and deport 
targets offered the president a means to neutralize dissidents. This was especially 
evident in legislation ranging from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the 
Espionage and Immigration Acts of World War I. And second, the advent of rapid 
transit and mass media ushered in a form of technocratic control that could 
manipulate public opinion through systematized censorship and propaganda. The 
president used these tools to help manufacture support for his policies, thus 
maintaining the appearance of democracy while undermining some notions of 
democratic legitimacy. Hoover helped develop such methods during the Great War 
and Red Scare as an apprentice to the attorneys general.      
 Hoover learned early on of strategies for social control through coalition 
building against political activists. Law enforcement, military, religious, and business 
communities had their own harmony of interests that encouraged secret and 
sometimes illegal collaborations of force. The president’s various duties made this 
combination of power almost inevitable. That is, because the executive’s roles blurred 




constituencies also blurred. This was especially notable when laborers disrupted 
order, military planning, and industrial profits. By curbing the labor movement, the 
president could simultaneously serve multiple interests.    
 Collusions of power still needed public backing. Palmer’s career demonstrated 
a potential for public opinion management in law enforcement. Before his prediction 
of a communist revolution in America was discredited, the Justice Department 
enjoyed wide latitude in its treatment of labor activists, Communist Party members, 
and immigrants. When the revolt failed to materialize, however, Congress and the 
courts turned its attention to the DOJ’s illegal practices. These constitutional checks 
were too powerful for the attorney general’s coalition to overcome.  
 Working with established interests to curtail what was widely perceived as a 
foreign threat to America’s internal security was a logical application of the Bureau’s 
resources.  Combating labor radicalism played to popular sentiments long established 
in American culture against internationalism and minority groups. Targeting the Ku 
Klux Klan, however, was far less enticing to many because its ideals were more 
aligned with mainstream values, especially white supremacy, Protestantism, and 
isolationism.270 Campaigns against popular targets were more rewarding in terms of 
public support, which translated into expanded appropriations and jurisdiction.   
 The presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt further expanded the powers of the 
executive branch. Scientific management was imported into the public sector by 
progressives during the Harding administration and beyond. Republicans and 
Democrats both agreed with a movement toward greater economy and efficiency in 




environment where notions of scientific government administration flourished even 
further.271 Director Hoover bolstered the Roosevelt administration by demonstrating 
the cultural neutrality and effectiveness of the New Deal’s law enforcement program. 
The director first built up the notoriety of celebrity criminals, and turned their arrests 
into high profile media events. Such publicity and power offered Hoover an 
opportunity to avoid some of the ideological battles fought during the New Deal, 
while reaping the rewards of expanded institutional authority. By scientifically 
targeting gangsters, Hoover simultaneously appealed to Republicans, Democrats, 
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Chapter 2: The War on Crime 
 On the morning of June 17th, 1933, a phalanx of law enforcement officers 
escorted gangster Frank “Jelly” Nash through the terminal of Kansas City’s Union 
Station toward the parking lot.1 The outlaw was an escaped prisoner from the federal 
penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. The officers included three Bureau of 
Investigation (BI) special agents and policemen from Oklahoma City and Kansas 
City, Missouri.2 Some travelers noticed the wedge of men and concluded that “Pretty 
Boy” Floyd had been captured because “the morning papers carried the news that 
Floyd had arrived in town the night before; it was all anyone was talking about,” 
observes Bryan Burrough.3     
 As the group began piling into their automobiles, Floyd appeared with a 
machine gun in front of Nash’s car and ordered everyone to raise their hands. A 
policeman sitting behind Nash fired at the gunman, which triggered a “fusillade of 
machine gun bullets” that raked the car. The historian suggests that the two police 
officers in the back seat “jerked like marionettes, splashes of blood erupting across 
their chests and faces; both men were dead before they hit the ground. In the front 
seat Frank Nash’s head exploded.” Outside of the car, Special Agent Raymond 
Caffrey “was blown against the hood and crumpled to the pavement in a heap.”4 The 
unidentified murderer and his accomplices escaped by car, sustaining minor injuries; 
the wanted men subsequently went into hiding. Special Agent R.E. Vetterli “placed a 
call within minutes to J. Edgar Hoover informing him of the events in Kansas City,” 
which expanded the director’s movement against banditry.5 He soon ordered his 




 Attorney General Homer Stille Cummings interpreted the Kansas City 
Massacre as a test to federal authority. According to a June 1933 New York Times 
article, he “answered the challenge with an order to set the entire department on the 
trail of the killers,” thus escalating a War on Crime that he had previously 
envisioned.7 Just one week earlier, Cummings spoke of a New Deal “campaign” 
against “the racketeers of high finance and the racketeers of violence and bloodshed,” 
which would be an “unrelenting and persistent effort continued over a long period of 
time.”8 Of course, J. Edgar Hoover’s BI had limited jurisdiction to lead such a charge, 
even lacking jurisdiction to investigate the events in Kansas City.9 Though the 
attorney general acknowledged that his Department of Justice (DOJ) and its bureaus 
operated with restricted budgets and limited appropriations,10 he committed his office 
to pressing “forward with confidence, faith and good will” in the area of crime 
prevention.11 A nationwide anti-crime drive was about to commence that symbolized 
and publicized the effectiveness of the New Deal’s centralization of power in the 
federal government in order to meet the national crisis. Indeed, the massacre 
“generated a shock wave felt all the way to Franklin Roosevelt’s desk in the Oval 
Office.”12 
 New Dealers recognized the War on Crime as symptomatic of a shrinking 
world that called for greater coordination across government agencies to maximize 
efficiency. Special Assistant to the Attorney General Joseph B. Keenan wrote in an 
August 1933 New York Times article that “vast changes have taken place in the vital 
affairs of life,” including the advent of automobiles, airplanes, telephones, and radio, 




rise to “immense problems in law enforcement as well as economics.” Because state 
borders demarcated the limitations of local jurisdictions in the “various states” and 
prevented the prosecution of interstate crime, he recommended expanding the 
jurisdiction and appropriations of J. Edgar Hoover’s Division of Investigation (DI) to 
serve all “citizens of the United States.” The Division of Investigation was the official 
title of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) until July 1935. The DI (and the 
FBI) represented the consolidation of the Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of 
Identification, and the Bureau of Prohibition.13 The reorganization expanded 
Hoover’s jurisdiction to include federal prohibition through the Volstead Act.14 Of 
course, Keenan’s sentiment to expand the DI was a part of a larger movement that 
recognized the New Deal as a function of juristic activism inspired by a philosophy of 
political idealism.15   
 FDR used his first State of the Union address to compare the questionable 
practices of bankers with racketeers and kidnappers. He stated that the nation was 
“shocked by the many notorious examples of injuries done our citizens” by “high 
officials of banks” and “organized banditry.” These “violations of ethics and these 
violations of law,” he suggested, called “on the strong arm of the government for their 
immediate suppression; they also call[ed] on the country for an aroused public 
opinion.”16 The support offered to Attorney General Cummings by President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt would arguably best serve Director Hoover, who would use the Crime 
Records Division (CRD) to locate himself at the center of the New Deal’s War on 




 The DOJ, however, was not unified in its anti-crime drive. The establishment 
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Federal Parole Board under the 
direction of Sanford Bates marked an ideological divide in the DOJ. The Justice 
Department began to examine crime as a social product, rather than as an individual 
defect, thus curable by reformative programming. Director Bates championed a more 
humane approach to criminal justice programming that sought the rehabilitation of 
deviant social members. His arrival in 1929 came with expansive appropriations and 
jurisdiction which dwarfed Hoover’s agency. 
 The ensuing rivalry between the two directors represents J. Edgar Hoover’s 
first full scale public opinion management campaign, an effort so successful it would 
remain Hoover’s primary tool for consolidating power and expanding operations 
throughout his long career. He proposed to the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) in October 1937 that together they “must carry on a never-ending 
campaign of information” by which they could “make partners of the public.”17 This 
suggestion was made well after the fact, as he had already begun secretly strategizing 
the campaign on behalf of his own political interests.   
 J. Edgar Hoover used the press and popular entertainment to begin a longer 
process of militarizing the FBI. During the War on Crime this movement was 
predicated on notions of scientific management and efficiency. This campaign 
unraveled constitutional safeguards and destabilized a coalition of prison reformers in 
the BOP, the DOJ, and the American Bar Association (ABA). Hoover’s Americanist 
conspiracy theories propagated notions of a criminal conspiracy that linked low-level 




advocates who challenged his containment strategies by associating gangsters with 
reformers through a vermin metaphor. Hoover further enhanced and expanded the 
vermin metaphor with ancillary contagion and parasite metaphors. The juxtaposition 
between a scientific-expert and a “rat” conspirator ultimately elevated the FBI and 
undermined the BOP. Hoover circulated spectacular narratives and militant 
metaphors through the press that aligned his leadership of the FBI with the urban-
crime genre. In this realm, order was created by violence which was also a 
presumption of political realism.  
 This chapter begins with an examination of the War on Crime as a historical 
movement against gangsters, surveying the FBI’s major busts and political 
opposition. It then examines the infusion of liberal principles and programs into the 
DOJ, which challenged Hoover’s law enforcement philosophy and authority. Finally, 
the chapter explicates the director’s rhetorical styling to construct himself, the FBI, 
and its agents in terms of militant and scientific action detective heroes. It also 
examines the manner in which his political opposition and gangsters alike were 
constructed as component parts of a conspiracy through the vermin metaphor. This 
argument privileged deterrence strategies and the realist worldview over 
rehabilitation and its idealist principles. The chapter analyzes the public campaign 
that helped establish a mutually beneficial relationship between the director and the 
president, which simultaneously championed the New Deal and the FBI; both were 






Crime and Politics 
 The anti-crime movement targeted notorious interstate gangsters, which 
offered the Federal Bureau of Investigation a nation-wide stage to demonstrate its 
necessity and efficiency. However, in an age of public distrust and distaste for 
politicians and bankers, some crime reporters sympathized and glamorized press 
savvy outlaws, like John Dillinger, which threatened the support of the DOJ’s 
campaign. Beyond this obstacle, detractors in the executive branch, Congress, and the 
press attacked J. Edgar Hoover’s policing methods and self-promotional activities, 
thus challenging his leadership and presence in the Roosevelt administration. 
 The public campaign against banditry was an early test of the New Deal’s 
emphasis on cooperation between federal and local governments. The hallmarks of 
the Bureau’s gangster era were bookmarked between the apprehensions of bank 
robber George “Machine Gun” Kelly in September 1933 and racketeer Louis “Lepke” 
Buchalter in August 1939.  Though the FBI announced the completion of its 
campaign against gangsters in 1938, the Buchalter arrest represented the Bureau’s 
first strike against the Italian-American mafia and was publicized like other major 
busts.18 Hoover often took sole credit for the G-men’s accomplishments even though 
his agents worked closely with local police departments in the location, apprehension, 
and killing of “public enemies.” This term was coined by the Chicago Crime 
Commission and promoted in popular entertainment like the blockbuster film The 
Public Enemy (1931).19  
 The director’s success was measured by the containment of high profile 




Alcatraz Federal Penitentiary was then considered the only “super prison” capable of 
holding alleged “super criminals,” and evidenced the extraordinary ability of G-men 
at bringing public enemies to justice.20 The president and Congress assisted the DOJ 
by passing the Omnibus Crime Bill in May 1934, which made robbing national banks 
and those insured by the Federal Reserve System a federal crime. According to Curt 
Gentry, the crime bill also regulated the following activities with federal law: 
 the transportation of stolen property, the transmission of threats, racketeering 
 in interstate commerce, and the flight of a felon or witness across state lines to 
 avoid prosecution or giving testimony. The Lindbergh Law was amended to 
 add the death penalty and to create a presumption of interstate transportation 
 of the victim after seven days, thus allowing the Bureau to enter the case.21    
Perhaps even more telling of the director’s success at promoting his agency was the 
expansion of its appropriations during the Great Depression. The Bureau grew from 
$2.75 million for fiscal year 1933 to $6.6 million for fiscal year 1939.22 This 
expansion, according to Hoover’s testimony in the Annual Report of the Attorney 
General, included developing the “training school for appointees,” creating a “system 
of uniform crime reporting based on police records,” opening the “technical-research 
laboratory and the single-fingerprint section” in 1933, and launching the Bureau’s 
National Police Academy in 1935.23 The Bureau “initiated an international exchange 
of criminal identification data” with “practically every important nation” in 1932, 
thus further expanding its international focus.24 The agency’s growth in jurisdiction 
and appropriations, and its militarization through an emphasis on scientific police 




rhetorical style emphasized his professionalism and competence in an age of 
disrepute for most other police agencies. 
 The FBI’s rapid expansion throughout the War on Crime was also related to 
New Deal programming that recognized crime control as symbolic of federal 
efficiency. FDR announced at the December 1934 Attorney General’s Conference on 
Crime that the “constant struggle to safeguard ourselves against the attacks of the 
lawless and the criminal elements” was a “component part” of his “large objective” to 
release and direct the “vital forces that make for a healthy national life.” Therefore, 
the president concluded, “law enforcement officers” were to be remedied of 
“inadequate organization, unscientific administration and lack of public support and 
understanding.”25 These statements expanded upon his May 1934 “Statement on 
Signing Bill to Help the Federal Government Wage War on Crime and Gangsters” in 
which he proclaimed that spreading “fear in the underworld” was an “event of the 
first importance.” He then suggested that “[l]aw enforcement and gangster 
extermination” could not become “completely effective so long” as the “public 
look[ed] with tolerance upon known criminals, permits public officers to become 
corrupted” or “applauds efforts to romanticize crime.” The president’s rhetorical 
selection of “extermination” highlights the linguistic framework in which Hoover 
emphasized the vermin metaphor. Roosevelt sought to arouse “public opinion” by 
equipping the FBI with “new facilities, men and funds” to make it as “effective an 
instrumentality of crime detection and punishment as any of the similar agencies of 




through a symbolic relationship between crime and punishment; the FBI director 
would adroitly expand upon this arrangement.  
 Hoover’s victories in the War on Crime began with a series of arrests and 
killings between 1933 and 1934 that framed the Bureau as a militaristic agency. The 
arrest of “Machine Gun” Kelly in September 1933 came a month after the arrest of 
Harvey Bailey, but was far more significant. Burrough suggests that the Kelly “arrest 
marked a turning point in Bureau history” because he “was the first nationally known 
fugitive the FBI had ever captured.” In addition to the arrest coining the term “G-
men,” it  “furthered the notion that there existed a realm of larger-than-life super-
villains loose in the land, popularized the idea that the nation was actually at war with 
these criminals, and catapulted the Bureau into the public consciousness as the 
nation’s proxy in that war.”27  The War on Crime narrative constituted the Bureau in a 
militant style and helped Hoover to fashion a reality that existed more in dime novels. 
Pulp fiction and true crime magazines transformed mystery into conspiracy and 
criminals into powerful villains with evil motivations and political connections. 
Hoover used notorious outlaws like “Machine Gun” Kelly to reify such storylines. 
The director cast himself, the FBI, and its agents as protagonists, while criminals, as 
well as his political opposition, represented the antagonists. This juxtaposition 
advocated his militant law enforcement philosophy. In this manner, a frightening 
world and an ideologically appropriate worldview were hoisted upon the citizenry 
through the Crime Record Division’s public relations material. 
 The public was captivated again in January 1934, when Kate “Ma” Barker and 




authorization to carry firearms. Bonnie and Clyde met a similar fate that May as they 
drove into an ambush. Perhaps most prominent was the July killing of John Dillinger 
when leaving a Chicago movie theater by Special Agent in Charge, Melvin Purvis. 
Dillinger was treated by the press as an “all-American anti-hero,” which made him 
more popular by some estimates than President Roosevelt or Charles Lindbergh.28 His 
killing was also treated with much fanfare. Two months later, the Bureau arrested 
Bruno Hauptman for the kidnap and murder of Charles Lindbergh Jr.29 In October, 
Melvin Purvis returned to the headlines for hunting down and killing “Pretty Boy” 
Floyd. And, “Baby Face” Nelson and Special Agent Samuel Cowley killed each other 
in a November shootout.30 Purvis obviously gained prominence for his successes, 
which arguably detracted from Hoover’s publicity. The director’s jealousy was 
provoked. According to Richard Gid Powers, Purvis was “forced to resign from the 
Bureau” for this after months of “harassment” from Hoover on July 10, 1935.31   
 The quantity of major busts against high profile offenders would decrease 
after Nelson; the director’s involvement, however, would notably increase. Known as 
“Director’s Cases,” Hoover was credited for the final four major arrests in the War on 
Crime: Alvin “Old Creepy” Karpis and Harry Campbell in May 1936, Harry Brunette 
in December of that same year, and Louis “Lepke” Buchalter in August 1939.32 
Buchalter was the leader of a notorious mafia organization known as Murder Inc.—
which included such notables as Benjamin “Bugsy” Siegel and Meyer Lansky—and 
his arrest was arranged by columnist and radio personality Walter Winchell, who 
used the opportunity to promote himself and Hoover.33 Buchalter was the only 




against his political rivals, the only one with political connections. His mediated 
arrest showcased the same press strategizing as the previous busts and was the last 
gangster era Director’s Case. In sum, the campaign captured five outlaws and killed 
eleven others. Five of those killed were wanted for non-capital offenses, especially 
bank robbery, and one was not wanted at all.  
 The media’s coverage of these outlaws posed its own challenge to the 
Department of Justice. The widespread distrust of bankers and government officials 
encouraged some writers to sympathize more with the major criminal personalities. 
William Beverly notes that John Dillinger “understood public relations” and enjoyed 
“popular media representations that aestheticized him and repressed the danger he 
posed” so much that “he briefly became more popular than his G-man pursuers.”34 
For example, Time magazine exclaimed in May 1934 that “to be plentifully loved and 
diligently hunted [was] the lot of desperadoes.” Time also referred to Dillinger as 
“Robin Hood”— a metaphor that equated Hoover with the villainous Sheriff of 
Nottingham.35 Such framing obviously threatened the director’s stature, which in turn 
jeopardized the Bureau’s jurisdiction and appropriations.    
 While Hoover publicly campaigned to build his and the Bureau’s national 
reputations, he also fought political opponents behind the scenes to maintain control 
of his agency and his status. The director quarreled with Democratic Party boss and 
Postmaster General James Farley, who sought to remove Hoover from office when 
the Roosevelt administration came to power.36 This contributed to an uncooperative 
relationship between Bureau agents and postal inspectors.37 Relations with the 




officially changed the name of the Division of Investigation to the “Federal Bureau of 
Investigation” on July 1, 1935. According to Gentry, the rebranding was “protested” 
by the “Treasury Department’s chief law enforcement officer. The new name implied 
that Hoover’s was the only federal bureau of investigation” even though “there were 
at least a dozen others, including Treasury’s own Secret Service.”38 
 Hoover also fought against detractors in Congress and the press. Senate 
Appropriations Committee Chairman Kenneth D. McKellar (D-TN) sympathized 
with Farley’s campaign against the director. The Bureau had ransacked the senator’s 
office when the DOJ was controlled by the Herbert Hoover administration. In 
addition, the director refused to comply with the senator’s request that Hoover hire 
some of his constituents as special agents, and even fired three Tennessee agents 
when McKellar complained to the attorney general.39 Sentiment against Hoover could 
also be found in the press.  
 Ray Tucker wrote in a 1933 Collier’s article that Hoover had turned the 
Bureau into a “secret federal police” that operated as a “personal and political 
machine,” that the director never “did any field investigating himself,” and that his 
“appetite for publicity [was] the talk of the Capital.” He also alluded to an effeminate 
demeanor. For example, Tucker observed that Hoover “walk[ed] with mincing step” 
and “dresse[d] fastidiously, with Eleanor blue as the favorite color for the matched 
shades of tie, handkerchief and socks.” The reporter noted that Hoover was averse to 
“liberals and advanced thinkers,” and warned members of the press that if they “write 
or speak criticism” of Hoover, Bureau agents would “investigate your wife, your 




politically charged and vulnerable to the same accusations that characterized local 
police administrations in their enforcement of prohibition laws. The director’s past 
strikes against Democrats were heretofore protected by the former attorney general 
and appreciated by President Hoover. The FBI director, however, now needed to 
reinvent himself for the New Deal or find himself replaced by a Roosevelt loyalist. 
Institutions and Ideologies 
 The War on Crime was waged during an era of uncertainty for law 
enforcement ideals. The DOJ encountered ideological divisions between its bureau 
directors who pushed the department in opposite directions. President Hoover 
established the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1930 under the leadership of Director 
Sanford Bates. Like the FBI director, the BOP director reported directly to the 
attorney general, making the position horizontal to the FBI director. The arrival of 
Sanford Bates represented a challenge to J. Edgar Hoover’s organizational potential, 
as the former enjoyed the privileges of ideological alignment with the legal 
community. This opposition presented Director Hoover with an ideological challenge 
to his realist worldview and limited his ability to curb crime through deterrence 
strategies.   
   Like Hoover, Director Bates managed a statistical unit. According to Bates’ 
appropriations testimony before Congress, that division compiled data on “the 
number and character of penitentiary and jail prisoners.”41 And, like the FBI’s CRD, 
this data created an opportunity for the BOP to publicize its work. The statistical 
bureau published the annual publication, Federal Offenders, and distributed it to 




parole.”42 The publication interposed articles written by the director and other 
rehabilitation advocates between statistical reports, thus serving as a liberal vestige.43 
Federal Offenders, coupled with a book on American prisons, a report on juvenile 
delinquents in the Soviet Union, and a few newspaper articles and speeches, 
represented Bates’ limited media reach.44 His expertise focused on juveniles, which 
Hoover would refute with his own ideas on the topic.  
 Bates promoted the intellectual underpinnings of the BOP’s rehabilitative 
operations. He wrote in an August 1938 Forum Magazine article that the “problem of 
the discharged prisoner ha[d] always been a difficult one. Society ha[d] not yet 
learned how to punish a man and reform him at the same time.” He noted that many 
men “leave prison with a resolve to go straight,” but noted that this often broke down 
when the released prisoner attempted “to confront a hostile or unsympathetic society 
single-handedly.” To ease the transition, “a period of supervision” was “added to the 
end of a man’s prison term.”  He contended that the “good parole system” made 
possible the adjustment of the release date “to a time when employment can be 
obtained.” It also provided an “incentive for good behavior,” assisted a “well-
intentioned prisoner to rehabilitate himself,” retuned a “violator” to prison “without 
trial,” and enabled “the authorities to keep a check on the man’s conduct and 
whereabouts.”45 
 Director Bates championed his own scientific leadership in the rehabilitation 
effort. He boasted that “in good parole systems, such as that of the federal 
government, not more than ten percent of discharged prisoners violate regulations 




evidence that “less than 1 per cent” of “all men now being arrested for crime” were 
“found to be on parole at the time of arrest.”  Therefore, Bates suggested, the “wiser 
and more careful the system of parole which [was] devised, the more protection will 
be.”46 In using the FBI’s data to build his own argument, Bates challenged Hoover’s 
control of information and philosophy of law enforcement. 
 The rivalry posed by Sanford Bates to J. Edgar Hoover was significant for a 
number of reasons. Being the only other DOJ bureau director, Bates served as 
Hoover’s foremost competitor for appropriations. This juxtaposition created clashes 
at points of overlapping jurisdiction. Controlling his own statistical division, Bates 
was in a position to check Hoover’s expertise with his own. Both men used 
aggregated data as evidence for claims on reality. Whereas Hoover recommended that 
“society [should] preserve itself” from the frightening criminal threat with the 
“Machine Gun School of Criminology,” Bates recommended protecting society 
through rehabilitating prisoners as recommended by the widely popular Wickersham 
Commission.47 In Bates’ vision, most prisoners were persons who would better 
themselves if they had such opportunity; the militarized law enforcement apparatus 
that Hoover would spend his career building was therefore not justified.  
 The FBI and BOP were linked through criminals in custody. As the FBI 
arrested more and more individuals for violating the various laws under its 
jurisdiction, its suspects would eventually transfer to the Prison Bureau’s custody. 
This inflated the BOP at an accelerated rate, which threatened Hoover’s 
appropriations and room for institutional growth.  Bates explained to the House 




unforeseen rate, in part, because of the “general increased activity of the Department 
of Justice in the old lines of crime.”48 Of course, he also wrote in the New York Times 
that America had “more crime” than other nations because it had “more crimes. We 
have attempted to lift people to a higher standard of morality” by the “doubtful 
method of punishing them into conformity.”49 Such statements challenged 
Americanism and its enforcers.  
 Ideological differences between bureau directors created conflict. The 
Washington Herald reported in October 1935 that a “feud long standing in the 
Department of Justice” had surfaced “between Hoover and Sanford Bates, director of 
the Bureau of Prisons and Paroles.” The newspaper explained that “Hoover’s 
outspoken attack on parole abuses furthered the strife” and that the assistant attorneys 
general “sided with Bates.”50 Central to DOJ infighting was the core disagreement 
between realism and idealism regarding the humanity of criminals and how they 
ought to be treated. More money for criminal rehabilitation meant less for detection 
and apprehension. Beyond organizing the FBI to combat crime, Hoover also 
mobilized it to combat alternative political positions. For this reason, he built the FBI 
on the twin foundations of domestic propaganda and censorship long before 
challenges were posed by the Axis powers or the Soviet Union.   
 Director Hoover looked to public opinion management for his faceoff with 
Sanford Bates. He invited Courtney Ryley Cooper to advertise the FBI through print, 
radio, and film. Cooper turned the G-men into a national sensation by reframing the 
federal officers as action detective heroes, which played to various national 




entertainment while the Bureau’s movements became a part of popular culture. In the 
process, Hoover became both a law enforcement expert and a celebrity.  
Rhetorical Strategizing in the War on Crime 
 The CRD’s process of invention pulled from various American historical and 
cultural facets. Powers explains that Hoover, Cooper, and the CRD developed an 
“FBI formula” for law enforcement propaganda. It unified “all aspects of the FBI’s 
operations into one coherent image” and it “became the model for all future 
publicity.”51 The formula relied on standards established by scientific managers, as 
well as realist assumptions of force, to present the Bureau as a professional corrective 
to solve the nation’s lawlessness. Cooper borrowed concepts from an immensely 
popular action detective genre in constructing the director’s political leadership 
within the DOJ. Cooper then used this identity to link the problem of gangsters to that 
of public corruption. Cooper’s material emphasized the vermin metaphor, which 
lumped criminals, lawyers, politicians, and idealists together in a grand conspiracy. In 
the process, Hoover’s worldview and interpretations were pitted against the 
leadership and ideology of Sanford Bates; the latter were implicated with corruption. 
 This section uses newspapers, speeches, departmental orders, government 
reports, letters, and FBI files to reconstruct an environment that had bearing on the 
rhetorical invention of Hoover’s ideas. According to Ronald H. Carpenter, 
historiographical research helps “explain what happened as a prelude to discourse” 
and the “choices” made in “creative processes.”52 In so doing, this case study 
highlights certain economic and ideological pressures that Hoover’s information 




rhetorical historians to illustrate motives, methods, and values of “political actors as 
they wrestle to shape public philosophy and implement public policy.”53 The War on 
Crime is examined here as an ideological campaign to maintain social control through 
public opinion management. This study examines how discourse was used to build 
legitimacy for deterrence strategies. It focuses on Hoover’s presentation of realism as 
an ideological alternative to the more dominant idealist worldview that occupied the 
halls of power in the early years of the Roosevelt administration.  
Militarism and the Rhetoric of Science, Realism, and Action Detective Heroism 
 The FBI formula used the urban-crime genre as a vehicle for demonstrating 
scientific management and for privileging realism. Using professional norms widely 
accepted by business leaders and public administrators, the CRD emphasized 
efficiency and profitability through scientific methodology and training. Focusing on 
process and procedure stripped FBI agents of their individual identities, leaving 
Hoover alone to accept accolades for the successes of his agents. Hoover’s discourses 
celebrated the procedural mechanization of criminal detection and apprehension. His 
speeches and stories praised technocratic control through technocratic power and 
reaffirmed the constant danger posed by super-villains through a familiar style of 
realm located in dime novels. This locus displaced constitutional protections with 
notions of militant efficiency, and influenced cultural understandings of realism 
during the 1930s and beyond.   
 Realism’s central concept of the power principle was defined in terms of 
technocratic control which militarized the Bureau’s operations. Power was 




and laboratory equipment, all components of militarized strength. More than crime-
fighting equipment, these became rhetorical tools for expanding Hoover’s jurisdiction 
and appropriations based on arguments of efficiency and professionalism. In the 
industrial era, science, technology, and power were melded together, lending police 
administration a scientific and militarized identity. These ideas were packaged in 
popular detective story conventions.    
 The dime novel urban-crime genre provided a framework suitable for 
advancing realist notions of a world steeped in chaos and verging on collapse, and, 
therefore in need of state control. Detective stories in pulp fiction and true crime 
magazines unseated the dominance of the western genre in the late nineteenth 
century, which marked shifting population trends toward urban society caused by 
immigration and the industrial revolution.54 Storylines reinforced isolationism and 
xenophobia through glorifying heroic, muscular, white Anglo-Saxon men motivated 
to do good for the sake of justice. Antagonists were motivated by evil to threaten 
cultural values and social stability.55 Wilbur R. Miller notes that protagonists held 
pessimistic views of city life and perpetually revealed “underworld” criminal 
“conspiracies” as “upper-class villains” hired street hoodlums to commit crimes 
against society. He adds that the genre “expressed the fears and values” of middle-
class American society toward a new and uncertain city life, filled with strange 
peoples and ideas. 56   
 Hollywood further circulated urban-crime storylines in the 1920s and 1930s 
through gangster and detective films. Thomas Shatz explains that popular story 




celebrating ideological precepts that affirmed American values. Specially, these films 
reified cultural threats in the form of antagonists who were irrationally brutal and 
were hostile to measures of law and order. Gangsters represented the “perverse alter 
ego of the ambitious, profit-minded American male” in an alienated urban 
environment with class distinctions. Because antagonists were denied legitimate 
routes to power and success, they turned to depersonalizing “technology—guns, cars, 
phones, etc.” Conflict was “translated into violence” and resolved through the 
elimination of the character. 57 The use of deadly force by antagonists justified its use 
by protagonists, which allowed the urban-crime genre to treat the punishment of 
cultural offenders in a hardboiled, unsentimental manner.58 Force was its ultimate 
currency.   
 The urban-crime genre interplayed realist notions of power and technocratic 
control. George Orwell wrote in 1939 that detective stories oriented readers to 
identify with an “all-powerful character who dominates everyone” through the threat 
of violence. The protagonist is a “superman” whose power emanates from “physical 
strength” and whose usual “method” for problem solving was a “sock on the jaw.”59 
Force, therefore, was considered a method for problem solving. According to Ron 
Gaulart, heroes could “box, fence, swim, and operate whatever new mechanism came 
along—automobile, airplane, etc.”60 Poetic justice was privileged before law. Villains 
were routinely punished by death in gun battles, mob lynching, and suicide; courts 
were nonexistent. Similarly, the public enemies, were rarely imprisoned or executed 




Therefore, according to the genre, militarism—not rehabilitation—was the natural 
response to criminals who challenged American value sets. 
Scientific Power and the Action Detective Hero  
 In his writings, Cooper celebrated Hoover’s scientific professionalism and 
constructed agents as singularly nondescript, but collectively composing an elite 
workforce. The CRD used urban-crime narratives to promote Hoover’s leadership, 
the Bureau’s facilities, its agents, and the realist worldview. Efficiency was privileged 
as the Bureau’s highest principle, which elevated militarism above constitutionality. 
In the process, realist assumptions of how the state ought to engage the citizenry were 
reified in speeches, articles, radio programs, and films.  
 Like pulp fiction action detectives, Hoover was constructed as an 
intellectually, physically, and socially elite scientific detective superhero. Cooper 
wrote in an August 1933 syndicated article that Hoover was ruggedly individualistic 
as he was a “master detective who simply [did] not conform to any picture of the 
average crime chaser.” Having studied French, English, and Canadian law 
enforcement methods, the director was allegedly accepted as an “expert all over the 
country” and knew “all the scientific short cuts devised for the unraveling of crime.”62 
Cooper added in another article that same month that Hoover’s leadership was 
egalitarian. He noted that Hoover “was Boss merely because he was the best of the 
gang.”63 In the introduction to Person in Hiding (1938), the public relations counselor 
described Hoover in super-human and militant terms. He suggested that the director 
had “machine-gun” speech delivery, with a “sixth sense” for finding a “flaw in 




aligned with the character profile of an action detective hero. For example, Newsweek 
printed in August 1933 that Hoover’s “build resemble[d] a light heavy-weight’s” and 
the New York Herald Tribune commended him in February 1934 for being “one of 
the world’s great criminologists” and for his “faultless breeding.”65  Hoover’s 
leadership was also showcased by film. As Hollywood producers worked to gain 
access to Bureau files in their pursuit of evolving the gangster genre into that of the 
G-man, they wrote scripts to ingratiate the director. The Motion Pictures Producers 
and Distributors of America (MPPDA) guaranteed to “portray upon the screen the 
best in law enforcement,” shaping films to “direct the sympathy of the audience 
against the crime and the criminal and toward the forces of law and order.”66 The 
film industry submitted scripts to the CRD for revisions and approval, which sought 
to further placate Hoover’s appetite for self-promotion.67 These films reinforced the 
theme of Hoover as action-detective-hero, thus serving the director and his realist 
ideology. For example, G-Men (1935) reenacted the Kansas City Massacre, but 
credited the War on Crime to the FBI director, rather than the attorney general. In the 
film, the dramatized and militant director stands before a group of congressmen and 
proclaims:  
 Gentlemen, give us national laws with teeth in them, covering the whole field 
 of interstate crime . . . Arm governmental agents, and not just with revolvers. 
 If these gangsters want to use machine guns—give the special agents machine 
 guns, shotguns, tear gas, and everything else! This is war!68 
In reality, the 1934 Omnibus Crime Bill was passed through the politicking of 




the public record. Powers explains that “Hollywood had done something Hoover 
would not have dared, something that Cummings could not prevent—it had turned the 
top G-Man into a star and it had demoted the director’s boss to an off-screen 
nonentity.”69 This film, and many others like it, portrayed the director and his G-men 
as militarized and powerful action heroes. 
 Hoover’s leadership identity was firmly connected to the FBI, which was 
militantly described in terms of science, machinery, and power. Cooper credited 
Hoover in August 1933 for creating “the nucleus of America’s first real national 
police force.” Hoover was praised for turning a “nondescript organization” into one 
of the “most powerful crime deterrents in the world and made it as much feared by 
the underworld as England’s Scotland Yard.”70 This new organization, according to 
Cooper’s introduction to Persons in Hiding, was “superhuman” and a “miracle” in 
action.71 The New York Herald Tribune explained in February 1934 that headquarters 
acquainted agents with the “machinery of Federal law,” who were then “taught 
fingerprinting and other sciences.”72 The New York Post applauded Hoover’s training 
of “gum-shoe tactics” in August of 1933, which according to the newspaper, pointed 
to “real achievement.”73 The ideas of realism were implicated through glamorizing 
the role of power in protecting the nation from cultural and economic outsiders; such 
pariahs were portrayed as enemies within America’s borders.  
 Power in scientific detection was showcased as a function of an elite 
workforce and its scientific training. G-men were constructed as action detective 
heroes, which reflected the culture’s class and racial hierarchy. According to the New 




identity as they simply looked “precisely” like other well “reared” individuals.74 They 
were presented as a conglomerate of college educated men, further rarified by their 
professional police training. In a series of articles appearing in the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology on “Police Science,” Hoover wrote in 1933 that “all 
special agents coming within the jurisdiction of this Bureau must either be lawyers or 
graduate accountants with experience in investigative work.”75 This established a 
social filter that privileged those who could attend college and enter the force, namely 
middle and upper-class white males. Among this subset of the workforce, Hoover 
privileged graduates from more conservative Christian universities, thereby further 
ensuring that the FBI’s personnel shared his Americanist value structure. These 
captains of race, class, and ideology were further trained in science to militantly battle 
crime.   
 The FBI sought to turn the social elites into law enforcement experts by 
training them in the mysteries of scientific power. Hoover told the ABA in August 
1934 that his agents received “intensive training courses in the training school of the 
Division at Washington,” which, according to Hoover, was “the only one of its 
kind.”76 He explained in an April 1933 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
article that “all reports” were then “carefully scrutinized in order to insure the 
employment of the latest, most scientifically comprehensive methods.”77 According 
to a November 1938 article published in Review of Scientific Instruments, these 
included microscopic inspections, “chemical analytical methods,” and 
“spectrographic examination[s]” by the “Bureau’s Technical Laboratory.”78 Such an 




had departed from the ideological investigations that marked the Bureau’s activities 
during previous administrations. The FBI then had an alleged monopoly on 
professionalism in law enforcement through its elite workforce and its unique 
possession of scientific facilities and instruments. 
 Special agents were equally trained and powerful in the militant methods and 
machinery of criminal apprehension. Busting criminals was a mainstay of Bureau 
publicity, as such narratives played into sensational action stories. In a June 1936 
speech before the Kiwanis International, for example, Hoover boasted that with 
“meticulous” training, FBI agents had been “taught how to arrest bandits in a 
speeding motor car, or under conditions of flight.” All agents were said to be an 
“expert marksman or better in the use of the pistol, the shotgun, the machine gun, and 
the high powered rifle.”79 The director’s imagery was further heightened in true crime 
articles.   
 Hoover wrote stories with Cooper in The American Magazine that 
sensationalized FBI operations through tales of militant danger and technocratic 
power. For example, they wrote in an August 1936 article of lights glowing “upon the 
switchboard in the Communications Room of headquarters” and “airplanes” rushing 
G-men “from city to city.” Agents in the field maintained “constant telephonic 
connection.”80 And, when special agents did catch up to the criminal, they were 
prepared for war. In a shootout appearing in the June 1936 edition, Hoover and 
Cooper wrote that while “outbursts of flame spat” from a criminal’s rifle, special 
agents “stepped up” their “swift government machine” to “its fullest power,” 




mechanization and professionalism, which was allegedly necessary to combat super-
villain criminals.82 These narratives of heroic force became Americanist political 
expression. The urban-crime genre thematically criticized law enforcement and public 
policy more generally, so its popularity only made it more political in nature.   
 Hoover heralded technocratic administration for its efficiency. He consistently 
used statistics compiled by the CRD to suggest before appropriations committees and 
other audiences that the FBI was an economic investment for the federal government.  
Speaking before the House Appropriations Committee in February 1936, for example, 
Hoover compared the Bureau’s funding for fiscal year 1935 with the “fines, 
recoveries, and savings” generated by the FBI; he concluded that “for every dollar 
expended, there was a savings of about $8 effected.”83 Using the same ratio, he told 
Westminster College in June 1937 that the FBI’s “efficiency” made it the “best 
paying investment” for “any community” as it offered “the cheapest form of 
insurance [and] the greatest profit maker” at no “cost to them.”84 Perennial statistics, 
though allegedly fabricated in many ways, reinforced the director’s stature as a 
scientific expert and justified the expansion of his appropriation and jurisdiction 
while undermining civil liberties.85 In this manner, efficiency was treated as the 
standard of professionalism, while the subject of constitutionality was largely 
ignored. 
 The rhetorical convergence of science and realism through action detective 
heroism presented a number of constitutive dynamics. Hoover was constructed as a 
strong, rugged individual with Anglo-Saxon heritage who understood the true danger 




force. The FBI was built as an omnipresent organization between headquarters in 
Washington, DC and its various field offices. Militarism was privileged as a form of 
scientific professionalism through its laboratory, training courses, equipment, and 
methods. Lastly, its agents were the yield of Hoover’s leadership and the Bureau’s 
facilities. They were constructed as a group of robust faceless white middle-class and 
upper-class college educated men who defended societal values and its institutions 
from their privileged positions. “G-men” were obviously a cultural product. These 
identities served to legitimate the director’s coercive operations as an inevitable 
conclusion based on cultural and technological trends. In the process, the FBI was 
militarized to fight outlaws like it was to fight the central powers during World War I.  
Americanists and the Vermin Metaphor  
 The FBI’s information campaign built arguments to win greater support for 
Director Hoover and detract from Director Sanford Bates and his BOP. The 
investigation director associated criminals, idealists, and corrupt politicians with each 
other through the use of the vermin metaphor. This was bolstered by the “Director’s 
Cases,” which functioned as public relations opportunities for the director. He used 
the press to publicly take personal credit for arrests made by his agents, which offered 
him staged and broad platforms from which to speak.86 As the CRD portrayed Hoover 
in an action detective frame, it also constructed Bates and idealism as outmoded and 
corrupt. Hoover’s discourse masked the CRD’s behind-the-scenes strategizing, and 
instead presented, the director’s official FBI leadership as a brand of pulp fiction 
evidenced by Bureau files. Creating this alternative reality was made possible by the 




Publications, who committed his support to the DOJ through calling for “a new 
Committee on Public Information.”87 The CRD worked closely with members of 
print, radio, and film media; all stood to profit by sensationalizing Hoover’s 
leadership.  
 True crime storylines bridged the world of pulp fiction into the allegedly real 
world by sensationalizing crime news stories that offered Hoover a coherent narrative 
for discrediting his opposition. According to Ron Goulart, content for pulp fiction 
characters like ace detective Nick Carter was largely drawn from “newspaper crime 
reporting and other contemporary accounts,” allowing comic strip detectives to travel 
to “real locales” and challenge “the real criminals of the day.”88 Conversely, a 
mediated Hoover existed in true crime magazines with superhuman, crime-fighting 
powers.  Fictitious characters could then travel to allegedly real locals, while celebrity 
crime fighters like Hoover could combat fictitious villains. The press largely adopted 
the CRD’s generic framings of persons and events, allowing the director to traverse 
these interconnected worlds. Publishers celebrated the rise of J. Edgar Hoover and his 
G-man as a new breed of action detective heroes.89 This genre was well suited for 
Hoover to convey and demonstrate his leadership and interpretations of the War on 
Crime.   
 Hoover used Courtney Ryley Cooper’s formula and the dime novel’s reality- 
making machine to frame his campaigns against criminals and political enemies alike, 
including John Dillinger, Sanford Bates, and idealism more generally. The CRD 
constituted Hoover’s feud with Director Bates as a part of the true crime universe. In 




underworld conspiracy. The CRD’s various constructions in fiction and non-fiction 
formats pushed forward a symmetrical realist logic that interconnected the logics of 
political culture and popular entertainment. Both fiction and non-fiction texts drew 
from the same types of evidence, relied on the same types of assumptions, and offered 
the same types of conclusions. This symmetry promoted Hoover’s philosophy and 
leadership over those ideas promoted by Bates. The following section further outlines 
a movement that valued force as a form of political expression. 
 The CRD constituted a vermin identity for Hoover’s various targets. This 
metaphor lumped Hoover’s oversight, bureaucratic competition, and ideological 
opposition together with the sensational criminals that the public was told to fear. The 
rhetorical maneuver was largely predicated on Cooper’s generic suggestions for crime 
stories that seeped into the director’s discourse and broader information campaign. 
The conspiracy theory added to the director’s leadership persona, which was a 
composite of his technocratic expertise and his alleged challenge to the political-
criminal underworld. And through the Director’s Cases, the boundaries of pulp fiction 
began to blur as Hoover became a superhuman character in true crime magazines and 
in major news outlets.   
 The rat metaphor offered strategic rhetorical advantages. Erin Steuter and 
Deborah Wills explain that vermin metaphors are common to war propaganda as 
rodents are abhorrent to the collective conscious. The vermin metaphor served as a 
vehicle for communicating Hoover’s conspiracy theory and privileged his realist 
worldview. The scholars suggest that rats are symbolically repulsive because they are 




Rats invisibly coexist with humans in cities through secretly “penetrating” and thus 
“corrupting the places we imagined safe.” Because they are loathed, constructing 
humans as rats invites containment logic, wherein traps are expected to be lethal. 
These ideas helped articulate the existence of a vast political-criminal conspiracy that 
corrupted public office, and encouraged deterrence strategies that sought to kill and 
contain public enemies.90  
 Cooper sought to frame the Prison Bureau and idealism as a part of the 
criminal conspiracy and ultimately turn public opinion toward the FBI and realism. In 
November 1933, Cooper proposed that he write a story “on the matter of prisons, and 
how they [were] being turned into country clubs.” He suggested that this would 
“arouse the country to such a point that something could be done about it” if the story 
indicted “the SYSTEM and the people of the United States who [had] permitted 
convict coddlers to get the upper hand.” Cooper’s editor wanted to focus on the 
manner in which “various convict organizations” were behind the prison reform 
program, and how they accomplished it by threat, force, and bribery.91 In portraying 
prison improvement as a conspiracy orchestrated by criminals, prison reformers were 
then aligned with underworld mechanics. Hoover, however, was presented as a 
faithful public servant battling corruption in the political system. This contrast 
presented deterrence strategies as an obvious solution to a constructed problem. 
Hoover emphasized Cooper’s social problems and realist solutions in speeches, films, 
books, and articles.   
 The publicist borrowed conventions from dime novel detective storylines to 




According to a memorandum written by Hoover in September 1934, Cooper wanted 
to “prove” that a “set-up” existed in “practically every town” whereby the “gangster” 
had “naturally assumed the place whereby he [could] control bonds, paroles, etc.” 
through “political affiliations, etc.,” and to “‘lick’ the crime problem all this must be 
uprooted.” Hoover told Cooper that this generic underworld conspiracy “theory” was 
“absolutely sound.”92 The director encouraged Cooper to write a “story” on the 
alleged existence of “political affiliations in gangster activities” even though no 
evidence of such connections were located after the CRD conducted a “survey” of 
“information along these lines.”93  
 Cooper’s stories borrowed from and distorted the Wickersham Commission’s 
review of police corruption. In Report on Police (1931), the commission observed 
that the “general failure of the police to detect and arrest criminals guilty of the many 
murders, spectacular bank, pay-roll, and other hold-ups, and sensational robberies 
with guns . . . caused a loss of public confidence in the police of our country.” The 
investigators noted that the collapse of public trust was largely caused by the “well-
known and oft proven alliances between criminals and corrupt politicians which 
control[ed] . . . the police” forces around the country.94 Rather than praising idealists 
for identifying the problem of public corruption in law enforcement, Cooper’s stories 
blamed prison reformers for creating conspiratorial networks. His ideas pitted the 
scientific detective administrator against an evil underworld, and were circulated 
throughout Hoover’s political discourse. 
 Cooper’s storylines and crime theories are evident in Hoover’s construction of 




The director enumerated the enemies of law enforcement before the IACP in July 
1935 as the “‘human rat’” who stood “with a gun in his hand and murder in his 
heart.” The street criminal was assisted by “legal vermin” who “orate[d] loudly” on 
the “preservation” of “constitutional rights” and “politicians” who associated with 
“gutter scum.”95 The director warned the Catholic Holy Names Society in September 
1936 that this conspiracy included “many forces” which had combined “under cloaks 
of respectability” to “make crime an easy and paying business.”96 This conspiracy 
theory was extended to include all of Hoover’s opposition.   
 Cooper sought to portray the director as protecting the nation from idealism, 
which was unwittingly playing into the hands of criminals. He suggested that his 
storylines should tell of “meddling women” and “how they [had] freed guilty man 
after guilty man.” According to his memorandum, he wanted to warn the public of an 
“insidious creeping process which [had] been put over” by the “convicts themselves 
and persons who perhaps meant well but who [had] brought about a serious condition 
in this country.”97 These ideas would turn into arguments against acts of parole, 
probation, and pardon in which Hoover complained of emotionally-blinded liberals 
who stopped the hand of justice as they sought to release dangerous convicts. 
According to Assistant Director W.H.D. Lester of the CRD, a part of this campaign 
made “considerable criticism, directly and by innuendo, of local police departments 
as well as of the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice.”98 The Bureau 
adopted a strategy of attack by implication to protect it from potential objections 
made by the “Bureau of Prisons” against Hoover for using his “position in the 




generic themes from urban-crime storylines recast the New Deal’s value set as a 
threat to the nation’s safety. 
 Hoover used the vermin metaphor to construct idealists and liberal politicians, 
especially parole advocates, as part of a vast network of evil doers with sinister 
motivations. The director told the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 
1936 that corrupt politicians and racketeers “scuttle out from the shadows” to assist 
the “sneering vermin of gangdom.” They were allegedly assisted by “theorist, 
pseudo-criminologists, hypersentimentalists, criminal coddlers, convict lovers, and 
fiddle-faced reformers” who surged forward to fill their own “pocketbooks.”100 The 
rodent family clearly included the director’s ideological opposites who viewed 
rehabilitation as a legitimate means for correcting the crime problem. His attack on 
liberals championed the hardboiled perspective of pulp fiction, elevating realism 
above idealism. 
 Hoover informed the vermin metaphor with an ancillary contagion metaphor. 
For example, he told the Association of Life Insurance Presidents in December 1937 
that he mourned the passing of “several . . . associates” who were “shot down by the 
guns of members of the underworld.” This latter group, according to Hoover, had 
been the “recipients of clemency” and included “such rats as ‘Baby Face’ Nelson, 
who was three times paroled” as well as other “vermin.” Hoover began building long-
term rhetorical continuity between his propaganda campaigns with this speech. He 
told the life insurance presidents that “crime” was as “malignant as any cancer, and it 
[was] as distinct a subject of health as tuberculosis.” The contagion metaphor was the 




campaigns. The metaphor was helpful, in part, because of its versatility. For example, 
Hoover encouraged the insurance executives to “take more interest in many of our 
jails and some of our reformatories and penitentiaries.” According to Hoover, it was 
“a distinct matter of public health to know” whether prisoners were “forced to remain 
in the same cells with other prisoners suffering from contagious diseases . . . and 
whether unfit persons [were] being released to again prey upon the public.”101 The 
contagion metaphor dynamically operated between fields of meaning. This statement 
started a broader tradition in Hoover’s rhetoric that conceptualized domestic threats to 
internal stability as a spreading disease. Metaphorically, the contagion could either be 
contained by isolating invasive cells by quarantine or it could be deterred by forcibly 
removing such suspicious outsiders from the national body.  
 Hoover also informed the vermin metaphor with an ancillary parasite 
metaphor. The director described the enemies of the republic to the IACP in July 
1935 as constituting a network of corrupt operatives who exploited democratic 
systems to corrupt them. For example, he derided the “legal shyster” who turned “bar 
associations and legislatures” against the “law-enforcement officer.” He suggested 
that the “shyster who passe[d] laws for the good of the criminal [was] no better than 
his professional brother who [hid] that criminal” because the “politician who stuff[ed] 
his parasitical being upon the fruits of underworld votes [was] as much a type of 
vermin as the scum which casts its ballots according to his dictation.102 The parasite 
metaphor, thus, warned that democracy was susceptible to corruption and was 
suffering from it. President Roosevelt and Hoover would later amplify this argument 




 These metaphors advanced a logic of ethnic and cultural purification. Carl 
Zimmer observes that people had been “referred to as parasites before the late 1800s,” 
but evolutionary biologists then gave the parasite metaphor a new “precision” and 
“transparency” that helped Adolph Hitler to formulate his own tirades against 
minority groups. Zimmer suggests that “Hitler probed every hidden turn of the 
parasite metaphor. He charted the course of the Jewish ‘infestation,’ as it spread to 
labor unions, the stock exchange, the economy, and cultural life.” Furthermore, 
Hitler’s usages of the parasite metaphor followed Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin who 
used it to construct the “bourgeoisie and the bureaucrats.” Zimmer concludes that 
“Hitler imagined the Jew and other ‘degenerate’ races” as “parasites” and thus a 
“threat to the health of their host, the Aryan race. It was a function of a nation to 
preserve the evolutionary health of its race,” argued Hitler, and “so it had to rid the 
parasite from its host.”103  
 Hoover expanded upon communist and Nazi rhetorical precedents with the 
contagion, parasite, and vermin metaphors, all of which suggested that a growing 
movement of invisibly coordinated subversives was destabilizing the nation. This 
theme permeated Hoover’s subsequent campaigns and thereby established rhetorical 
continuity between his metaphorical clusters. Hoover’s patterns of terminology 
during the War on Crime offered a starting point for shaping future metaphorical 
arrangements. The next three decades were marked with metaphors that portrayed 
liberalism as a subversive threat to the nation.  
 The vermin metaphor, for example, portrayed idealism as political and moral 




Clubs of America in May 1936 as “scuttling rats in the ship of politics, gnawing at its 
timbers, besmirching its ideals, and doing their utmost to wreck our system of 
government.”104 He told the American Hotel Association of the United States and 
Canada in November 1937 that prison reformers contributed to the practice of 
“unwarranted parole,” which allowed “vermin” to “go out and steal babies, lure them 
away, defile them, and leave them shapeless masses of broken pathetic humanity, 
dead at the hands of degenerate parolees.”105 The director concluded before the IACP 
in July 1935 that they were all “enemies to our cause and enemies to society.”106 In 
this manner, Hoover provided an ideological alternative to Bates’ leadership as he 
interpreted the crime problem as including the Prison Bureau and its worldview. The 
media was persuaded to adopt his storylines.  
 Hoover worked to ensure that his metaphorical framing was circulated by the 
press and to prevent the circulation of uncooperative material. He told the American 
Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) in April 1937 that he “preferred the term 
‘public rat,’ rather than ‘public enemy’” because it better captured the “craven 
stealthiness” of criminals. Hoover suggested that “John Dillinger” should have been 
framed as the “filthy type of vermin that he was, crawling through the holes of our 
law enforcement” rather than a “Robin Hood.”107 He wrote thank you letters to the 
press when they complied. He revealed to the editor of Literary Digest in August 
1936 that he was “particularly pleased” that an article in his magazine referred to a 
criminal as “Public Rat No. 1” rather than “Public Enemy No. 1.”108 The director also 
asked the ANPA to not run stories regarding some administrative affairs including an 




and comfort to the criminal.”109 Furthermore, in an August 1938 article appearing in 
Collier’s, the director complained of “constant surveillance set up by reporters and 
camera men at the field offices of the F.B.I.” and asked the publishers to “impose a 
voluntary restraint upon themselves.”110 Such self-censorship concealed Bureau 
embarrassments and complaints that Hoover allegedly hoarded publicity and utilized 
unsafe operational methods. Simultaneously, his metaphors and framings emphasized 
his leadership against the dangerous political-criminal rat conspiracy.  
 Cooper worked to develop radio programs that circulated Hoover’s metaphors 
and narratives. The director requested from the attorney general “authority to prepare 
material for presentation on the radio.” He argued that the “request . . . should be 
granted because of its possible value to the Department of Justice, in that it will bring 
before a large portion of the public some of the work performed by the Agents of the 
Department.” Hoover suggested that the broadcast should begin with the 
announcement “that the facts in the cases have been authenticated by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation of the United States Department of Justice,” indicating that 
the dramatizations were consistent with the Bureau’s official record.111  
 Though the radio program was supposed to promote the DOJ as a whole, 
internal memoranda suggest that the producer, Phillps H. Lord, sought to focus his 
attention on the FBI. He proposed to title the program “G Men” and emphasize “the 
scientific angle in which the Department attacks crime” to demonstrate that the 
“criminal” had an “impossible chance of escaping the long arm of the law.” Such 
framing advantaged Hoover’s ideological predisposition over Bates, as detection and 




promised that no unapproved “information would be given out,” but if Hoover “had a 
message or something” that he “wished to put over to the public,” Lord guaranteed to 
“see that it was worked in.” Lord offered to “work in close harmony” with the Bureau 
and to “have the scripts checked by some member of the Department.” 112 Cooper and 
Rex Collier would fill this role. Because the scripts were reportedly taken directly 
from Bureau files, an element of authenticity was added.113  
 The Dillinger script emphasized Hoover’s action-detective leadership in 
catching Dillinger and constructed the outlaw through the vermin metaphor. The 
gangster was allegedly a criminal genius that was far too advanced for local 
authorities to apprehend. Hoover reportedly ordered Special Agent Samuel Cowley to 
“leave for Chicago immediately—spare no expense—get all the men you need and 
get John Dillinger. He’s clever—he's a killer. Get him alive, if you can; but GET 
HIM!” The script has Agent Cowley’s wife fearing for his safety. She warns, “I wish 
it weren’t Dillinger. Sam – I’m game – if you were going to war to face men I could 
stand it – but he’s a rat. He’ll shoot behind your back.”114 These sequences centered 
the Bureau’s action in Washington, D.C. and elevated Dillinger’s danger to 
proportions beyond those of war by turning the outlaw into a dehumanized Other with 
base instincts. Ultimately, he was transformed into a social monster which legitimized 
his militant killing.  
 The episode emphasized a number of themes evident in Hoover’s arguments 
against Bates, the prison system, and local law enforcement, while championing the 
Bureau’s efficiency. In the script, some members of the Dillinger gang smuggle guns 




escape from their prison and to siege the “Indiana State Prison,” where Dillinger was 
held captive. After they arrive undercover as prison officials, they announced that 
Dillinger was “on parole from our prison.” Following a brief overview of his ensuing 
crimes and capture during “the next four months,” the script highlighted his next 
escape from “the County Jail, at Crown Point, Indiana.” On the lam, Dillinger sought 
plastic surgery to conceal his identity because “the G-Men” were “hot” on him. He 
lamented that he could not sleep because FBI agents were “everywhere,” so he may 
“as well croak” if he could not “get them off [his] trail.” A gang member responded, 
“You’re right, boss. When them guys get started, they don’t stop.”115 The mediated 
Bureau’s alleged omnipresence reinforced its claim to always get its men.  
 The radio program portrayed events in a manner that privileged Hoover’s 
interests by rewriting the public record. Before the dramatized Dillinger is killed, FBI 
agents take precautions to protect the public’s safety in case a gun fight should occur, 
and there was no mention of civilian injuries.116 However, according to the New York 
Times, when Dillinger was slain in Chicago, “two women spectators were wounded 
when caught in the fire from the federal men’s revolvers.”117 Whereas the script 
emphasized that Dillinger was scientifically identified by his unalterable 
demarcations, like eye color and gate, local police told journalists that the FBI was 
tipped off—a method associated with old school law enforcement. And, whereas the 
script had Dillinger opening fire on FBI agents, historians report that Dillinger was 
killed while running for an alley and still reaching for a gun.118 One newspaper 
printed at the time that Dillinger’s killing made “one wonder if such informal 




And, federal judge Robert Cowie called the Dillinger killing “lawless” before the 
Wisconsin Bar Association, warning that with “the support of a misguided public, the 
government was building up a secret police comparable only to its counterparts in 
Germany, Russia and Italy.”120 This statement underscored secretive institutional 
collaboration and strategizing that was, in fact, about to occur between the FBI, the 
Gestapo, and Italian political police forces. The G-Men radio broadcast of a safe and 
scientific killing of a criminal rat is an example of Hoover framing and narrating 
history in a manner that was consistent with his own ideology and interests; he 
concealed evidence against his operation and its potential embarrassments. His 
opportunism would go on to implicate the BOP for its alleged role in the political-
criminal conspiracy.    
 Hoover attacked Director Bates by implication, raising concerns over the 
programs and appropriations for which he was responsible. He told the Kiwanis 
International in June 1936 that each year, “3,200 persons convicted of murder” were 
released from “penal institutions” and that more than half of those were the “result of 
pardon or parole.” He called on local organizations to “examine” the “political 
appointment of unfit men as deputies or wardens of penitentiaries, or directors of 
reformatories, or of guards of penal institutions” to ensure the legitimacy of the 
“parole system” in their communities.121 Hoover suggested that resources were better 
spent in containing and killing criminals, rather than in their rehabilitation. He 
remarked before the IACP in July 1935 that the “people of America” were annually 
taxed “millions upon millions of dollars” for “police, State constabularies, Federal 




Prisons received the largest single share. This money, according to Hoover, was 
“squandered because of ill-considered, ignorant, or politically controlled parole and 
clemency actions which release[d] dangerous men and women to prey upon 
society.”122 He also attached the danger of parole to kidnapping. Hoover charged in 
August 1933 that in “practically every instance” of “kidnapping,” the criminal was a 
former “recipient of a pardon, parole or probation which [had] permitted him to again 
pursue his criminal activities against the social structure of our nation.”123 The 
director went still further in discretely connecting the BOP to mismanagement and 
corruption.  
 Hoover drew a disingenuous distinction between the effectiveness of public 
and private organizations in rehabilitating delinquents, thus attacking the BOP’s 
idealistic mission. He told the Boys’ Clubs of America in May 1936 that private 
organizations did much to reform juvenile delinquents “with limited funds.” 
Conversely, he blamed  “community” institutions with “heavy appropriations, full-
time employees, large buildings, and expansive grounds” of turning child offenders 
into criminals. According to Hoover, “private institutions” were better equipped for 
“rehabilitation and accomplishment” than “community institutions” because the latter 
had “fallen into the grasping hands of the renegades of our political system.” He 
described this type of politician as a “barrier to law enforcement” who constantly 
undermined “the finer ideals of our political system” by sneaking “into our 
reformatories, into our probation system, into our prisons” for “personal gain at the 
expense of the common wealth.”124 Notably, when speaking about the Police Athletic 




financial investment” for offering youth a “substitute for temptation” and 
recommended to the IACP the following month that this effort by law enforcement 
should be “vastly extended.”125 Obviously, Hoover was not opposed to all public 
spending on juveniles.  
 The director also attacked specific arguments made by Bates and labeled them 
propaganda. He told the American Hotel Association in November 1937 that “paid 
professional propagandists” who sought to “aid the criminal by pulling the death 
mask of misinformation over the mind of the American citizen should be made to 
reveal their selfish motive for doing so.” According to Hoover, these “moo-cow 
sentimentalists” claimed that “less than one per cent of all arrests made in the United 
States [were] of persons on parole.” This proposition, according to Hoover, was a 
“deliberate and reprehensible dissemination of misinformation about the status of 
crime.”126 Such claims implied a dark and ulterior motive for rehabilitation held by 
idealists, who he also considered overly emotional.  Of course, Hoover failed to 
mention his own information campaign or that he ordered agents to have ever 
increasing caseloads, which obfuscated his own statistics. Hoover’s control of 
information, therefore, played a vital role in the broader construction of the 
hardboiled super-villain realm, wherein action detectives needed deterrence methods 
to protect a community and to promote its values. In this manner, Hoover promoted 
realism with misinformation, claiming that information which contradicted his own 
was suspect. The control of information was at the center of Hoover’s attempted 




 Assistant Director Clyde Tolson masterminded a system to better regulate the 
Bureau’s official record. After Melvin Purvis captured the spotlight for slaying John 
Dillinger and “Pretty Boy” Floyd, Hoover forbade Henry Suydam from supplying 
further information to the press regarding his agents. He claimed that when 
“publicity” was “given to one man as being the so-called ‘hero’ of a situation, it [was] 
likely to engender jealousies which would be harmful to the morale and espirit de 
corps of this Division.”127 Beyond censoring information, Tolson recommended in an 
April 1936 memorandum that Hoover fly to cities on days of major arrests to furnish 
“information to the press.” Tolson suggested “that such a plan would be received 
enthusiastically by the American public as a further indication of the efficiency of the 
bureau in dealing with the crime situation.”128 Of course, Hoover would also be 
portrayed as the arresting officer and, in Hoover’s words, the hero of the situation.  
Arrests were turned into platforms from which the director could demonstrate his 
superhuman leadership and attack his political and ideological opposition. This 
offensive borrowed the worldview previously established in the detective genre by 
juxtaposing the admirable scientific action detective hero image with a human rat-
image, thus emphasizing Hoover as a noble and venerated political leader. The public 
was invited to join his conspiracy-wrought reality.     
 The director constructed his political leadership against his opposition through 
various spectacles in a manner that drew from the urban-crime genre. Historians 
Sanford J. Ungar, Bryan Burrough, and Anthony Summers challenge the authenticity 
of Hoover’s claim to have personally captured Alvin Karpis in May 1936. Ungar 




raiding party to capture a member of the ‘Barker gang,’ Alvin Karpis.” Allegedly, 
however, Hoover only entered the scene “after all danger was past and that he had 
played a purely symbolic role.”129 Burrough substantiates such suspicions, charging 
that “Hoover’s story of the arrest, as told to reporters the next day, was flat wrong in 
several details.”130 Staged “though it was,” Summers adds, “the arrest worked 
wonders for Edgar’s image.”131 Hoover used such stunts to become an action 
detective hero, thus reifying the pulp fiction genre in the political world.  
 The press immediately helped Hoover promulgate his narrated spectacle by 
disseminating information as the director released it.132 Journalists failed to explore 
the meaning of Hoover’s travel to New Orleans. On May 2, 1936, the New York 
Times flashed the front page headline, “Karpis Captured in New Orleans by Hoover 
Himself,” and the Washington Post boasted on its front page, “Hoover Leads 20 
Agents in Arresting Nation’s No.1 Outlaw.”133 The Nashville Tennessean titled its 
story, “U.S. Men Take Public Enemy Without Shot” and the Saint Paul Pioneer Press 
ran on its headline “G-Men Capture Karpis Without Firing a Shot in Raid Led by J. 
Edgar Hoover.”134 These storylines came just weeks after Senator Kenneth McKellar 
(D-TN) scoffed at Hoover for never making an arrest and argued at an appropriations 
hearing that he doubted “very much” whether Hoover “ought to have a law” that 
permitted him “to go around the country armed as an army would, and shoot down all 
the people” that the director suspected “of being criminals.”135 Newspapers across the 
country would emphasize the meaning that Hoover sought to convey. For example, 
on May 2, the Washington Post ran a story titled, “Karpis Made ‘Name’ for Self After 




Hoover Brands as Enemy No. 1 Politics that Hampers Justice.”136 Such headlines 
focused public attention on parole failure and alleged political interference in law 
enforcement, which served Hoover’s interests. Many reporters unquestioningly 
accepted the narrative offered by the only G-man authorized to talk to the press—the 
same G-man who was solely allowed to receive credit for the FBI’s successes.137  
 Hoover’s expert status permitted him to craft the story of the Karpis arrest in a 
manner that reinforced his perspectives. Though no journalist was present at the 
event, reporters substituted witnessing the arrest with the director’s cultural authority 
to fashion the public record.138 News reports celebrated Hoover’s action leadership; 
one account even included Hoover leveling a “submachine gun at Karpis.”139 A May 
3rd front page New York Times story heavily quoted the director, simply repeating his 
narrative to readers: “‘Karpis said he would never be taken alive,’ Mr. Hoover said, 
‘but we took him without firing a shot. That marked him as a dirty, yellow rat.’”140 
The director’s use of the vermin metaphor reflected language that was familiar and 
meaningful to his national audience. For example, Inspector Ben Guarino tells the 
villain in Scarface (1932), “I told you you`d show up this way. Get you in a jam 
without a gun and you squeal like a yellow rat.” The film’s antagonist was a 
homicidal maniac and the “Detective Chief” complained of gangsters being freed 
from police custody by “the red tape, the crooked lawyers” and corrupt “politicians.” 
In one scene, the publisher of the local newspaper told a group of concerned citizens: 
“don’t blame the police.” Rather, they should push the government to “pass a federal 
law that puts guns in the same class as drugs and white slavery. Put teeth in the 




citizens.”141 Hoover’s construction of criminals through a genre that denied their 
citizenship and encouraged their deportation highlights James J. Kimble’s observation 
that domestic propaganda contrasts “an internal protagonist” against “an external 
antagonist.”142 The logic of Scarface was symmetrical with that expressed by Hoover. 
Its rationale reinforced the propaganda mission envisioned by Hoover and fashioned 
by Cooper.  
 Scarface presented an image of American city life engulfed by organized 
crime and decried limitations on law enforcement that prevented it from punishing 
gangster activity with militant force. This arrangement of problem and solution 
complimented Hoover’s worldview and challenged that which was advocated by the 
Wickersham Commission. In Hollywood’s vision of city life, undocumented 
immigrants were the core cause of crime, and police were victims of criminal 
conspiracies. This was a land where antagonists were simply motivated by evil, and 
justice was hampered by a lack of enforcement mechanisms. Realism was more 
appropriate for this reality, according to Hoover’s logic, than the one presented by 
former Attorney General Wickersham, where crime was created by American 
institutions and ideology, and where marginalized groups were the most victimized. 
And, similar to Scarface, newspapers played a key role in purveying the environment 
and the allegedly logical ideology. 
 Beyond failing to scrutinize Hoover’s narratives, the press promoted the 
vermin metaphor in its headlines following the arrest. The Milwaukee Journal, for 
example, ran the headline “‘Respectable’ Citizens who Shield ‘Rats’ the Real Public 




“Call ‘Em Rats.” An article appearing in Phoenix, Arizona’s Evening Gazette 
included the subtitle “No. 1 Public Enemy Stricken with Terror After Capture in New 
Orleans; Described as ‘Dirty Rat.’” The Times-Picayune of New Orleans subtitled 
one of its articles “GANGSTER ‘YELLOW RAT,’ Says Hoover.” And the Pittsburgh 
Sun-Telegraph featured a headline: “Karpis Quit ‘Like Rat,’ Says Chief of G-
Men.”143 Indeed, the press coverage reflected the strategizing of both Hoover and 
Cooper.  
 Furthermore, the CRD supplied cooperative journalists with the director’s 
speeches, Bureau publications, and ghost-written stories, which were then printed in 
full or used as the basis for nationally and internationally syndicated articles. 
Reporters were vetted by the Bureau and, if determined to be “friendly,” were put on 
the Bureau’s “mailing list” to maintain a regular information flow.144 These 
journalists were also tapped for inside information on Congress and other 
organizations of interest, and used to gain access to affluent places beyond the 
Bureau’s reach. For example, according to a FBI file, one Washington Times writer 
received “information” that was to be used “in a series of articles” for William 
Randolph Hearst’s International News Service. The file indicated that the CRD had 
furnished the journalist with a “story” that was “widely printed throughout the 
country.”145 And, the Bureau courted another reporter in August 1936 who was 
“affiliated with Congressional Intelligence” as a “means of entry to someone in the 
Senate.”146 These processes were repeated thousands of times over. 
 The Hearst chain helped build public opinion for the Bureau. One of its 




underway a nationwide campaign to procure for the Division of Investigation 
additional men and to have Congress strengthen the Federal law-enforcement as 
much as possible.”147 Tolson attributed the Bureau’s “additional appropriation” in 
1935 to the “crystallization of public opinion through the campaign of the Hearst 
newspapers,” which was supplemented with CRD material.148 The press thus 
circulated Hoover’s issues, frames, metaphors, and narratives around the nation, 
helping to privilege his worldview and political leadership over Bates’ philosophies. 
The vermin metaphor introduced both threat and solution. 
 Because the presence of rats invites a lethal response, the metaphor played 
into Hoover’s realist worldview and arguments for deterrence methods. He told the 
General Federation of Women’s Clubs in May 1938 that there must be “certain 
punishment” for “crimes committed.” This punishment, according to Hoover, “should 
serve not only as a deterrent to potential criminals, but should be a means of 
rehabilitation.”149 Hoover suggested before the Attorney General’s Crime Conference 
in December 1935 that “adequate detection and sure apprehension plus swift, certain 
and just punishment are the time-proven deterrents of crime.” He elaborated that the 
“only one way to make a law breaker obey the statutes of our country” was to “to 
make him fear punishment . . . A criminal obeys the law because he [was] forced to 
it.” Force, again, surfaced as a form of political expression in Hoover’s public 
arguments. He suggested that the “long road to internal peace and security [had] no 
short cuts. Civilization’s recourse is remorseless pursuit, complete punishment, and if 




Through this framework, the ambush and extermination of public enemies could be 
referred to simply as a “trap.”151  
 Director Bates responded to the CRD’s assault against his authority both 
privately and publicly. He complained directly to the FBI for their releasing of 
restricted information to the press.152 According to a memorandum written by Hoover 
in March 1935, Bates regularly complained to the “Attorney General” in regards to 
“remarks” by Hoover “made from time to time concerning the granting of paroles.” 
The memo indicated that an especially “long controversy” erupted between the two 
“following” Hoover’s “speech” to the ABA, an organization which Cooper thought 
needed to “clean house.”153 In a May 1936 memorandum to the attorney general, 
Bates complained of “adverse publicity” that was inspired by the “Bureau of 
Investigation.” He noted that it “was discouraging to feel” that “public opinion” was 
“being built up in a way which [was] not justified by the facts and which [was] 
damaging to some of the ideals which [they] were trying to establish.”154 Bates also 
wrote a letter to Cooper in March 1935 lamenting that the writer had fallen “into the 
too prevailing habit” of “exaggerating the figures of crime” as he portrayed “intrigue, 
and conniving, and corruption in prison” as a common occurrence.155 Bates’ public 
appeal consisted of a July 1935 New York Times article titled, “The Parole System 
Strongly Defended: The Federal Prison Director Replies to Critics who have 
Condemned It,” which appeared in the back section of the paper.156  
 The Office of the Attorney General made some attempts to control the 
director. In August 1937, Attorney General Cummings issued an order to DOJ 




through the office of the Attorney General and not otherwise. Any matter arising in 
any Bureau or Division of the Department” that deserved “publicity” must “be 
submitted to the office of the Attorney General for such action as may be deemed 
appropriate.” The order stated that this policy was meant to prevent an “imparting of 
information” to press members that could lead to “charges of favoritism from press 
representatives. In addition, the failure to clear press information through the office of 
the Attorney General results occasionally in confusion as to what the policy of the 
Department may be on a particular matter.”157 Hoover’s information campaign 
against Bates obviously led to some confusion over the DOJ’s position on its own 
programs.  
 Some members of the press identified Hoover’s strategy to undermine 
oversight mechanisms. Press cooperation and networking through field offices and 
syndicated periodicals gave Hoover national and international reach, thus making him 
more resistant to congressional or any other form of oversight. His power was made 
evident in a 1937 Saturday Evening Post exposé, which exclaimed: 
 Sheer envy of Hoover’s genius for marshalling public opinion causes many a 
 government official to hate him. Congress, fearful of appearing to be prodigal 
 with the tax payers’ money, is stingy in doling out appropriations. For the 
 FBI,  however, the purse string is loosened, because it is risky for a 
 legislator to appear to be hamstringing the G-men. The voters back 




His power was indeed as much, if not more, rhetorical as it was institutional. 
Newspaper and magazine surrogates played a key role in building public opinion in 
favor of the Bureau, and accordingly, the director’s leadership and power.  
 Hoover thus used his cultural authority to mold narratives that portrayed him 
as the essential figure in the War on Crime. Powers explains that “one of J. Edgar 
Hoover's cultural roles after 1935 was to be the ‘great detective’ of his day, the 
official narrator of action detective stories to the American public.”159 Hollywood and 
radio producers disseminated these narratives, which featured the director as a 
militarized leader, centered him in Washington, D.C., coordinating the campaign, but 
also made him available to travel to the dangerous events at any time when his 
involvement was necessitated.  His service in both capacities was depicted as a heroic 
response to a criminal army attacking the nation. The director’s leadership was 
unique, though, because he possessed a mythic power to confront a frightening enemy 
powerful enough to defeat most other law enforcement agents and agencies, including 
his own G-Men. In short, he was featured as the top G-Man. He was the strongest 
member of America's response to the nation's nefarious underworld, and, by virtue of 
being a member of the executive branch, he was a powerful member of FDR’s war 
against the destabilizing forces of the economic depression. 
 At the War on Crime’s end, the recently instituted Gallop Poll revealed that 
the director’s campaign inside and outside the DOJ was successful by at least some 
measures. Whereas eighty-one percent of respondents reported that Hoover had done 
an “excellent” or “good” job as “head of the G Men” in 1939, only two percent 




contrasted with the thirty-seven percent of respondents who reported that “Attorney 
General Cummings” had done a “good” job in his “office,” thirteen percent who 
reported that he had done a “poor” job, and fifty percent who had “No opinion” in 
1938, his final year in office.161 Hoover was by then the nation’s top authority on law 
enforcement and would remain so for the rest of his career.  
 The director’s self-promotional success was also evident in the amount of 
appropriations allocated by Congress. Whereas the FBI’s appropriations increased 
from $2.75 million for fiscal year 1933 to $6.6 million for fiscal year 1939, the 
Bureau of Prisons appropriations decreased from $12.35 million for fiscal year 1933 
to $11.8 million for fiscal 1939.162 By the end of the following decade, the FBI’s 
appropriations would more than double those received by the BOP.163 Hoover’s 
arguments that law enforcement belonged to the realm of superheroes and super-
villains, and that realist strategies were vital to control crime, were seemingly 
accepted by the American citizenry. By then, Bates had retired from the DOJ and the 
War on Crime was widely believed to have been won by militarizing federal law 
enforcement that overpowered criminals with force.164  
 The prison director’s ability to interpret the crime problem and propose more 
idealistic solutions was largely undermined by the quantity and quality of Hoover’s 
discourse. Quality was not measured by accuracy, but by its ability to present a 
seemingly authentic and familiar reality to his various publics through true crime 
storylines featuring action detective heroes.  Such narratives praised realism and 
constructed idealism as an empty vessel of corrupt motivations that actively sought to 




conspiracy that threatened the nation’s security. Or, as one writer explained, Hoover’s 
campaign showed that “hell breaks over the underworld” when “G-men take to the 
trail of relentless justice,” which marked “a red welt of fear on every criminal in the 
land.”165 Indeed, Hoover’s power was as mighty as his image was sensational. 
 
Concluding the War on Crime: Forecasting a Realist Future 
 The CRD’s promotional material during the War on Crime has a number of 
significant dimensions worthy of consideration. First, it demonstrates the ideological 
work performed by some quarters of popular entertainment in the Depression era, 
which privileged realism over idealism. Second, the War on Crime illustrates a role 
played by the American intelligence community in shaping political and popular 
culture. And third, it highlights Hoover’s adaptation to the secular-scientific linguistic 
framework that then dominated public institutions. Hoover’s rhetoric of science 
began an ongoing process that would eventually militarize the FBI. As the director’s 
prominence rose, so too did his philosophy.  
 The urban-crime genre performed important ideological work for J. Edgar 
Hoover and the FBI on a number of levels. The New Deal represented a moment of 
intense polarity between members of the Department of Justice at a time of great 
uncertainty for many Americans, especially concerning the realities of city life. The 
War on Crime provided moments of action where Hoover’s political discourse 
borrowed from a century of stories that promulgated themes of force that were 
common to political realism. By adopting the genre’s logic and conventions, the CRD 




attempted to expand equality by reforming undesirable citizens. Hoover’s hardboiled 
interpretations of events ultimately built public support that favored the FBI and its 
militancy.  
 The director’s definitions and proposed solutions constructed a familiar world 
to insecure Americans that reflected his realist philosophies. Hoover’s rhetorical 
invention made Bates’ idealistic vision appear outmoded by presenting marginalized 
citizens as menacing super-villains. Hoover simultaneously constructed his FBI as a 
super-heroic response to this menace, thereby crafting a juxtaposition that ridiculed 
idealism. Therefore, Hoover did not need to attack Bates in every utterance; rather, he 
just needed his narratives and metaphors to promote a logic that countered Bates’ 
philosophy. Such reasoning infiltrated multiple forms of information outlets, which 
increased its persuasiveness.  
 The FBI’s reality-making mechanism in the CRD utilized both propaganda 
and censorship. Beyond muzzling some major members of the press by their own 
commission, the director reinforced his action hero reality by blocking competing 
literary genres. Claire A. Culleton notes that the FBI actively censored modern 
literature in the 1930s and afterward precisely because the genre prioritized 
internationalism and a “free exchange of ideas,” which sometimes favored liberalism, 
progressivism, and socialism. This made literature an important means of 
international opinion formation as well as a source of propaganda. Modern literature 
challenged Hoover’s Americanist vision of citizenship as it probed such topics as 
legitimacy, democracy, the citizen, and the state in an international world. Hoover 




publishing communities.166 The FBI was then serving as both propagandist and 
thought police. These duties were justified through Hoover’s metaphorical selections. 
He would perpetuate rhetorical continuity between the War on Crime and Fifth 
Column campaigns by recycling the contagion and parasitic ancillary metaphors. He 
continued to imagine new conspiracies in various terms that emphasized an always 
spreading and always invisible threat, which always required more containment 
programming. The rhetorical perpetuation of this singular threat indefinitely justified 
the same types of realist solutions described by George Orwell in his review of the 
urban-crime genre. Force had become a popular form of political expression, and it 
advanced more realist perspectives.      
 The rise of the G-man action hero paralleled the rise of twentieth century 
Christian realist treaties, including Reinhold Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral 
Society (1932) and Walter Marshall Horton’s Realistic Theology (1934). While 
writing about Cooper’s FBI formula, Powers explains that “public interest later 
shifted from gangsters to Nazi spies and then to Communist subversion.”167 Though 
the Bureau’s public campaigns would evolve, its core realist principles of anarchy, 
power, and monolithic state identity would transcend time and genre, and were 
echoed by realist writers. That is, the vermin menace turned into the Fifth Column 
threat, which in turn, evolved into the crisis of Red Fascism. These menaces were 
related in a number of ways, including their implications of liberalism with 
subversion, presumptions that threats were somehow of alien or foreign extraction, 




 The rhetoric of science played a central role in promoting a logic that 
undermined constitutional boundaries. Whereas the Constitution was supposed to 
establish and maintain the country’s highest legal ideals, science came to represent 
efficiency in the Depression era when liberals and conservatives jointly abandoned 
certain “constitutional barriers” that prevented the federal government from 
intervening in the crime problem.168 The CRD’s metaphors privileged technocratic 
control, which translated to paramilitary force and equipment. Science was thus 
equated with militarism. And, because science represented efficiency, it also came to 
represent state power and professionalism, a conceptual organization better fitted for 
fascism than democracy. This reconceptualization of state authority helped the 
president to further militarize the FBI during the wartime era when idealism was 
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Chapter 3: Fighting the Axis Powers:  “Americanism” Versus the Fifth Column 
 On January 17, 1938, British intelligence officers discovered a Nazi plot to 
ambush and kill a high-ranking U.S. military officer in New York City, with the 
ultimate aim to obtain information on Atlantic coast defense operations. Through 
secretly screening the mail of a German agent living in Scotland, MI6 learned of a 
plot involving an American citizen named Guenther Gustave Maria Rumrich. After 
the American military attaché in London was briefed of the affair, the War 
Department requested FBI assistance to monitor the threat. They discovered that 
Rumrich was already in police custody for impersonating Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull in his attempt to obtain American passports for the German government. He was 
transferred to FBI custody on February 19 from the New York Police Department.1   
 Rumrich’s arrest was ultimately not significant to military and law 
enforcement agencies because the plot had been abandoned. It was important, 
however, for the volume of information the spy proffered on Nazi operations. 
Rumrich revealed a transportation mechanism that utilized transatlantic steamship 
lines operated by German companies to carry spies between North America and 
Europe. Employees on these vessels were secretly assigned to transfer materials from 
agents to German high command. Ship captains were ordered to lend all assistance to 
maintain security and achieve German strategic goals. At its peak, Rumrich’s spy ring 
included military personnel, steamship crews, and military-industrial engineers 
working in private plants. According to Raymond J. Batvinis, Germany successfully 
collected blueprints for military aircraft and new Navy destroyers, military 




confidential ship-to-shore communication codes, and “contingency plans for the 
installation of aircraft weapons in the New York metropolitan area.”2 Fears of the 
Fifth Column were realized.  
 Reports of the plot’s revelation produced expressions of surprise and concern. 
The Washington Post described the Rumrich discovery in a front-page story as “‘one 
of the biggest spy cases in American history.’”3 Fears of high-profile spies and 
foreign agents on American soil coordinating with external military forces emerged 
again before another world war.  Following the exposure, Hoover’s perceived ability 
to neutralize this threat paled in comparison to his reputation against gangsters. Of the 
eighteen defendants named in three indictments issued by U.S. Attorney Lamar 
Hardy, only four were arrested and they received a combined sentence of fourteen 
years in federal prison. The rest remained in Germany or had escaped as stowaways 
aboard steamships.4 
 The Rumrich case ultimately played a major role in the Roosevelt 
administration’s battle against its anti-interventionist opposition.5 The story 
reinforced other press reports during the buildup to war of a wide-scale Fifth Column 
conspiracy—a network of covert revolutionary cells—that was actively engaged in 
sabotage, espionage, and propaganda activities. Although associated with external 
threats, the growing fear was that the enemy existed within the United States and 
involved some of the country’s top political leaders seeking to thwart the Roosevelt 
administration’s foreign policies. In response, Richard W. Steele explains, “FDR led 
an education campaign that portrayed his domestic critics” as part of this alleged 




concern shortly after war was declared.6 Francis MacDonnell notes that the president 
“played a more influential role in shaping popular attitudes towards the Fifth Column 
than did any other single individual.”7 FDR's intelligence operatives were 
instrumental in this administrative campaign, Steele maintains, working with “British 
Intelligence” to produce “hundreds of books, articles, and movies” that 
“authoritatively informed the American public that Hitler’s success could be 
explained” by the “susceptibility” of democracy to “internal subversion.”8 Within the 
build-up of such a domestic propaganda campaign, notions of “free speech,” removed 
from government encroachment, became a wartime casualty reminiscent of such 
government-sponsored information activities of the previous world war.  
 Roosevelt’s anti-neutrality campaign was met with considerable opposition, 
and his critics spanned the political spectrum. He was flanked on the far right by 
foreign propagandists and American media sources that were sympathetic to the 
military actions of Germany. These groups were joined by anti-interventionist 
organizations and publishers as well as conservative and liberal members of Congress 
who sought to deter intervention. The information campaigns launched by these 
groups were bolstered by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) which, 
according to Albert Fried, was simultaneously “isolationist and radical” in its support 
for neutrality.9 Such opposition was reinforced by the African American press, which 
alleged discriminatory practices in the war effort. Civil rights and labor advocates 
were further supported by liberal academics and jurists who attempted to preserve 
freedom of speech during the war. Strengthening the resistance offered by these 




 These groups were politically divergent. The president, however, treated them 
all as un-American subversives that were conspiring to undermine U.S. foreign 
policy. MacDonnell explains that “FDR lumped together actual spies in the employ of 
Hitler with his isolationist critics” and thus failed to recognize a “distinction between 
legitimate opposition and treason.”10 Roosevelt reasoned that patriotism during 
wartime was expressed through unified political support, which necessitated that all 
political factions rally around the war effort.11 Given the severity of the national 
security crisis, any attempt to thwart the president’s foreign policy goals represented a 
threat to the nation's safety, Roosevelt's reasoning suggested; all other issues, 
including the protection of civil liberties associated with free speech and civil rights, 
had to be subordinated to a singular national interest.  
 J. Edgar Hoover played a central role in tainting Roosevelt’s views of the 
administration’s critics. The FBI director forwarded information to the president that 
labeled anti-interventionists, idealists, as well as labor, civil rights, and civil liberties 
activists as anti-American—groups that would metaphorically make up the Fifth 
Column threat in the United States. Conversely, interventionists and anti-communists 
represented patriotic citizens who championed an idealized sense of Americanism that 
would preserve the nation’s security against the Fifth Column threats.12 Such 
rhetorical constructions of the “enemy,” both domestic and foreign, limited the role of 
dissent in U.S. political culture, paving the way for the Roosevelt administration to 
move forward with its own foreign policy agenda.  
 Accordingly, the FBI developed an Americanization program that 




view and policies of detractors. As will be discussed in this chapter, Hoover and other 
Americanists interlaced the tenets of Christian fundamentalism with Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s Christian realism. Ultimately, the director’s strategies cemented and 
expanded the FBI’s role in foreign policy by reshaping the American political and 
religious landscapes. Within this chapter, Hoover’s juxtaposition between 
Americanism and anti-Americanism is examined through a metaphorical constellation 
that promoted the containment of the Fifth Column. The Fifth Column metaphor 
typically targeted internal groups that secretly coordinated with external militant 
enemies. Hoover and FDR, however, would tactically use it against critics of the 
administration’s foreign policies, helping to intensify the significance of the threat 
and warrant more extreme measures of retribution. The Fifth Column metaphor was 
informed by ancillary contagion, parasite, and termite metaphors. Such threats 
imposed a containment logic, which pushed forward Americanism as a means to 
maintain national security through cultural purification. This campaign identified 
FDR’s opposition as a conspiratorial network of subversives that exploited 
constitutional guarantees in their alleged attempts to overthrow the government. In 
the process, the FBI was constructed as a militarized bulwark that protected the 
homeland from such threats, and the director ultimately used “Americanism” to 
replace liberal values with those of militant Christianity. This chapter begins with a 
brief history of Americanism that also traces its intersections with realism before 
moving into the analysis of speeches, articles, and films created by Assistant Director 
Louis B. Nichols and his Crime Records Division between 1939 and 1945 as part of 




Fundamentalism and Christian Realism 
 The culture wars that J. Edgar Hoover helped to stoke during the 1920s 
became moot as secularism increasingly prohibited religious speech in public 
institutions. Fundamentalists spent the 1930s in the cultural margins of public life and 
many liberal Christians grew disillusioned with political idealism. Christian realism 
emerged during this period of political and cultural change. Reinhold Niebuhr was a 
recent convert from both Marxism and idealism. The theologian promoted a 
perspective that elevated neo-orthodoxy, which he viewed as more “real,” and 
subordinated cultural pluralism, which he viewed as more “illusory.” Larry L. 
Rasmussen observes that Niebuhr’s “neo-orthodoxy” attempted to locate a “positive 
relationship between Christianity and culture,” which represented “the ‘neo’ of ‘neo-
orthodoxy.’” Rasmussen adds that in “Niebuhr’s social ethic, neo-orthodoxy [was] 
reflected in his understanding of the need for coercion in the interests of justice” and 
that he placed “issues of power at the center of ethics.”13 Though he identified 
himself as a liberal and supported civil rights and labor activism, he also renounced 
liberalism by dismissing its presumptions and commitments to human rationality.14 
Niebuhr believed that liberalism shared this faith in reason with communism. He 
attacked them both for supporting secularism.    
 Christian realism undermined idealism, liberal Christianity, and political 
liberalism in the 1930s. Walter Marshall Horton suggested in 1934 that Christian 
realism was based in “objective reality,” allegedly differentiating it from idealism, 
which he described as a body of “romantic illusions.”15 Idealists grew disenchanted 




this failure and promoted instead the tenets of realism and its neo-orthodoxical 
presumptions about coercion and power.16 Niebuhr rose to prominence with this 
movement. Beginning with the publication of Moral Man and Immoral Society 
(1932), his theology outlined a more authoritarian perspective that conservatives used 
to undermine liberalism.   
 Niebuhr was indisputably the most influential twentieth century Christian 
realist philosopher. Martin E. Marty explains that of the realists, Niebuhr held the 
“ear of politicians” and introduced the movement to the public as he became “the 
century’s most influential native-born American theologian.”17 Reinforcing Marty’s 
position, William D. Dean notes that “Hans Morgenthau called him ‘the greatest 
living political philosopher of America;’ George Kennan called Niebuhr ‘the father of 
us all;’ and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey said of Niebuhr, ‘No American has 
made a greater contribution to political wisdom and moral responsibility.’”18 
Ultimately, Niebuhr’s realism offered moral legitimacy to policy planners who sought 
to dismantle constitutional guarantees. 
 Niebuhr routinely lamented that liberals were guilty of placing too much 
emphasis on reason and sharing too many ideas with communists. He challenged the 
idealistic assumption that all peoples had the same appreciation and capacity for 
rational thinking.19 Accordingly, the theologian posited that “liberal culture was 
dying” from its “rationalistic” and “optimistic illusions” in “both the religious and the 
political.”20 He wrote in 1933 that “Political realists” were growing “cynical about 
moral and religious idealism in politics” because “confused liberals” had 




tolerance through “rational capacity.”22 He traced such misplaced faith to Thomas 
Jefferson and the Age of Reason.23     
 Christian realism rejected liberalism for its displacement of Protestant 
domination in American culture; specifically, Niebuhr rejected the tolerance 
encouraged by liberalism as a compromise of principle. He defined the “final sin” in 
national life as the spread of atheism, secularism, or other ideologies that did not 
recognize the primacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Niebuhr suggested that the 
“modern fascist nations” had “achieved a daemonic form of national self-assertion” 
that was “more dangerous” than that of the “ancient religious empires” because it was 
expressed against “Christian culture.”24 His argument was predicated on the premise 
that ancient Israel fell because it broke its covenant with God.25 Thus, the theologian 
located a point of unity for Catholics, Protestants, and Jews who shared a common 
contempt for the atheism inherent in communism.  
  Fundamentalists had traditionally resorted to force as a method of social 
control to curb socialist radicalism, a strategy advocated by Niebuhr. For example, 
Vice President Thomas R. Marshall declared in 1920 that “Americanism” meant that 
“America belonged” to only those citizens who comported themselves in “orderly and 
constitutional ways” and that all others “should be taught, peacefully” if possible and 
“forcibly” if necessary that “our country” was “not an international boarding house 
nor an anarchist cafe.”26 Similarly, Niebuhr wrote in 1932 that “violence” was a 
legitimate means to effect change if its “terror” had the “tempo of a surgeon’s skill.”27 
He subsequently observed in 1940 that Western democracies should “destroy or 




society.”28 Fundamentalists and industrialists were thus granted a theological 
rationale for using violence to subvert adherents of Marxist ideologies and their 
sympathizers.  
 Niebuhr’s criticism of inherent rationality in human nature, and his support of 
violence to maintain order, harbored obvious implications for international relations, 
democracy, and capitalism. Michael Cox observes that the theologian strongly 
influenced the watershed moment of twentieth century political realism—the 
publication of E.H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (1939).29 Following 
Niebuhr’s prognosis that human nature was tragically self-interested and self-
destructive, Carr suggested that the “harmony of interests” between individuals and 
nations presupposed by Jefferson and Adam Smith was delusional.30 Order, thus, 
replaced harmony, and was thought to stabilize the interests of majority parties by 
controlling the intellectual pursuits of minorities with force. Limiting the freedom of 
inquiry—an ideal championed by Carl Schurz’s more liberal tradition of 
Americanism—was advocated by many fundamentalists. The threat was associated 
with Marxist speech that could lead to anti-Christian, anti-capitalist, and even racial 
revolution. As suspicions of internal subversion grew, realists became increasingly 
skeptical about of the patriotism of protest. They began to view democracy as a 
system of government in which the majority needed to operate with less regard for 
minority rights.31  Hoover articulated such conceptions of majority rule as he worked 






Fighting the Fifth Column 
 Director Hoover used the existing antithesis between Americanism and un-
Americanism to divide and realign group loyalties. Metaphorically, the Fifth Column 
constituted a conspiratorial network of anti-interventionists, intellectuals, civil 
liberties advocates, labor unionists, and civil rights activists. These groups were 
defined as un-American because of their opposition to the Roosevelt administration, 
as well as their advocacy for cultural pluralism.32 Conversely, the FBI director 
pressed fundamentalists, interventionists, anti-communists, realists, and those who 
supported law and order to align with him under his banner of Americanism. The 
director specifically courted Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups. He encouraged 
their conservative members to turn against their more liberal counterparts and to join 
his coalition of Americanists, thereby ensuring the preservation and 
institutionalization of his ideals in the federal government and in public life.   
 Such coalition building stemmed from Roosevelt’s wish for a unified war 
effort.  Eric L. Goldstein explains that fears in the pre-war era of “fascist propaganda” 
sowing racial discord led the administration to launch its own “propaganda 
campaign.” Speech that encouraged disunity among the white races was denounced 
by FDR as “‘un-American,’” which reduced support for Anglo-Saxonism, anti-
Semitism, and anti-Catholicism. The scholar further observes that Jews and Catholics 
benefitted from this new white racial unity that also undermined some of their 
previous commitments to cultural pluralism.33 Entering the mainstream required the 




 This section examines films, speeches, government reports, newspaper 
articles, letters, and FBI files to show the ways in which Hoover used the Fifth 
Column metaphor to portray the administration’s critics in a manner that bolstered 
Hoover’s behind-the-scenes collaboration with President Roosevelt. Roosevelt turned 
to Hoover for political intelligence on his critics. The director in turn framed the 
president’s opposition as members of an underground revolutionary movement. 
Specifically, he used the Fifth Column metaphor to starkly juxtapose Americanism—
informed by Christian realism, Christian fundamentalism, and their commitments to 
neo-orthodoxy— against un-Americanism. Ultimately, the alleged risk of anti-
American sentiment was made to appear as necessitating the containment of any 
adversarial elements, which justified the violation of widespread civil liberties. 
Notions of un-Americanism also helped constitute a secretive religious-political 
culture in which Hoover functioned more like a dictator and the FBI more like his 
secret police.   
 The analysis begins with an examination of Hoover’s juxtaposition between 
“Americanism” and “un-Americanism.” The former helped Hoover further militarize 
the FBI’s identity as the country’s protector; the latter symbolized any perceived 
threats to conservative religion and the nation’s safekeeping. This chapter then ends 
with an examination of Hoover’s containment logic, which sought to protect and 
preserve his vision of Americanism and undermine the New Deal.  
Americanism and Religion 
 Hoover’s Americanism campaign encouraged a conservative revolution in 




of Christian fundamentalism that was more welcoming of anti-communist Jews and 
Catholics. The director used the militancy of Christian realism and Christian 
fundamentalism to establish a more robust Americanist coalition. This grouping was 
hospitable to those industrialists who promoted a free enterprise economic model. 
Similar to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer’s military-industrial base of support, 
Hoover co-opted local law enforcement agencies as extensions of Hoover’s campaign 
to maintain law and order. The director’s discourses on Americanism are first 
examined, followed by an analysis of his militarized vision for national law 
enforcement. Both conceptions were predicated on a broader religious alliance of 
groups that followed the Judeo-Christian tradition.    
 The Jewish-American community was at the forefront of promoting tolerance 
during the wartime era. Various organizations led a movement—based on the 
principles of cultural pluralism—to encourage tolerance and to combat bigoted 
ideologies. Beyond anti-communism, B’nai B’rith’s Anti-Defamation League and the 
American Jewish Committee also worked in an intergroup collaborative effort with 
more liberal Catholic and Protestant councils as well as with labor unions, 
educational associations, and civil rights agencies to encourage tolerance. According 
to Stuart Svonkin, these organizations launched a large scale social-scientific public 
education campaign that depicted “Nazism as atheistic, antidemocratic, and un-
American” and “anti-Semitism” as the “opening gambit in a Nazi scheme to ‘divide 
and conquer’ the United States.” The historian further notes that the Jewish 
community was helped by the “ideological battle against totalitarianism.” The 




included “Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism on equal footing.” The 
administration treated the Jewish tradition as a foundational component of American 
civil religion and, thus, U.S. political culture.34 The FBI played a key role in the 
evolution of this perspective.  
 Hoover grounded notions of Americanism in FDR’s attempt to build national 
cohesion and also in the liberal Jewish-Christian campaign for tolerance. For 
example, he proclaimed to B’nai B’rith in May 1940 that “Our Nation was formed 
upon the foundation of TOLERANCE.” Accordingly, he lauded its “Americanism 
Program” for curbing “intolerance against” the nation’s “essential tenets,” and 
specifically warned that “Communism” could “kill everything that is American.”  
Highlighting B’nai B’rith’s commitment to anti-communism, Hoover directed its 
members to equate unity among the white races, as well as religious devotion, with 
patriotism. He asserted that the “Republic should stand fast as a sanctuary, where the 
voices of religious and racial bigotry [were] absent, where all [were] dedicated to 
faith in and service to God and human freedom.” Unification on these terms required 
religious Jews to renounce ideologies that challenged the Judeo-Christian tradition—
including ethnic Jews in the Socialist Party or those who were sympathetic with 
communism.35 Hoover echoed B’nai B’rith’s disdain for the relationship between 
communism and atheism. In the process, he warned the organization in February 
1941 that the “Godless forces of totalitarianism” pretended to “aid the less fortunate 
and the oppressed” in their promotion of “revolutionary activities.”36 Statements like 




 The FBI’s interest in the Jewish community further accelerated after the 
dissolution of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939- June 1941), which 
pledged neutrality between Germany and the Soviet Union. An FBI informant 
reported in November 1941, for example, that influential “Jewish Capitalists in this 
country” were “leaning toward the Communists” and were “becoming friendly with 
them” even though “Mr. Hoover” was “dead [set] against the Communists” and, 
therefore, was a “stumbling block in their way.” The Jewish capitalists allegedly 
sought to use their political connections with Attorney General “Biddle to gradually 
make strong enough inroads to ‘upset the boss.’”37 Dividing the Jewish community 
with notions of Americanism served to undermine such adversaries. Fears of 
totalitarian revolution abroad raised concerns about such issues domestically. 
 The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) created challenges for the coalition of 
Catholics and liberal Protestants in America. Pope Pius XI’s endorsement of 
Francisco Franco’s military coup against the Spanish Government—a coalition of 
liberals, socialists, and communists38— signaled the beginning of a worldwide 
Catholic anti-communist campaign.39 This new focus displaced the Catholic Church’s 
social justice commitments and its alignment with Social Gospel Protestants, perhaps 
most notably its commitment to the labor movement. 40 Whereas ideas belonging to 
the social justice and Social Gospel movements underscored notions of cultural 
pluralism, Americanists insisted upon order to prevent violence, to protect property, 
and to preempt atheism. This change in emphasis provided an opportunity for 
broadening the Americanist coalition and for undermining the more liberal Social 




 Hoover expanded Americanism to welcome into his network those Catholics 
who associated neo-orthodoxy with U.S. democracy. For example, he told Notre 
Dame University in May 1942 that “American patriotism” was “inseparable from 
religion; [was] strengthened by fervent religious expressions and devotions.” 
Accordingly, Hoover reasoned, “Americans should be more and more religious – 
reverently and ardently and sincerely religious.” The director’s Americanism built 
unity between Catholics and Protestants by rejecting the atheistic, rather than the 
economic, element of communism. He told the school that by “placing our faith” in 
“God” and by “rising as one in righteous wrath . . . democracy” would “vanquish” the 
“godless forces of dictators.”41 The Americanization of the Catholic Church required 
that it refocus its commitments away from social justice. In November 1942, he told 
the Holland Society of New York—an exclusive organization of descendents from 
the New Netherland colony42—that if “more emphasis were placed on the Gospel of 
Salvation,” which was associated with fundamentalism,43 and “less on social justice, 
the latter would become a greater reality.”44 Hoover elevated fundamentalism and 
subordinated social justice while the Church struggled to Americanize its stature. 
Hoover’s doctrinal preferences were directly related to his national security mission. 
The director explained to Holy Cross College—a Catholic institution—in June 1944, 
for example, that the “fundamentals” of “Liberty” required “America” to “make her 
people moral” through “religion” because “Religion” was a “necessary factor” in a 
“well-ordered society.”45 The values of Christian fundamentalism, thus, were elevated 




fundamentalist precepts to Catholics and Jews. He further elaborated upon his 
political philosophy when speaking to more traditional anti-communist communities.    
 The director’s Americanism valued federal power over the universal rights 
that it was seemingly designed to protect. In October 1939, for example, he told the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) that “true Americanism” was 
“abiding adherence” to the “principles” of the “Declaration of Independence,” the 
“Bill of Rights and the Constitution,” which constituted American “Democracy.”46 
Rather than celebrating their guarantee of civil rights as many liberals did, though, the 
director instead accentuated the Constitution’s creation of law and order. He told the 
National Fifty Years in Business Club in May 1939 that the “major task of society” 
was to “insure that law and order” would continue to “reign supreme.” When 
speaking to such mainstream groups, Hoover defined “liberty” as “Obedience to the 
law.”47 The director had long sympathized with industrialists who shared his disdain 
for agitation. He informed the White House in October 1940 that the FBI maintained 
a “friendly relationship over a period of many years with many banking 
establishments” and in return received “excellent cooperation” from “financial 
institutions” in a “monitoring program” to detect “espionage, sabotage and similar 
activities.” He also pledged that “[e]xtraordinary care” was “exercised at all times” to 
avoid the “so-called ‘labor spying”’ that was often accused of interfering with 
“employer-employee relationships.”48 Such reassurances, however, belied his 
surveillance organized labor which he formalized that year with help from the 




 Many well-established Americans agreed that the social order needed 
protection from the destabilizing influences of labor and civil rights activism. He told 
the Holland Society that “without order, democracy” was an “empty, meaningless 
symbolism.”50 He reiterated this sentiment in August 1943 to the IACP, stating that 
“law and order – the corner-stone of civilization” was the “keystone of democracy.”51 
Hoover subordinated liberty to order when addressing distinguished members of law 
enforcement, industry, and cultural groups. 
 Hoover conveyed Americanism throughout the war as an anti-communist 
ideology that welcomed those Jews and Catholics who appropriately Americanized—
those who elevated their allegiance to anti-communism above their previous 
commitments to cultural pluralism. The director promulgated this perspective during 
a time of infighting among Protestants. Marty observes that the “Fundamentalist-
Modernist controversies” of the 1920s led establishment Protestants to view what was 
then the conservative fringe as harboring an anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, anti-
intellectual, anti-communist,  militaristic, and free-enterprise ideology for “hillbillies” 
and “rednecks” up through the early years of the war. Interpreting the Bible literally, 
they waited for the anti-christ and his forces to be revealed in the human world. By 
the war’s conclusion, however, fundamentalism was quickly becoming a mainstream 
Protestant perspective.52 The director spent the interim promoting fundamentalism’s 
principles and its fears through Americanist discourses, while also demanding Judeo-
Christian unity. This challenged traditional racial and ideological boundary lines 
inherent to fundamentalism and also encouraged the formation of a new anti-




 Hoover's perspective appealed to conservative Protestants who believed that 
America needed militant religious fervor to protect the free-market economic order, 
which represented to them the core of democracy. Such Americanism privileged 
capitalism over pluralism and social justice on religious grounds. The ideology also 
commissioned government officials to use all means available to maintain the 
preeminence of Protestantism and capitalism. Correspondingly, Hoover’s 
Americanism appealed to the values of Christian realism and Christian 
fundamentalism. It also championed the militarization of law enforcement to protect 
“Americans” from those groups who held different, and sometimes atheistic, values. 
Such a rhetorical strategy was implemented as the president expanded Hoover’s 
jurisdiction and appropriations.      
Americanism and Militarism 
 Roosevelt used the Rumrich exposure to centralize police power in the FBI, 
under the auspice of battling Fifth Column subversion. The FBI’s annual 
appropriations moved from $6.5 million in 1939 to $44.2 million in 1945; staffing of 
special agents increased six-fold during that same period.53 Additionally, Hoover was 
appointed as chair of FDR’s Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), which 
made the FBI the sole civilian agency with jurisdiction over counterespionage 
investigations within the United States and its territories. The IIC established the 
Special Intelligence Service, which covertly expanded the FBI’s jurisdiction to 
“conduct overseas espionage and counterintelligence activities,” observes Batvinis.54 
In December 1941, Roosevelt ordered the “heads of all Government Departments and 




connection with any intelligence work within . . . Mexico, Central America, South 
America, the Caribbean, and Canada.”55 Additionally, FBI agents had already been 
placed in East Asia, Eastern and Western Europe, and the South Pacific.56      
 Hoover developed the FBI’s national policing methods in conjunction with 
foreign police departments that were also anti-communist and interested in 
maintaining racial, religious, and ideological boundaries. He networked with the 
German Gestapo and members of the Waffen-SS through the International Criminal 
Police Commission from May 13, 1935 until December 4, 1941, just three days 
before the attack on Pearl Harbor.57 In this time, the FBI collaborated with Heinrich 
Himmler and Chief of German Police and Holocaust architect, Reinhard Heydrich.58  
Hoover also accepted a medal from Benito Mussolini of Italy in this era for his police 
work through the International Association of Chiefs of Police.59 According to FBI 
memoranda, the Bureau and ICPC shared an interest in efficient and “new scientific 
developments” in law enforcement, particularly pertaining to “repressive and 
preventative measures against actions preparatory to crime and other dangerous 
conduct showing criminal intentions.”60 Methods of propaganda were also exchanged 
as the FBI reprinted its speeches in ICPC publications. Whereas the FBI used the 
vermin metaphor to represent criminals and prison reformers, the Gestapo used the 
metaphor to represent Jews;61 both of these usages followed Lenin’s references to 
capitalists and clergy as vermin.62   
 The FBI expanded in a manner that resembled the more centralized policing 
models implemented in England, Germany, and Italy. The president ordered all local 




1939, which the director used to assume control over such work.63 Roosevelt also 
made Hoover the Director of the Office of Censorship in December 1941, where he 
gained more formal authority over domestic and foreign media.64 The FBI used this 
latitude to develop its controversial Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), 
which largely replicated policing methods developed by British authorities.65 
According to Batvinis, Roosevelt secretly created an intelligence community that had 
jurisdiction over the entire federal government and its constituencies, but was only 
responsible to the president.66 Kenneth O’Reilly explains that in addition to chasing 
spies, FDR used this new European-styled policing apparatus to “occasionally exploit 
the bureau’s intelligence functions for partisan purposes, thereby sometimes 
demonstrating an ambivalent commitment to civil liberties.” Various requests for 
“political information” allowed “FBI officials” to ingratiate themselves with the 
“president” and to pursue “independent political objectives.”67 Frank J. Donner 
suggests that such expansion of “civilian anti-subversive surveillance” institutionally 
militarized the FBI and allowed the president to circumvent the “austere language of 
the Constitution limiting the Army’s role in civilian affairs.”68 This development 
demonstrates Douglas M. Charles’ observation that a domestic security state (1939-
1945) preceded the Cold War era national security state, and did so with a hidden 
agenda to manipulate public deliberation.69  
 Roosevelt’s centralization of authority in the FBI was encouraged by Hoover, 
who eagerly wrested authority away from the State Department and the Army. In 
turn, an unfriendly rivalry emerged, pitting the FBI Director against Secretary of War 




president and feared that he had unfairly biased Roosevelt’s perspective to win 
interagency battles.70 Though Hoover had a contentious relationship with intelligence 
leaders behind-the-scenes, the FBI’s militarization of American law enforcement was 
facilitated by its public portrayal of cooperation between civilian and military 
agencies.  
 Hoover used Americanism to suggest that the U.S. armed forces needed 
insulation from communism. He explained to Notre Dame University in May 1942 
that “Red-blooded Americanism” bound “[a]l law enforcement bodies” together in a 
“united front” to safeguard the “armed and naval forces” as well as “the “country’s 
soldiers, sailors and marines” from the “enemy within” who would otherwise 
disintegrate their “strength.” 71 Like Niebuhr, he warned that godlessness threatened 
America’s national security. For example, he told the Daughters of the American 
Revolution—an elite organization of Anglo-Saxon Protestant women72—in April 
1940 that the FBI was the “first line of defense” in preventing the “Communist Party” 
from permeating the “Army and Navy” with the “exponents” of “atheism” to promote 
“revolution.”73 Hoover, thus, constructed the FBI as a proxy to the U.S. military that 
prevented the spread of subversive beliefs. This new role required federal authorities 
to assume control over more local jurisdictions.  
 The militarization of the Bureau reconstituted policing agencies across the 
country as extensions of Hoover’s centralized and vastly expanded power. He used 
Americanism to communicate the president’s authority over local departments and 
their obligation to the national war effort. For example, Hoover told the FBI National 




the “request” of the “President” for its “coordination and centralization.”74 His use of 
“American” did more than express the president’s national jurisdiction; it also 
asserted that the centralization of policing power was constitutionally legitimate. 
Hoover, for example, told the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement 
Problems of National Defense in August 1940 that the “Chief Executive” entrusted 
“constituted law enforcement” to prevent the “blackout of justice” by making the 
“FBI” the “clearing house” for “subversive activities” in a manner that was “typically 
American” and met “democratic standards.”75 Roosevelt expanded upon his law 
enforcement directive in January 1943 to encourage “all patriotic organizations and 
individuals” to “report” all war-related matters to the FBI so that it could conduct a 
“comprehensive” correlation of “information” that avoided “confusion and 
irresponsibility.”76 The president’s interest in coordinating law enforcement against 
subversion, thus, laid the foundation for Hoover to operate without a check on, or 
counterweight to, his power.      
  Because Hoover valued the Constitution for the power that it generated, rather 
than the rights that it protected, the Americanization of law enforcement detached it 
from constitutional restraints. He told the IACP in September 1940, for example, that 
“Freedom of the press, of speech, and of thought, conceived by the founders of this 
nation” was not intended for “crooks or dictators, spies or traitors, Communists or 
[German-American] Bundsmen.”77 Hoover, thus, asserted that the founders intended 
for groups that harbored Americanist values to wield militant power against those 




also turned to popular entertainment for help in shaping favorable perceptions of 
expanded federal authority. 
 The militarization of a civilian agency was strategically communicated 
through major motion pictures. Assistant Director Hugh H. Clegg recommended to 
Hoover in 1942 that the FBI approach “motion picture producers” and suggested that 
“some ‘A’ grade pictures” be produced that portrayed the “Special Agent in at least as 
favorable a light as those who are in the armed forces.” Such films were supposed to 
emphasize that the “Special Agent” served America “unselfishly without the glamour 
of uniforms and military-sounding titles.”78 Assistant Director and propaganda chief 
Louis Nichols helped coordinate the Twentieth Century Fox production of The House 
on 92nd Street (1945). He summarized the script to Clyde Tolson, who was then 
Assistant to the Director, as opening with “alien round-ups, showing Germans and 
Japs being taken into custody – utilizing FBI Agents, Police, ONI, M.P.’s – giving 
credit to the entire group.” Nichols noted that the narrator should state that the FBI 
worked “in complete cooperation with all branches of the Armed Services.” He also 
wrote to Hoover that the film would include “two full-dress conferences consisting of 
admirals, captains, generals, colonels, along with [a special agent] and FBI 
executives.”79 The film celebrated the FBI’s militarization and asserted that it 
operated at the highest levels of national defense.  
 The House on 92nd Street misinformed audiences about the Bureau’s official 
role in the war effort. The film was released just six weeks after atomic bombs were 
dropped on Japan, making it the “first post-Hiroshima bomb film.”80 The only other 




production’s release that the Head of the Army Pictorial Review Section raised 
concerns “upon the question of jurisdiction” because the film falsely claimed that the 
FBI was authorized to guard the atomic bomb. In spite of such reservations, however, 
he ultimately approved its release.81 According to the film’s publicist, audiences were 
invited to view the movie as sticking “as closely to the truth as any non-fiction book 
or magazine article,” thereby obscuring the FBI’s duties in civil defense.82 
Constructing the FBI as the premier guardian of the world’s most dangerous military 
secrets and of American power increased the Bureau’s cultural prestige. Such a large 
expansion of power, however, resulted in more informed members of the intelligence 
community growing weary of Hoover’s power grab.  
 Americanism served as a vehicle for communicating a form of anti-
communism that favored the interests of conservative Catholics, Jews, and Protestants 
as well as industrialists. Hoover’s Americanism also encouraged a process of thought 
that replaced the New Deal’s more idealist philosophy with the presumptions of 
Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism. It also extended ideological support 
to his burgeoning militarized law enforcement empire. He used un-Americanism, 
conversely, to inform his construction of the administration’s adversaries. Such 
perspectives were welcomed by the White House.       
Un-Americanism and the Fifth Column 
 Hoover exploited the president’s interest in political intelligence. O’Reilly 
explains that Roosevelt requested political information from the director on American 
fascists in 1934, his critics in 1935, and communism and fascism in 1936. These 




presidency whereby Hoover forwarded solicited and unsolicited reports to the White 
House. FDR would repeatedly express his gratitude for Hoover’s due diligence.83 For 
example, the president ordered his secretary in June 1940 to “prepare a nice letter to 
Edgar Hoover thanking him for all the reports on investigations he has made and tell 
him I appreciate the fine job he is doing.” The outgoing letter celebrated Hoover for 
having done “a wonderful job” in the “fast moving situation,” resulting in Roosevelt’s 
“gratification and appreciation.”84 By utilizing Hoover’s expertise in political 
intelligence gathering, Roosevelt came to trust the director as a confidant during the 
New Deal.  
 In the process of elevating Hoover’s administrative role, Roosevelt also 
appeared increasingly suspicious of the administration’s critics. Charles observes that 
FBI officials “played to President Roosevelt’s political interests” by forwarding 
“intelligence to the administration that suggested its critics were, indeed, 
‘subversive.”’ Specifically, Hoover more eagerly shared intelligence summaries that 
portrayed FDR’s opposition as treasonous. Such reports were based largely on the 
anonymous speculations of the American Legion—and as the director admitted—
were “not susceptible to being verified.”85 The Legion had remained committed to 
one-hundred percent Americanism since its formation in 1919. Athan G. Theoharis 
observes that the FBI’s dependence on the American Legion Contact Program 
(ALCP) from 1940 to 1945 resembled its relationship with the American Protective 
League during the Great War; both programs were manifestations of Americanism 
campaigns. Once again, the Bureau employed “conservative activists to monitor 




the FBI’s domestic surveillance capabilities on a more permanent basis.86 The Legion 
would become a key power broker in American culture during the early Cold War. 
Hoover’s manipulation of national security intelligence embittered the president’s 
debate with anti-interventionists in the legislative branch and other wartime 
adversaries. For example, FDR wrote in a May 1942 memorandum to the attorney 
general that “Senators and members of the Congress” were “protected” only in a 
“sense” by the “Constitution” and that such a boundary “must be strictly construed” 
so as to allow the “F.B.I.” to investigate “suspected subversive activities on their 
part.”87 It was with such a mindset that Roosevelt accepted information from the FBI 
on a menagerie of anti-interventionist critics.  
  Intermixed in this broader perspective, Hoover implicated his own political 
opposition through the metaphor of an American Fifth Column. The term was coined 
during the Spanish Civil War to discuss the movement of General Franco’s military 
coup. The metaphor asserted a framework in which “four columns” of fascist 
“troops” coordinated externally against Madrid and with the assistance of an internal 
“fifth column.”88 This surreptitious group was perceived to have the power to 
infiltrate and undermine military and governmental agencies. Hoover’s reports to the 
president encouraged this view of the administration’s adversaries. The director 
reserved his own uses of the Fifth Column metaphor to emphasize the allegedly un-
American activities of those who criticized the FBI’s wartime methods. Arguments 
for restraint in law enforcement were then dubbed as disloyal speech that 




Hoover’s broader denouncement of un-American philosophies and then turns to his 
embodiment of such ideas through the Fifth Column metaphor. 
 Fears of foreign—or un-American—intrigue had circulated throughout 
Congress since at least the early 1930s, manifesting itself in un-American activities 
committees. The Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the 
United States (1930-1931) was formed to examine allegations of Soviet 
conspiracies.89 The panel was succeeded by the Special Committee to Investigate 
Nazi and Other Propaganda (1934-1937), which also heavily focused on charges of 
Soviet activities in America.90 Furthermore, the Special Committee on Un-American 
Activities (1938-1944) defined Americanism in a manner that aligned un-
Americanism more with communism than with ideologies associated with the Axis 
powers. Chairman Martin Dies (D-TX) wrote in January 1939, for example, that 
“Americanism” was the recognition that “fundamental rights” were derived from 
“God” and included the freedoms of worship and “property rights.”91 Richard Gid 
Powers observes that the Dies Committee was more interested in using the 
information that it had gained on the CPUSA as “ammunition for red-smearing 
attacks on unpopular opinions and associations.”92 Some members of Congress thus 
used un-Americanism to articulate the conspiracy theories that reflected the reasoning 
of fundamentalism. Such obtuse conservative politicking was met by liberal polemic 
partisanship.   
 Roosevelt defensively dismissed all charges of communist infiltration as anti-
New Deal conservative politics. Perhaps most notably, he ignored Whitaker 




when he acknowledged his service as a Soviet spy; FDR also dismissed Chambers’ 
revelation of widespread Soviet penetration of the executive branch.93 Once Joseph 
Stalin allied with the United States in 1941, the administration rebutted anti-
communist attacks with accusations that Dies and other critics were actually Nazi 
sympathizers who were attempting to obstruct the war effort. Roosevelt even directed 
Hoover to not investigate Soviet espionage in order to maintain Stalin’s trust. 94 The 
order did not stop the director from using allegations of communist “un-
Americanism” to discredit the administration’s detractors. This rhetorical move 
simultaneously served the foreign policy goals of the president and distanced the FBI 
from the administration on the issue.  
 Hoover, like Roosevelt, portrayed those who disrupted national unity in the 
war effort as un-American and linked these individuals to hostile foreign powers. He 
told the Annual New York Herald-Tribune Forum in October 1939, for example, that 
the nation “must unite to resist the insidious propaganda designed to foment unrest” 
by those whose “allegiance” was “pledged abroad.” The “good citizen,” he suggested, 
needed to “guard against subversion in all its forms. Call it Communism, Fascism, or 
what you will – it [was] un-American.”95 He focused his meanings of un-
Americanism more on communism than fascism as the war progressed. The director 
told the Boys’ Clubs of America in May 1944, for example, that “alien-minded and 
un-America forces” sought to “destroy the American way of life” by corrupting 
“Democracy” and injecting the “Communist virus” into the “veins of our American 
youth.”96 Hoover, thus, relied upon un-Americanism to portray American communists 




metaphor described a threat that could allegedly spread uncontrollably throughout the 
population. 
 The director used un-Americanism largely to imply that those groups and 
ideas that were rejected by fundamentalism were of foreign origin; he made, however, 
exceptions for Catholics and Jews who were willing to Americanize. The perspective, 
in general, even marked liberal commitments as embodiments of foreign ideas. 
Svonkin explains that by wartime, Jewish “intergroup professionals” began distancing 
themselves from the term “cultural pluralism”—a phrase coined by a Jewish 
American—because it had developed “distinctively European (and thus inherently 
un-American)” connotations.97 This context informed the Fifth Column metaphor. 
Hoover conflated pluralism, communism, Nazism, fascism, and criticism of the 
administration under a common trope. This recast anti-war, civil rights, and civil 
liberties agitation as well as anti-interventionism and cultural pluralism as elements of 
menacing foreign ideologies. This perspective advanced the principles of Hoover’s 
Americanism, which centralized power in the nation-state to combat atheism.  
 The Fifth Column metaphor was broadly used by members of the federal 
government to conceptualize notions of threat and to promote social control. The Dies 
Committee used it to describe domestic groups that were sympathetic with, or loyal 
to, the Soviet Union or Germany. A June 1940 Washington Post article, for example, 
explained that the committee used “the ‘fifth column’” to link the CPUSA with the 
“Communist International in Moscow,” and the “German-American Bund” with the 
“Third Reich of Germany” even though Germany had formally disavowed the Bund. 




meaning. The Post printed that Robert H. “Jackson defined the ‘fifth column’ as 
“[s]aboteurs” of “national defense,” as “[s]pies seeking either military or industrial 
secrets,”  and as ‘“[r]epresentatives”’ of ‘“foreign governments”’ that attempted to 
‘“influence American policy on behalf of foreign governments.”’ Measured against 
this more technical description, the article portrayed the FBI as the organization 
singularly prepared to neutralize the secretive threat. The article asserted that the FBI 
knew “who the ‘fifth columnists’” were and that “[g]overnment leaders” had “thrown 
the power of the G-Men against the potential menace from within.” The Post further 
suggested that because “the most dangerous ‘fifth column’” allegedly stayed “under 
cover,” only the FBI and “their chosen police aids” were “equipped to deal with it.”98 
Hoover, thus, did not singularly invent or promote notions of the Fifth Column, but 
worked in conjunction with other national security leaders to inform its meanings. 
 The director used the metaphor to further articulate Roosevelt’s assertion that 
democracy was prone to subversion, an assertion previously made by Hoover with the 
parasite metaphor during the War on Crime. Hoover reiterated arguments made 
during the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy in an August 1940 Washington 
Star article. He wrote that the “real danger to democratic institutions” was “always 
within a country’s own borders – and this danger lies in a possible breakdown of 
moral fiber among its citizens.” He specifically blamed the “Fifth Column” for 
disrespecting the “processes of law and order upon which the well-being of any 
community [was] founded.” Hoover explained this menace in terms of Christian 
realism and Christian fundamentalism. Like Niebuhr’s and Vice President Marshall’s 




nations” in “[h]istory” was due to the “growing weakness of the rulers” and their 
“consequent inability to enforce their laws.” Accordingly, he condemned the “Fifth 
Column” for its “total lack of decency, of patriotism, love of country or any interest 
in the public good” and the subsequent “moral corruption” that it caused. Such decay 
eroded respect for the law which endangered national security. Therefore, as Hoover 
warned: “the enemy that infiltrates through our gates and into our current life” to 
“poison our democratic idealism at its source,” and who also threatened America’s 
“moral stamina and patriotic idealism,” did so to subvert “democratic institutions” 
and ultimately defuse American power.99 Therefore, the Fifth Column, according to 
Hoover, threatened America by attempting to turn the citizenry against the strict 
enforcement of moral norms, which ultimately weakened the nation-state in the 
international arena.  
The America First Committee and the Fifth Column 
 Hoover’s conspiratorial outlook envisioned a vast network of ideologically 
disparate individuals working in concert to surrender the U.S. government to foreign 
powers. Hoover proclaimed before the Daughters of the American Revolution in 
April 1940 that it made “little difference from what foreign ism” American 
subversives emanated because “recent unions of allegedly opposing factions” had 
“ended much necessity to differentiate,” making them of the “same stripe.”100 
Similarly, he told the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police in July 1940 
that “Fascism and Nazism did not come into being until the wickedly winding way 
was paved by Communism.”101 The director introduced this schema even before 




told the American Legion in September 1938, for example, that “Fascism ha[d] 
always grown in the slimy wastes of communism” and warned that the “Nation” 
could not “exist half American and half alien in spirit.”102 He sought to maintain a 
conceptual link between Nazism and communism, seemingly blaming communism 
for the rise of fascism. He used the complexity of this threat to suggest that the Fifth 
Column had penetrated Congress, the media, organized religion, academia, as well as 
the civil rights and labor movements. The America First Committee (AFC) was an 
appropriate representation of Hoover’s fascist-communist conspiracy theory. 
 The president’s interest in political intelligence presented an opportunity for 
Hoover to suggest that an ideologically diverse group of critics was acting in concert 
to undermine the nation’s sovereignty.  Charles observes that the AFC represented the 
hub of Roosevelt’s most influential opposition and the greatest challenge to his 
wartime planning.103 The process of sending reports to the White House on the 
president’s critics formalized in February 1941 when the president ordered Hoover to 
investigate the committee’s funding.104 The historian further explains that this opened 
a floodgate of misinformation in which Hoover forwarded “political intelligence to 
either sustain or create the impression” that AFC members had links to “subversive” 
individuals who held foreign loyalties.105 Hoover specifically associated prominent 
anti-interventionists in the legislative branch as well as in the publishing, labor, civil 
rights, and academic communities with “groups or interests such as the Nazis, 
Communists, Fascists,” and other “forces essentially foreign.”106 Their criticism of 
the lend-lease program, for example, was portrayed as a strategy to foment disunity in 




 The FBI’s portrait of the AFC as a widespread subversive organization was 
predicated, in part, on reports that the committee had deeply penetrated the legislative 
branch to promote an insurgent campaign. The Washington, D.C. field office 
suggested in May 1942, for example, that the AFC was the “spearhead” of a larger 
“totalitarian movement” of “Nazis” and “Fascists” who sought to use the “war and its 
aftermath as an opportunity for totalitarian-democratic revolution.” This review 
relayed that the AFC claimed over fifteen million members and included “more than 
one hundred representatives and thirty-one senators” who were “known to be in 
sympathy openly or clandestinely with the America First movement.”107 The 
imagined Fifth Column was expansive; alleged traitors included Committee on Naval 
Affairs Chairman David I. Walsh (D-MA), Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
member Gerald P. Nye (R-ND), former Chairman of the Special Committee to 
Investigate Communist Activities in the United States Hamilton S. Fish (R-NY), and 
Interstate Commerce Committee Chairman Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT).108 Notably, 
the Commerce Chair was also accused of communist subversion eighteen years 
earlier while leading the charge against the DOJ for its involvement in the Teapot 
Dome Scandal.109 This effort ultimately dismantled Hoover’s GID and made Wheeler 
a lifelong nemesis.110    
 The director identified the Fifth Column in the legislative branch as those 
politicians who attempted to control law enforcement. Hoover told Father Flanagan’s 
Boys’ Town in June 1941, for example, that “Corrupt politicians” had reached “high” 
into “governmental bodies” and “legislatures” to “seize control” of “law enforcement 




observation that democracy was susceptible to foreign infiltration and intrigue—an 
idea reinforced to Roosevelt by Hoover. He suggested at Drake University in June 
1940—when it was still affiliated with establishment Protestantism—that the 
“Communist and the Bundsman” relied upon “‘Fifth Column’ methods” to burrow 
“deeper and deeper into our system of democracy” where they could obstruct the 
“national necessity” of “preparedness.”112 Specifically, he claimed that the Fifth 
Column had penetrated government, in part, to dismantle his agency through 
diminishing its reputation. He insisted before the IACP in September 1940, for 
example, that “persons” in “high places,” who he described as the “high-handed 
political dictator of the upper world,” worked with a “‘Fifth Column’” of 
“Communists” to launch a “‘smear campaign’” against the “FBI” and “wreck public 
confidence in its mission.”113 The director linked the administration’s war planning to 
his agency’s expansion and called into question the loyalty of those who challenged 
his methods. For example, he warned the New York State Association of Chiefs of 
Police in July 1943 that the “‘Fifth Column’” repeated from “high places” the 
“Communistic charges” that the FBI functioned in “violation of Civil Liberties” to 
obstruct “preparedness.”114 Hoover, thus, aligned democracy’s alleged vulnerability 
with legislative leaders who challenged his power and his rhetorical framings of the 
Bureau’s wartime activities. Such allegations came at a time of pointed criticism. 
 FDR and Hoover shared Wheeler as a political adversary. According to the 
AFC’s FBI file, the chairman was actively involved in the committee at its September 
1940 founding.115 The director warned the president in March 1941 that Wheeler was 




United States” to oppose “any plans that the President might have” to bring the 
“country into war.”116 The FBI’s close monitoring of the chairman followed his 
allegations that Hoover had built a political police force that served industrialists. 
Wheeler proclaimed in March  1940, for example, that Hoover’s technocratic “‘spy 
systems,’” especially the use of “wire tapping and dictographing,”’ increased the 
“power of law-enforcement agencies to oppress factory employes (sic)” who were 
under investigation “‘only by reason of their views and activities in regard to labor 
unions and other economic movements.”’117 Such allegations against the FBI were 
destabilized by Hoover’s own charges of Fifth Column penetration into high 
government offices, which also impinged non-AFC members of Congress. 
 Many of the president’s congressional critics suggested that Hoover was 
manufacturing a panic surrounding the war effort by using German-style propaganda 
and police tactics—sentiments that were further linked to the Fifth Column metaphor. 
Representative Vito Marcantonio (American Labor Party from New York) suggested 
that the FBI had built a “system of terror by index cards” that reflected “Himmler’s 
super secret service in Germany.” The congressman warned that “Mr. Hoover and 
other people in power” had created a surveillance system that constituted a “real 
serious menace to civil liberties” and laid the “foundation” for “Palmer raids, for a 
Palmer system, and for a Gestapo system in the United States.” Marcantonio also 
suggested that Hoover’s “language” in support of the renewed GID generated “war 
hysteria.”118 Members of the citizenry echoed such complaints with linkages between 
hysteria and the metaphor. A July 1940 Washington Post article subtitled, “Fifth 




people go on that only our own Army Intelligence and Brother Hoover’s boys know” 
about. According to the writer, however, that did not excuse the “hapless hysteria” 
that made any individual with a “faintly Teutonic name” seem to be a “fifth column 
suspect.”119 The director’s use of the Fifth Column metaphor, thus, created anxiety 
about subversion, but was also challenged by some members of the public. His core 
methods were even criticized by the president’s congressional friends.    
 Roosevelt’s political ally, Senator George W. Norris (Independent from 
Nebraska), went the furthest in enumerating charges against Hoover. After Norris 
indicated that he “worried” about the FBI’s “activities” and suggested that it had no 
legitimate right to its $10 million emergency supplemental appropriation in February 
1940, Norris listed the various reasons for which the FBI “ought to be curbed.” The 
senator proclaimed that the FBI had developed a “formula” for arresting communists 
in which agents “put handcuffs on before they find out even whether or not they have 
got the right man. They handcuff him, make him helpless, scare him, arrest him in 
bed at night,” torture him “all day, and deprive him even of the opportunity of saying 
good-bye” to family members. Norris argued that the Bureau’s “procedure must be 
outlawed and prohibited,” especially wiretapping.120 Support of the president’s 
leadership, therefore, did not translate into support for his confidants. 
 Roosevelt’s wartime expansion of the FBI occurred in tension with the 
idealistic value-set that he used to support the New Deal. According to a 
memorandum from December 1940, Norris had prepared “material for a blast at the 
Bureau” that was going to target “defense appropriations for the FBI, appropriations 




Lowenthal, who shortly thereafter served on Wheeler’s Interstate Commerce 
Committee.122 The assistant symbolized the DOJ’s era of idealistic reform. Tamm, for 
example, reminded Hoover that “Max Lowenthal” had closely “worked with the 
Wickersham Committee,” which examined a Bureau case that had been “‘reversed by 
an appellate court because of ‘third degree’ [i.e., torture] or other improper treatment 
of defendants.”’ The assistant to the director concluded that Lowenthal “was behind 
much” of the alleged “smear campaign” against Hoover.123 The alleged obstruction of 
wartime mobilization, therefore, was associated with the expectations and limitations 
placed by idealists on law enforcement.    
 Hoover, however, used the Fifth Column metaphor to reframe public 
deliberations on expanded law enforcement appropriations in more supportive 
manner. A September 1940 Milwaukee Journal articled subtitled “Fifth Column is 
Painted in Lurid Tints by J. Edgar Hoover in Talk at Parley,” relayed Hoover’s 
remarks that “America” was “so menaced” by “‘fifth columnists’” that “every police 
force in the country should be enlarged at once and given the utmost in equipment.”  
Hoover also complained that “nowhere in the nation “was there a “law enforcement 
agency” that had not “felt the ax of ‘false economy’ at one time or another.”124 Such 
arguments challenged Norris’ objections to the domestic security state. 
 The director thus collapsed administrative critics with all other Fifth Column 
forces, suggesting any attack on the FBI would be met with charges of anti-
Americanism. The perspectives of anti-interventionists, as well as civil liberties 
advocates in Congress and the Senate, were summarily dismissed as un-American. 




after serving for thirty years in the Senate. Wheeler would also lose in 1947 after 
serving for twenty-six years. Marcantonio would continue to serve in Congress until 
1951.  
 Yet, the legislative branch represented only one target of Hoover’s 
Americanization campaign. Roosevelt and the director also shared a common mission 
in controlling the media—especially those news organizations with AFC sympathies 
and ties. In response to the president’s request for information on the AFC’s 
financiers in February 1941, Hoover reported that the conservative-isolationist press 
was financing the committee, specifically mentioning the New York Daily News and 
the Chicago Tribune.125 Along with the New York Journal American, Theoharis 
contends that Hoover began monitoring the “personal conduct and political beliefs” 
of journalists writing for these papers in 1939. Such press outlets represented a major 
hurdle to the administration’s information control. Senator Wheeler leaked top-secret 
military planning information to the Tribune just days before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.126 His strategy was to evidence the president’s secret war preparations and 
thereby undercut public support for his interventionist foreign policy goals. FDR 
wrote to Hoover the following month that intervention gave them “a good chance to 
clean up a number” of “vile publications” that came “pretty close to being 
seditious.”127 The director used such encouragement to censure his own detractors in 
the press and elsewhere.     
The American Gestapo and Cultural Pluralism  
 Hoover charged that outspoken members of the press were members of the 




president focused his effort to silence allegedly seditious and anti-war presses from 
1942 to 1944.128 In tow with Roosevelt, Hoover told the IACP and radio audiences in 
August 1943 that “psychopathic canard purveyors” in the “American daily press” 
disgraced the “good name of journalism” when they sought to “undermine public 
confidence in law enforcement agencies” because they ultimately assisted the nation’s 
enemies.129 However, he first suggested that some press members were engaged in 
Fifth Column activities before America intervened into the war. A May 1940 Boston 
Post article titled “Says ‘Fifth Column’ in Nation Now,” relayed Hoover’s speech to 
B’nai B’rith. Departing from his prepared text, the director warned: “‘Under the 
shielding cloak of the American Constitution, traveling salesmen of foreign isms 
[had] formed a strong, vicious ‘fifth column’ in this country and seek to mold the 
democratic design to that of foreign totalitarianism.”’ Hoover placed accusations 
against the FBI at the center of the Fifth Column’s propaganda program. The article 
observed that Hoover “lashed out at the un-American activities of the ‘fifth column;’ 
their ‘smear campaign against the [FBI] and the foul propaganda which [had] 
emanated from the banner carriers of foreign isms—hard at work in a vicious 
campaign of chicanery, falsehood and the spreading of misinformation.”130 
Condemning dissent to his leadership became a focal point of Hoover’s wartime 
campaign. He warned the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1940 that 
any “accusations” against the FBI suggesting that it was “an OGPU”—predecessor to 
the KGB—a “Gestapo,” or a “national police” emanated from “certain anti-American 
bodies” to “discredit” the Bureau and thus “disrupt the entire United States.”131 




highlighted strategic vulnerabilities in the U.S. Constitution. In a speech presented on 
Hoover’s behalf, he told the Michigan Bankers Association in June 1940, for 
example, that the “Communist-controlled press” contributed to the “‘Fifth Column’ 
of destruction” as it hid behind “statutes” and “Constitutionalities.” Clegg claimed 
that the Fifth Column attempted to “‘smear’” Hoover for violating “civil liberties” 
because the director only defended “true Americans!”132 Such permissiveness of the 
press allegedly threatened Americanists. Hoover warned the New York Federation of 
Women’s Clubs in May 1940 that the “Communist charge” of an FBI “Ogpu” or 
“Gestapo” was a “‘smear’ campaign” to “undermine public confidence in the law 
enforcement bodies of America, and thus weaken the defenses of our internal 
security.”133 The domestic security state was, thus, allegedly vulnerable to the Fifth 
Column’s exploitation of speech guarantees. Hoover’s attack of constitutional 
safeguards was, in part, a response to wide spread unease to his methods.  
 The country was reintroduced to anti-communist raids in the spring of 1940—
a tactic that was reminiscent of Attorney General Palmer, and that would become a 
mainstay of Hoover’s power. The rhetoric of force that Hoover pioneered during the 
War on Crime was amplified during the wartime era. In the early hours of February 6, 
Hoover coordinated raids against the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a communist 
volunteer organization that had fought in the Spanish Civil War. The FBI rounded-up 
twelve veterans who were booked in field offices, handcuffed and chained together, 
and then “paraded in front of photographers” for violating the Neutrality Act of 1937, 
observes Powers.134 Similarly, the FBI allegedly relied upon military tactics to 




representatives complained that federal agents had used “Hitler’s ‘secret police’ 
methods” to break their strike. These tactics included false charges to justify arrests, 
and involved the herding of twenty “strikers into a private concentration camp” where 
they were “‘held for six days, questioned and threatened’” until some members 
signed “‘confessions’” under “the use of force.”135 The People’s Voice of Helena, 
Montana, further reported that FBI agents had “doped” and “tortured” these strikers 
to “extort confessions” by making “threats against the men’s families, alternate 
freezing and roasting treatment, and forcing victims to sit straight for hours on high 
stools.”136 News sources widely reported upon what many saw as an abuse of power.  
 Prominent publications drew parallels between the FBI and foreign police 
systems, warning of Hoover’s use of force and propaganda.  The New Republic, for 
example, observed various similarities in February 1940 between the “Russian 
OGPU” and “German Gestapo” when discussing the FBI’s raids upon the Brigade. 
The magazine encouraged an investigation of “the lawlessness of Hoover’s bureau, 
and also the wide scale salesmanship by which Hoover” had made “himself much too 
powerful to be easily curbed by a superior.”137 And, in April, it specifically called for 
a “congressional investigation” of the FBI’s “publicity squad” to reveal its hidden 
connections with supposedly independent media outlets.138 Similarly, the Nation 
referred to Hoover as an “American Himmler” in March and emphasized that the 
Hearst press boosted Hoover to push forward an ideological agenda.139 The press, 
thus, reverberated some of the same charges made by members of the legislature 
against Hoover’s power grab. These allegations repeated Circuit Judge Robert 




“government was building up a secret police comparable only to its counterparts in 
Germany, Russia and Italy.”140 Such charges would increasingly accelerate 
throughout many other quarters of public life. 
 Hoover’s illegal methods were again exposed in the summer of 1941. The FBI 
placed CIO leader and covert CPUSA member Harry Bridges under surveillance 
while the DOJ built its unsuccessful case to have the Australian immigrant 
deported.141 Bridges detected his watchmen in August 1941 and invited reporters to 
spy with him on two agents who had checked into an adjoining room at the Edison 
Hotel in New York where he was staying. Curt Gentry explains that Bridges also let 
the press “examine the microphone he’d removed from his telephone box, as well as 
the notarized statement of a young woman the agents had invited up to listen to the 
tap.”142  The story circulated widely in the press and led the Senate Judiciary 
Committee—according to the New York Daily News—to demand a “grand jury 
investigation of first-hand evidence gathered by PM in the Harry Bridges wire-
tapping case.” His “Citizen’s Commission” soon thereafter organized a petition that 
was signed by authors, educators, performers of “stage, music, and screen,” 
clergymen, and lawyers to condemn FBI methods as being “‘Devious AND 
Unusual.”’143  Hoover’s rhetorical strategizing aimed to diffuse such oppositional 
forces.       
 Charging his critics in the federal government and the press with Fifth 
Column subversion helped the director overcome formal checks upon his authority. 
This strategy was predicated on realist and fundamentalist presuppositions that the 




welfare.  Hoover advanced this claim by accusing members of religious groups and 
academia of engaging in subversive activities as well. He told the graduates of Notre 
Dame University in May  1942, for example, that they ought to expose the “motives” 
of “Fifth Columnists” who preached a “foreign ‘ism’” from “some pulpits, some 
lecture halls, some radios, some presses and even on some screens” rather than “good 
old-fashioned Americanism.”144 Hoover’s conspiratorial outlook challenged many 
vestiges of cultural pluralism, especially those that campaigned in mass media. 
 The director suspected that the religious campaign for cultural pluralism was 
ultimately a front for subversive activities. Svonkin explains that intergroup 
professionals from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the American Jewish 
Committee (AJC) launched an educational campaign to teach tolerance and fight 
prejudice through the “mass media and the school system” throughout the 1940s. This 
program popularized the results of research conducted by Professor Franz Boas, who 
was Chair of the Department of Anthropology, and his distinguished colleagues also 
at Columbia University—Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead.145 Boas’ revulsion of 
anti-Semitism promoted a more general cultural pluralism. More religious and 
conservative Jews, however, relied on the principles of cultural pluralism to more 
narrowly argue against anti-Semitism. These two different approaches to curbing 
discrimination were evident in the AJC and ADL. The former more broadly and 
academically advocated tolerance and inclusion—and accordingly was suspected of 
subversion by Hoover—while the latter worked closely with the FBI to more 
singularly root out anti-Semitic groups.146 For example, Assistant Director Louis 




organization—in 1942 for supporting the “Bureau one hundred percent” and doing 
“anything” the FBI requested. This loyalty included dismissing its own members who 
challenged Hoover and severing “all connections with the American Jewish 
Committee.” This triumph was commemorated in the propaganda chief’s personnel 
file.147 The FBI worked to embrace the ADL while raising suspicions about the AJC.   
 Hoover incorporated an Orwellian twist of logic as he conflated tolerance with 
tyranny and totalitarianism through Fifth Column subversion. He warned B’nai B’rith 
that wide commitments to tolerance came dangerously close to subverting American 
culture and its institutions. Hoover explained in February 1941 that the “‘fifth 
column”’ operated fascist and communist “front organizations” with “high-sounding 
names” to promote ideologies of “tolerance” and ultimately foster “intolerance” by 
obstructing the FBI’s attempt to “hamper” their “revolutionary activities.”148 The 
director specifically targeted educators with this message. He told Rutgers University 
in May 1943 that though “[t]olerance” was a “virtue,” the “greatest crime” of the 
“age” was the “toleration of wrong.”149 Specifically, he linked such toleration to the 
rise of fascism at home and abroad. He suggested before the Daughters of the 
American Revolution in April 1944 that “misguided world tolerance and stupid 
apathy” had permitted the “world menace” of Nazism to spread. Similarly, a “false 
spirit of toleration” allegedly allowed the KKK and other anti-Semitic groups to 
promote “racism, hate, greed, and injustice.”150 Hoover, thus, concluded that 
tolerance had its limits in U.S. culture and that its advocates included Fifth 




was only one aspect of his contempt for academia that reflected the Fundamentalist-
Modernist culture war. 
 The director extensively campaigned against public intellectuals who 
challenged his control of information and ideology. Historian of sociology Mike 
Forrest Keen explains that Hoover “held a special disdain for sociologists and 
‘criminologists.’”151 Similar to his rivalry with Prison Bureau Director Sanford Bates, 
social scientists who studied crime problems like AFC member and Columbia 
University Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, University of Washington Professor 
Norman Hayner, and University of Chicago Professor Ernest W. Burgess were placed 
under wartime surveillance after challenging the director. Barnes—a criminologist 
and a sociologist—claimed in 1936 that “the Attorney General and J. Edger Hoover” 
had “hoodwinked the public with a lot of cheap publicity in the tracking down of a 
few criminals.”152 The FBI accelerated its ongoing investigation of him after he wrote 
that “Roosevelt” was “attempting to set up a dictatorship in this country, with himself 
as the dictator” and defined “Americanism” as the “right to hold any opinion, 
however conservative or radical” in a 1942 textbook.153 These accusations followed 
his signing of the Humanist Manifesto (1933), an anti-Fundamentalist declaration that 
was endorsed by prominent members of the academic community. The proclamation 
denied the existence of supernatural power, attacked capitalism, and called for the 
secular “transformation” of “religious institutions” to promote a more “free and 
universal society.”154 Not only was Barnes offensive to Roosevelt, his atheistic 
secularism and his universal commitment to free speech was also an affront to 




in 1940 after they reportedly delivered a “‘scathing denunciation”’ of Hoover’s 
“‘machine-gun school of criminology.”’ And, Burgess was placed on the FBI’s secret 
Security Index for emergency round-ups in 1944 for allegedly belonging to such 
groups as the Teachers Committee of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade.155 Hoover’s suspicion was not isolated to these scholars.  
 Some liberals in the academy advocated a civil liberties perspective that 
provided the legal underpinnings for cultural pluralism. Prominent First Amendment 
scholar and Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. attempted to prevent the 
DOJ and the FBI from reverting to the Wilson administration’s unconstitutional 
strategies, marked by censorship and propaganda.156 He wrote idealistically in Free 
Speech in the United States (1941) that political expression in “war time” should be 
“unrestricted” by “censorship or by punishment, unless it [was] clearly liable to cause 
direct and dangerous interference with the conduct of war.”157 This titled echoed his 
1919 Harvard Law Review article, “Freedom of Speech in Wartime,” which had 
prompted Hoover to open an FBI file on the scholar.158 
 According to FBI documents, Franz Boas presented a speech to the American 
Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom in mid-April of 1940 titled, “The 
Menace of the F.B.I.” He proclaimed in it that “J. Edgar Hoover” and his “Bureau” 
were “dangerously overstepping the bounds of legality,” which “raised problems of 
the gravest kind for all Americans who believe in the maintenance of orderly and 
constitutional government.” Specifically, he charged that the FBI targeted any person 
“connected with liberal, progressive, labor, and radical movements” for their “cultural 




Conference on Civil Rights to draft resolutions that supported anti-trust prosecutions 
as well as greater protections for racial and political minority groups. The conference 
also included CPUSA General Secretary Earl Browder and CPUSA member and 
American Civil Liberties Union founder Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.160 Together, they 
supported and commended “Senators Norris and Wheeler for exposing the dangers of 
the F.B.I.’s conduct” and condemned “Mr. Hoover’s attempts to smear his critics by 
charactering them with communists.”161 The purpose of Boas’ meetings, explains 
Gary Bullert, was to pressure Roosevelt into firing Hoover for the Brigade 
roundups.162 Hoover’s warnings of the Fifth Column in academia gave his audiences 
reasons to be suspicious of more liberal scholars from a variety of fields.  
 While Roosevelt struggled to balance war planning and civil liberties, the FBI 
used the Fifth Column to suggest that idealistic commitments espoused often within 
the nation’s colleges and universities left the country more vulnerable during 
wartime. A November 1940 New York Times article titled, “Hoover’s Aide Sees Fifth 
Column as Menace to Nation’s Colleges,” relayed a speech delivered by Assistant 
Director Nichols to the National Interfraternity Conference. Hoover’s “administrative 
assistant” asked the group to “help the government combat fifth-column activities in 
colleges and universities in the ‘American way.’” Reminiscent of Blair Coan’s red 
web conspiracy theories of the 1920s, Nichols suggested that the FBI wanted to 
prevent “‘foreign agents”’ from weaving “‘their web of alien philosophies to ensnare 
America in darkness and scuttle and destroy our national defenses.’” College students 
were consequently asked to report the “‘possible activities”’ of “‘subversives”’ on 




concern. Hoover complained to the Holland Society that “misguided souls” attempted 
to apply “peacetime conceptions of civil rights” to a “wartime situation.” For Hoover, 
during times of national emergency in particular, national security unquestionably 
trumped civil liberties in the hierarchy of American values. The director lamented, 
however, that the liberal “segment” of “American life” sought the “maintenance of 
civil liberties” but failed to “distinguish between” America’s “traditional safeguards” 
to protect the “legitimate rights” of “Americans” and their exploitation by “enemy 
agents” to “undermine America.”164 Hoover hinted at the plurality of more liberal 
ideas that challenged his perspective. He told Notre Dame University, for example, 
that the “Nazi threat” facing the “American people from within” was compounded by 
an “insidious injection of several European ‘isms’” from the “Fifth Column,” which 
flourished in “the Republic under the false guise of Democracy.”165 More liberal 
ideas that promoted cultural pluralism were, thus, broadly rejected as ignorant and 
subversive.          
 Academics were particularly vulnerable to Hoover’s wartime red-baiting 
because of the defenses provided by some scholars during the 1930s to Stalinism.166 
Powers suggests that in defending intellectual freedom, they also supported a foreign 
regime that abolished liberty—an argument also made by Hoover about tolerance.167 
This paradox was at the core of realism’s insistence that only by restricting the liberty 
of agitators could liberty be maintained more generally. If agitation unexpectedly 
accelerated into revolution, the communist persecutions could be expected in 
America. Notions of the Fifth Column in academia, religion, and elsewhere linked the 




belligerents. Hoover warned the FBI National Police Academy in October 1940, for 
example, that the “Fifth Column” had “penetrated” our “schools, our churches and 
our civic organizations.” According to Hoover, “[e]missaries from totalitarian 
governments” had “joined reform organizations and civil liberties groups” to 
“undermine our national integrity.” The “Fifth Column” was allowed to 
“contaminate” the nation because “too many” American “citizens” had allegedly 
pledged themselves to “apathy.”168 This was a trait, of course, that he also equated 
with tolerance. The director used this rhetoric of crisis to challenge the loyalty of 
those who campaigned for labor unionism or against white supremacy.  
 Furthering the assault on what Hoover depicted as anti-American sentiment, 
he informed the Roosevelt administration of various groups at work that threatened 
the nation's security; such coalitions were construed in terms of economic and racial 
alignments. Organizations like the CIO and W.E.B. Du Bois’ National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) were perceived as revolutionary 
threats for their large memberships of cultural outsiders and various communist 
affiliations.169 Du Bois—an accomplished sociologist—challenged Hoover’s 
Americanism at a number of locations as he suggested that capitalism, militarism, and 
racism were interconnected belief systems. Such intellectualism made him a target for 
perpetual FBI surveillance and harassment.170 The director warned the White House 
in September 1943 that the “Communist Party” was advancing its “revolutionary 
program” through a “‘boring-from-within’ technique” of the civil rights movement. 
Its “agitational program” allegedly targeted the NAACP, A. Philip Randolph’s 1940 




that “branched” into fields beyond “religious activities.”171 Hoover informed White 
House aide Harry Hopkins the previous month that the “Communist Party” sought to 
unite the “Negro and the Labor Movement,” in part, to address “racial problems” in 
law enforcement.172 He observed in a June 1943 letter about the “‘Negro Freedom 
Rally” that “Congressman Vito Marcantonio” delivered a speech promoting an “Anti-
Poll Tax Bill” following another “Communist Party” speech that attacked “‘Jim Crow 
in the Armed Forces.”’173 At other times, Hoover blamed the “Axis Powers” for 
creating “disunity” by fostering “racial agitation” among “negroes.” Such 
conspiratorial forces allegedly worked to make African Americans sympathetic to the 
“Japanese” because they were also of “the colored race,” thereby conceiving of 
World War II as a “race war.”174 Issues of race and labor were thus at the forefront of 
Hoover’s wartime concerns.  
 Many union activists vocally protested against intervention and the FBI’s 
inequitable police work, which likewise attracted negative attention to the Roosevelt 
administration. John L. Lewis—anti-communist, AFC member, CIO President (1938-
1940), and President of the United Mine Workers of America (1920-1960)—
denounced FDR’s war planning. According to Albert Fried, the extensively press-
covered labor leader publicly argued in 1940 that America’s entrance into war would 
undermine labor and civil rights reform, ultimately hurting the poor, the unemployed, 
blacks, the working class, soldiers, and their families.175 The Daily Worker reported 
in April that Lewis called for “full and unrestricted rights of citizenship” for the 
“Negro people” and “urged that Negro America unite with labor for the ‘common 




challenged Hoover to “‘turn his face” to see “where American people” were “being 
lashed by white-robed riders” and to “‘seek the dark night trails of lynching 
parties.’”177 Roosevelt directed Hoover to open an investigation on the labor leader 
for his unsupportive views, which Lewis discovered and made public.178 The director 
portrayed such criticisms of the administration as domestic subversion. 
  Hoover charged that persons with foreign loyalties sought to create racial and 
economic discord through exploiting the nation’s cleavages. He construed criticisms 
of the administration’s war planning, and the social order more generally, as evidence 
of subversion. Accordingly, the director warned the IACP in August 1943 that a 
“subversive group” sought to “seize upon racial differences, economic stresses and 
political difficulties” to attack the “fair play” that characterized “America.”179 
Marginalized and mainstream groups, suggested Hoover, were susceptible to foreign 
ideologies. He told the Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1940 that “ism 
advocates” exploited the “working man, the colored races, the farmer, the renter, and 
the white collar class” with “claims” that only looked “enticing” to the “unthinking 
person.”180 Hoover’s statements, among other things, recast civil rights and labor 
agitation as subversive activities bent on undermining Americanism, thus conflating 
American sovereignty with the commitments of his Americanist vision.    
 The Fifth Column metaphor associated the labor movement with foreign 
aggression. While the CIO organized strikes in defense plants to address local 
grievances,181 Assistant Director Clegg told the Michigan Bankers Association in 
June 1940 that “agents of foreign ideologies” had incited “chaotic conditions in 




“subversive forces” included the “saboteur” and the “propagandist” who attempted to 
“retard our preparedness program” through “un-American activities.” Clegg 
concluded that the interests of industrialists were paramount while they battled 
against labor unions and civil rights organizations. Similar to McKinley before him, 
the FBI speaker charged that the “call of Americanism” demanded that “[e]very 
assistance must be given to the industrial world” against the “‘Fifth Column’ of 
destruction” that allegedly sought to “hinder or harm it.”182 Reminiscent of the DOJ’s 
treatment of organized labor while the attorney general was under retainer by the 
railroad industry, Hoover directed law enforcement to regard strikers as communist 
agents. 183  For example, he warned the Federal-State Conference on Law 
Enforcement Problems of National Defense in August 1940 that “Communist-
controlled labor” groups were composed of “‘Fifth Columnists’” who attempted to 
instigate strikes in factories to “weaken our means of national defense.” The director 
charged that subversives, not loyal Americans, were the source of social agitation. He 
insisted that “the spy, the saboteur or the destroyer” attempted to sap “national 
strength” by “fomenting unrest in the community, the school, the factory, and the 
mill.”184 The Fifth Column, therefore, not only threatened to undermine national 
security but also the economic bedrock of Americanism—its industrial basis.  
 The Fifth Column metaphor allowed Hoover to revive the Americanist 
conspiracy theorizing that first appeared during the Fundamentalist-Modernist 
controversy. Hoover used cultural cleavages to signify Nazi and Soviet intrigue, and 
then expanded upon this base to implicate social reformers who defended civil 




president and his foreign policy planning. The metaphor was central to establishing a 
guilt-by-association framework that discredited the administration’s critics, and more 
importantly, adversaries of Hoover’s Americanist commitments. The Fifth Column, 
thus, transformed perceptions of political dissent into evidence of disloyalty. The 
severity of intergroup conflict that ran along numerous American cleavages made the 
Fifth Column appear tremendously dangerous. The metaphor constituted a threat that 
justified and further encouraged the FBI’s rapid expansion.  
Containment Strategizing and Thought Control  
 Hoover used the Fifth Column portrait of a Soviet conspiracy to advance a 
containment corrective as the solution to anti-American expressions and actions. 
Consequently, this metaphorical construction justified the containment of any activity 
that threatened Hoover’s conception of Americanism. His perspective was said to 
limit the spaces in which communists operated; in practice, however, the rhetoric of 
containment established intellectual barriers that restrained cultural pluralism and the 
movements that it fostered. Whereas idealism attempted to universally manifest the 
principles enumerated in the Bill of Rights, Hoover’s Americanism limited the 
protections offered by the Constitution to only those who shared his racial, religious, 
and ideological precepts. The director reconciled this particular vision with American 
political tradition by elevating commitments to security above the Constitution’s 
stated principles. Like Theodore Roosevelt, Thomas R. Marshall, and Reinhold 
Niebuhr before him, Hoover privileged the defense of Christianity before that of 




 James Madison had provided sturdy foundations for cultural pluralism in U.S. 
culture.185 Madison wrote in Federalist 10 (1787) that the “regulation” of a “landed 
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, [and] a moneyed interest” 
formed the “principal task of modern legislation” to prevent an “overbearing 
majority” from abusing the “rights of the minor party” with “schemes of oppression.” 
Therefore, he recommended a “government” of “representation” as a “cure” that 
would “Extend” the “sphere” to “take in a greater variety of parties and interests” and 
“encourage” a “diversity of opinions.”186 Madison redoubled this philosophy in 
Federalist 51 (1787), suggesting that because mankind was not composed of “angels,” 
it was “necessary” to impose “external” and “internal controls on government.” He 
reminded the framers that public accountability was, “no doubt, the primary control 
on the government.” He located democratic legitimacy in the ability of the governed 
“to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers” and to prevent a “majority” 
from becoming “united by a common interest” and thereby threatening the “rights of 
the minority.”187 Such fears of majority tyranny played a central role in establishing 
civil liberties in U.S. political culture and in developing American liberalism. 
Specifically, the founders insisted upon a system of checks and balances to prevent an 
organized majority from using government machinery to advance factionalism. The 
Bill of Rights, then, placed considerable limits on the power of federal government 
office holders.   
  Hoover, conversely, suggested that any perceived exploitation of the U.S. 
Constitution threatened Americanism, particularly those acts he deemed more radical 




Daughters of the American Revolution in April 1944, for example, that “Native-born 
agitators” who were not “American” had “[c]loaked” themselves with the 
“guarantees” of the “Constitution” to represent the “FBI as a menace to civil 
liberties” and advocate their own “philosophies.” The existing legal structure was 
allegedly too weak to preserve Americanism because these “malicious forces” were 
“cunning enough to keep within the strict letter of the law.”188 Hoover raised 
suspicions of civil liberties advocates in general. He told the New York Federation of 
Women’s Clubs in May 1940 that those who undermined “liberty” shouted “most 
loudly for the protection of the Constitution” while they sought to “destroy” its 
“sacred guarantees.” The director targeted such groups for challenging his 
Americanist calls for Judeo-Christian supremacy. He complained that subversive 
groups promoted “false notions of liberty” and failed to recognize that there was “no 
such thing as liberty unless” it was “liberty under law.”189 Their manipulations of the 
Constitution were allegedly a moot point because the Bill of Rights, according to 
Hoover, fostered a political culture that was only intended for those who agreed with 
him. Clegg told the Michigan Bankers Association in June 1940 that American civil 
liberties were “conceived by the founders of this Nation” strictly for “honest persons” 
seeking “liberty” and not for “Communists or Bundsmen.”190 Whereas Madison 
promoted pluralism to curtail industrial-based tyranny in the federal government, the 
FBI asserted that civil liberties only extended to Americanists. He craftily articulated 





 Hoover informed the Fifth Column metaphor with ancillary termite metaphors 
to further conceptualize how America was susceptible to subversion. For example, 
Kirby Farrell explains that the termite metaphor projects invisible threats for which 
our “everyday senses and reason are helpless until the damage is already done, and 
relief from which can only be found in extermination.”191 Accordingly, the director 
suggested that his cultural adversaries and their more liberal beliefs threatened the 
nation’s democracy and purity. He told the Annual New York Herald-Tribune Forum 
in October of 1939, for example, that the “foes within our gates, like termites,” had 
“betrayed America by chiseling at the foundations of this great edifice of freedom.” 
He blamed them for inculcating their “alien ideas into our social order,” which 
disturbed the “cradle of liberty.”192 These enemies were especially dangerous to 
America’s democracy because they had already penetrated the civic strata with Nazi-
like force. He warned Notre Dame in May 1942 that “termites” had “bored deep into 
our social structure with a brazenness that was as daring as the blitzes of Hitler’s 
blood-crazed forces.”193 Hoover encouraged remodeling the nation to protect it from 
further infestation. He told Drake University in June 1940 that since “termites” had 
already weakened the “internal structure of America,” it was imperative to “put” the 
nation’s “houses” back “in order.”194 The termite metaphor was so rhetorically valued 
by Hoover that he continued its use into the Cold War era. He used it to suggest that 
the foundation of the American civic structure had been destabilized by alien peoples 
and ideas.  
 The FBI encouraged barricading the nation’s enemies through use of a wall 




“American has a distinct duty in the erection of a national wall which will encircle 
Americanism” and prevent “anti-American propagandists” from swaying “our settled 
decisions.” For the FBI, it was important to keep the foundations of Americanism—
and not those of civil liberties—secure. Clegg further explained that the “wall of 
patriotism must be so sturdy that no foreign ism can penetrate it and weaken 
Americanism, which guarantee[d] to all, Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of 
Happiness.”195 These statements legitimized citizenship for only those individuals 
who harbored the racial, religious, and ideological precepts of Americanism. 
Hoover’s conceptual fortress not only kept foreign ideologies outside of protected 
spaces, it also perpetually sequestered un-American ideas, which allegedly hid in 
academia.  He told the National Police Academy in September of 1939, for example, 
that his “walls of civic pride” would “forever protect” the country from the 
“theoretical blatherskites” and “academic theorists” who had “wandered from the 
protective cloisters of the classroom.”196 Hoover’s barricade, thus, established 
intellectual boundaries that isolated more liberal ideas and insulated the government 
from them.  
 Hoover nominated the FBI to implement a national political quarantine. The 
director’s containment philosophy required the citizenry to voluntarily cooperate with 
federal authorities. In his October 1939 remarks at the Annual New York Herald 
Tribune Forum, he explained that “American law enforcement” and “every loyal 
American citizen” had to work with the FBI to “erect defensive walls to protect” the 
“body politic from the insidious and malignant germs of foreign isms.”197 In Paul A. 




an invasive organism, contagious sickness, or malignant growth, it may follow that 
the body politic should be sanitized, or that the disease should be stopped, or the 
cancer excised.”198 Accordingly, isolation, removal, and execution composed a three-
part containment strategy for sequestering pluralism away from Americanism. 
Hoover told the IACP that same month, for example, that the “way to cure a plague” 
was by “quarantine, by ferreting out the carriers of disease and either eradicating 
them, or placing them where they cannot infect the populace.”199 Similarly, the 
director told the National Police Academy in September that the “social disease” must 
be “treated” like a “cancerous growth,” it must be “cut out or burned out of the body 
politic.”200 Such separation logic—in which purity was maintained by segregation 
and removal—injected principles of isolationism into internationalism, and thereby 
encouraged containment philosophy. Instead of protecting American sovereignty by 
isolating the nation away from the world, Hoover provided a blueprint for protecting 
the nation by isolating and removing what he viewed as alien and atheistic 
worldliness away from America. With his agents already operating around the world, 
America’s presence was global and, accordingly, so was Hoover’s vision for 
Americanism. This reoriented American internationalism and the means by which the 
federal government maintained stability.     
 The director built rhetorical continuity between the vermin and Fifth Column 
campaigns by recycling his ancillary metaphors. Beyond his continued use of the 
contagion metaphor, Hoover also circulated parasite metaphors, both of which 
extended from the War on Crime. For example, Hoover told the Holland Society in 




insecure for parasites, termites, subverters, and the forces of lawlessness.”201 While 
the parasite metaphor connected the vermin and Fifth Column campaigns, the termite 
metaphor would go on to associate the Fifth Column and Red Fascism campaigns. 
The parasite metaphor enhanced the vividness of the Fifth Column. For example, 
Hoover told the FBI National Police Academy in October, 1942 that anti-
interventionists acted like “parasites” in their attempt to “eat away at our 
preparedness program” to make America “an easy victim for the Axis machines of 
war.”202 By constructing wartime threats in terms of the War on Crime, Hoover 
extended and expanded upon his program already in place to elevate the FBI’s stature 
as well as his own power. 
 Hoover’s perspective asserted that militant force was necessary for 
maintaining his quarantine. He told the IACP in September of 1940, for example, that 
“superior manpower, superior equipment and superior training” was the necessary 
“formula” for neutralizing the “‘Fifth Column.’” Accordingly, America needed to 
“build up the forces of law enforcement” to the “maximum quota” to “meet every 
emergency” and “assist the FBI in dealing with ‘Fifth Column’ activities.”203 In 
practice, this meant the public’s blind support of the FBI’s COINTELPRO methods, 
including the use of secret informants, illegal mail opening, breaking-and-entering, 
bugging, wire-tapping, and propagating derogatory information.204 These were not 
methods that Hoover could rally public support behind, so instead the implications of 
militarization were shrouded in the language of government secrecy. He told the 
Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense in 




with “the utmost secrecy” because the “spy” was “not a person” who could “be 
arrested and prosecuted like a gangster.” Allegedly, relying on democratic processes 
would only “allow his comrades to outwit” the government’s “further efforts.” 
Instead, law enforcement had to “combat him in ways and means which [had] been 
evolved from long experiences.” He reassured his subordinates that the “public” 
would be “fully advised of all the facts in every matter” when the FBI was “ready for 
presentation in a court of justice.”205 He even warned officers against revealing 
information about his secret methods. Hoover told the New York State Association of 
Chiefs of Police in July of 1940, for example, that there was “no place in our ranks 
for men who unwittingly or otherwise encourage[d] the forces of subversion” with 
any “stab-in-the-back activities” of the “‘Fifth Column”’ that could “‘smear”’ the FBI 
or otherwise “break down its efficiency.”206 Thus, the director militarized law 
enforcement through a rhetoric of secrecy that denounced whistle-blowing as an act 
of disloyalty. Whereas Hoover relied on rationales inherent to the domestic security 
state when speaking before law enforcement officials, he more overtly appealed to 
Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism when addressing religious 
organizations.   
 Militant FBI tactics were portrayed as a religious test of force against the 
rising power of evil. Niebuhr wrote in The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941) that 
“evil” arose from “freedom” as a “force” from the “devil” that preceded “human 
action.”207 Hoover appealed to such reasoning when describing the nature of FBI 
power. He told the Knights of Columbus in March 1942, for example, that the 




ascended “over the forces of decency.”208 In Hoover’s framework, evil forces could 
only be balanced by more righteous power. He asserted to St. John’s University Law 
School in June of 1942, for example, that the “Axis forces and the pagan evil” could 
“only” be met by a “superior force of spiritual development.”209 Notions of force and 
counterforce were also used to conceptualize intergroup relations. After race riots 
erupted across the country in the summer of 1943, he directed the IACP in August to 
use “superior strength” in a clash of “force” against “force” to control any “outbursts” 
that may pit “race against race, creed against creed.”210 While the intergroup church 
movement attempted to build racial and religious tolerance to prevent such outbursts, 
Hoover argued that the root of intergroup hatred was godlessness. He suggested to 
Holy Cross College in June of 1944, for example, that the “conflicts between groups 
in our large cities” were not “truly religious” in nature because they were drawn along 
“racial” lines and existed between communities where “God” had “not entered.”211 
The militarization of law enforcement was facilitated by national security and 
religious discourses that targeted racial minority groups.  
  The FBI’s wartime mission to organize a religiously-based majority against 
various minority groups reshaped the political-religious landscape. Fundamentalists 
had previously accused Catholics of radicalism for their commitments to social 
justice and cultural pluralism. Hoover’s juxtaposition between Americanism and the 
Fifth Column redirected many Catholics toward accepting his fundamentalist 
precepts. For example, the Dean of the Faculties at the University of San Francisco 
relayed to Hoover in July 1944 that his Jesuit community—which previously 




speeches for the customary “spiritual book read at one of the meals each day.” The 
dean further informed Hoover that his own “primary interest” was in “Communism” 
and that the FBI had the “best informed man” on the subject who was also the “best 
analyst of international strategy.” The Church, thus, had begun reorienting its more 
measured anti-communist perspective, which was previously counterbalanced with 
labor advocacy. Instead, many Catholics then began adopting the tenets of Hoover’s 
Americanism, which suspected organized labor of subversion. The director 
commemorated this accomplishment in the personnel file of his propaganda chief.212 
Indeed, a perspective that recast the nation’s political system through the rhetoric of 
Americanism was quickly accelerating.   
 Hoover’s antithesis between Americanism and the Fifth Column recast the 
nation’s political culture in terms of a totalitarianism that demanded ideological 
conformity. The director proclaimed to Holy Cross College, for example, that for 
“true Americans,” there could be “no unity with the enemy within and no 
compromise with those who would destroy all that we fight for” and “believe in.” He 
further proclaimed, “America cannot exist half democratic and half Communist or 
Fascist.”213 He explicitly contradicted the spirit of Federalist 10 and the history of 
American civil liberties. Specifically, Hoover defined democracy as majority rule 
without minority rights. For example, he told the Daughter of the American 
Revolution in April 1944 that “loyal Americans” composed a “majority” that needed 
to defend “America” and “neutralize the woeful will” of the “minority.”214 He arrived 
at this conclusion even before America intervened into the war. Hoover encouraged 




strength to him in May 1939 and organize a “dictatorship of the people, for the 
people, and by the people” to preserve “Democracy” and “Justice” in their “purest 
form.” Emphasizing both his scientific expertise and his Christian militancy, he 
concluded that this “dictatorship of the collective conscience” was a “crusade for 
America” in which “true Americanism must prevail.215 Hoover, thus, relied upon the 
modes of loyalty and patriotism inherent to realism and fundamentalism to help 
destabilize ideas and groups that promoted cultural pluralism. In so doing, he adopted 
a rhetoric of totalitarianism. 
 
Fading American Idealism and the Usurpation of Dissent 
 J. Edgar Hoover manipulated changing currents in American religious 
philosophy. He undermined the idealistic principles of the New Deal and encouraged 
a covenantal logic that legitimated the rise of an invasive national secret police force. 
The director’s rhetorical schema relied heavily upon the Fifth Column metaphor as 
well as ancillary cancer, parasite, and termite metaphors. These tropes shaded the 
Fifth Column with conceptions of movement and growth. The Fifth Column was 
coined during the Spanish Civil War to describe a coordinated movement of 
subversives in Madrid who conspired against their system of government by assisting 
external military forces. The metaphor, however, was also uniquely American. The 
Fifth Column’s emphases on internal subversion and foreign loyalties resuscitated 
suspicions that traced back to the early republic. 
  Informing the Fifth Column metaphor with the contagion and parasite 




during the War on Crime to its pursuit of Fifth Columns. This recycling of metaphors 
extended rhetorical continuity into the world war crisis, which amplified the 
previously established urban-crime reality. In this world, the rhetoric of force 
continued to be a popular form of dissent against political liberalism and liberal 
Christianity. Hoover played on the fears of Catholic and Jewish religious leaders who 
sought to prevent the spread of religious persecutions. These metaphors served as 
vehicles for importing the values of Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism 
into more mainstream quarters, which refashioned religious value hierarchies. 
Whereas Catholic leaders had previously valued social justice above protecting the 
interests of industrialists, order became privileged over agitation. This reorientation 
would cause the Church to remove itself from the labor movement. Similarly, many 
Jewish leaders had once worked in coalition with more liberal Catholics and 
Protestant councils as well as with labor unions, educational associations, and civil 
rights agencies to  promote notions of tolerance that were steeped in cultural 
pluralism. Such inclusiveness, however, was curbed as the director equated tolerance 
with subversion. Hoover then located Americanism at the center of American 
religious thought, and used it to forge alliances between anti-communist Catholics, 
Protestants, and Jews. His use of metaphor, thus, influenced religious value structures 
which, in turn, reoriented American political culture to value order above civil 
liberties. The well-ordered society, according to Hoover, was pure of malefactors and, 
therefore, protected by God.  
 Hoover’s Americanist vision of militarized public life was articulated through 




national disease or infestation—and associating their activities with external military 
forces through the Fifth Column—invited his audiences to embrace the domestic 
security state and its disregard for the Constitution. Hoover was at the head of this 
empire, which he likened to the U.S. armed forces and used to assume centralized 
control over local police departments. This expansion of federal law enforcement 
power into the states was predicated on extermination and quarantine logics that 
elevated force above constitutional safeguards and framed dissent to unconstitutional 
police work as an act of subversion. Discouraging criticism of the federal government 
broadly contrasted former idealistic efforts, especially the Wickersham Commission’s 
attempt to reform police corruption. The interplay between idealism and realism, thus, 
represented a seismic shift in federal culture from the harmony of its constituents to 
their control. The FBI largely accomplished this change through exploiting the 
president’s fears. Roosevelt erected the domestic security state while accepting 
anonymous and unsubstantiated FBI reports that showcased a need for centralized 
control of political dissent.  
 Hoover ultimately mimicked the Gestapo institutionally, ideologically, and 
rhetorically. The International Criminal Police Commission and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police offered Hoover a mechanism for studying and 
networking with fascist police forces in Italy and Germany. Together, they devised 
methods for technocratic law enforcement programming. Hoover synced well with 
Himmler and Heydrich because Americanism and Nazism both sought to maintain 
ethnic and ideological purity through containment and extermination logics. 




Goebbels to conceptualize the enemy with vermin, contagion, and parasite metaphors. 
More than just fascism, this rhetoric of totalitarianism expanded upon rhetorical 
precedents that were established by Lenin.        
 FDR colluded with Hoover by elevating him in his administration and 
encouraging his illegal assistance. Hoover was Roosevelt’s rogue cop who used 
vested unconstitutional powers to counteract the spirit of the New Deal. After 
Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, the director used this power to curb momentum for 
the president’s commitments to expanded economic liberties. Hoover next put Harry 
S Truman’s Fair Deal and his domestic security agenda in the FBI’s crosshairs. 
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Chapter 4: Red Fascism: The Masquerade and the Menace 
  
Growing international tension between the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the post-war era realigned America’s peacetime domestic and foreign policy 
planning. While State Department officials were suspicious of Joseph Stalin’s actions 
by June  1945, opinion in the Harry S Truman administration more broadly mobilized 
against the Soviet Union in early 1946.1 George F. Kennan triggered a watershed 
moment in February when he recommended a more hard-line stance against the 
Soviets. Administration officials then began to accept that harmony between nations 
was impossible because the Russian political vision was predicated on an economic 
system that was hostile to capitalism. Kennan wrote in his “Long Telegram” that the 
“U.S.S.R.” perceived itself inside of an “antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with 
which there [could] be no permanent peaceful coexistence.” Rather than being open 
to diplomacy, he suggested that the Soviets seemed more responsive to threats of 
force and coercion. Kennan concluded that “Soviet power” was “(i)mpervious to 
logic of reason” and was “highly sensitive to logic of force.”2  
 Many of Kennan’s warnings reflected J. Edgar Hoover’s anti-communist 
arguments from the wartime era. Like the FBI Director, the diplomat viewed Moscow 
as the head of an international Fifth Column. Kennan suggested, for example, that 
Soviet planners sought to instigate “revolutionary upheavals” in “capitalistic 
countries” through nefarious infiltration techniques. He warned that a “wide variety 
of national associations or bodies” were susceptible to “such penetration,” 
highlighting those organizations that attracted racial, religious, and economic 




would take the form of “economic or racial” protesting. Moscow’s ultimate 
clandestine objective, according to Kennan, was to weaken the military defenses of 
capitalist nations in preparation of forthcoming military invasions.3 Indeed, he, like 
the Americanists, feared that Stalin was engaged in post-war Fifth Column 
strategizing.    
 Hoover’s rhetoric typically excited more conservative Americans who wanted 
to protect the nation’s economic, ethnic, and cultural traditions at home from 
allegedly alien influences. Kennan’s more liberal perspective conversely focused 
upon Soviet expansionism in a more global context. Anti-communism was divided 
between first, an Americanist tradition that targeted “un-Americanism” and those 
perceived as cultural “outsiders” living within the United States, and second, a liberal 
internationalist tradition that sought to expand America’s presence on the world stage 
(hereafter called liberal anti-communism).4 Americanists prioritized domestic 
containment by routing out communists in government and throughout the entire 
country. Liberal anti-communists conversely prioritized international containment by 
focusing on limiting the military expansion of the U.S.S.R. These perspectives were 
strengthened by fears of military movements abroad and reports of Soviet espionage 
at home. The exigency for such domestic and international containment resulted from 
the growing force of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow 
and rumors of communism’s Fifth Columns that resembled the fascist threats Hoover 
identified during World War II.  
 The director used this context to further exploit the stature that he had built up 




the president had helped Hoover expand the director’s authority to rival that of the 
presidency. Truman, conversely, attempted to constrain the FBI and even 
communicated a basic distrust of the director. Budget Director Harold Smith wrote in 
a September 1945 diary entry that Truman “thought the FBI should be cut back as 
soon as possible to at least the prewar level; that he proposed to confine the FBI to the 
United States; and that he had in mind a quite different plan for intelligence” than 
Hoover. 5 This came after Smith recorded in May that the “President” did “not want 
to set up a gestapo.” Smith further observed that Truman did “not approve of some 
of” the FBI’s work.6 He recorded in July that Truman questioned if “having the FBI 
in South America” compromised FDR’s idealistic “good neighbor relations.”7 
Following these exchanges, Truman successfully cut FBI appropriations from $44.2 
million in 1945 to $34.9 million in 1947.8 Furthermore, Truman nominated Harry 
Dexter White to be the first American executive director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in January 1946 even though the FBI had warned that White 
was a Soviet agent.9 Such actions signaled Truman’s proclivity to downsize the FBI 
and to dismiss its credibility.  
In response to the larger Cold War landscape and the attempts by the Truman 
administration to check Hoover’s power, the FBI organized a domestic propaganda 
campaign that symbolically broadened the international crisis into the domestic 
sphere. Five days after Kennan sent his widely circulated telegram in February 1946, 
the Bureau decided to encourage the citizenry to view the Communist Party of the 




  Hoover’s campaign would ultimately couple persuasion and coercion as a 
means for enhancing the FBI’s power and for undermining idealism and its 
proponents. With the commencement of WWII, Hoover’s propaganda strategies had 
further militarized the FBI, increasingly resembling the tactics of the Nazi 
propaganda machine. In so doing, he integrated the Red Fascism analogy with the 
Fifth Column metaphor. This analogy was coined by Henry Chamberlin when he 
observed in the September 1935 issue of the Atlantic Monthly that while 
“Bolshevism” had been “rapidly shedding its international revolutionary skin and 
evolving into something that might reasonably be called Red Fascism, it [was] 
conceivable . . . Germany will go through a reverse process.”11 While Truman used 
Nazi-Soviet analogies to condemn Soviet expansionism, Hoover exploited such 
analogical reasoning to establish rhetorical continuity between the wartime and post-
war eras. Ultimately, he conceptualized the rhetorical exigencies in ways that made 
the president’s own liberal anti-communist arguments a threat to U.S. national 
security, substantiating the crisis imagined by Americanists. More specifically, the 
director used the Red Fascism analogy and the Fifth Column metaphors, along with 
their ancillary termite, Trojan horse, and fellow traveler metaphors to contaminate 
cultural pluralism even during peacetime. In the process, Hoover aligned the New 
Deal, the Fair Deal, liberal Christianity, political liberalism, and secularism with 
communism. He used this opportunity to bolster the FBI and Americanism.  
 This chapter begins with a contextualization of early Cold War history (1945-
1953), which helps explain the development of both the foreign and domestic 




and the Fifth Column metaphor and other ancillary metaphors (e.g., termites, Trojan 
horses, and fellow travelers) are examined. The pattern of terminology highlights the 
dominant ideas and ideologies that ultimately prevailed in the 1946 election cycle, as 
well as the debate about Truman’s Federal Employee Loyalty Program (1947-1953). 
The analysis subsequently examines how the FBI helped generate the Red Scare with 
the help of Americanists in Congress and the American Legion. This latter section 
also explores Hoover’s use of militaristic and contagion metaphors to justify what 
many of his contemporary critics defined as a form of propaganda and thought 
control. Together, this material highlights the ways in which Hoover’s strategizing 
worked to co-opt the rhetorical presidency, to elevate Americanism, and to discredit 
the New Deal and the Fair Deal. The analysis pulls extensively from speeches as well 
as newspaper, magazine, and scholarly journal articles written or influenced by the 
FBI during the years of the Truman administration.  
 
  Christian Realism and International Relations 
 Containment strategy in the early Cold War era developed in response to 
international and domestic pressures. Christian realism provided a response to 
idealism that ultimately gave rise to political realism and post-war anti-communism. 
These perspectives helped to build a coalition, in part, between former idealists, who 
became liberal anti-communists, and Americanists, who conflated the New Deal with 
communism.   Realism encouraged liberals and conservatives to share a common 
value set that privileged individualism over idealism’s spirit of cooperation in 




other, and were combined in different ways by the liberal anti-communists and the 
Americanists. Liberal anti-communists sought to contain communism abroad; 
Americanists sought to contain communism at home. Promoting individualism 
worked against the notion of community and collectivism valued under the New Deal 
and permitted the federal government to transfer its resources toward domestic and 
international containment strategies. In the process, the movement undermined the 
CPUSA and other allegedly communist influences in American public life. 
The Truman administration’s actions during and immediately following 
World War II helped shape the early Cold War era. In August 1945, the president 
directed the use of atomic force against Japan. He sought to quickly accomplish an 
unconditional surrender, as well as to give the United States and Great Britain a 
power advantage over the U.S.S.R. in the post-war world. Robert J. Donovan 
observes that, in part, the decision to drop the atomic bomb “pertained to the 
diplomatic import of possession of an atomic bomb and consideration of how this 
might affect power alignment in the world, especially between the United States and 
Great Britain . . . on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other.”12 
Liberal anti-communists devised their attempt to contain communism 
internationally through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.13 Truman issued 
his Doctrine in March 1947 and pledged economic and military support for Greece 
and Turkey to help prevent civil wars that would make them more vulnerable to 
Soviet imperialism. This strategizing was reinforced in June 1947 with the 




European economies in the post-war era was designed, in part, to also curb Soviet 
expansionism by providing economic support to the war-torn regions. 
Capitalist domination of the international landscape, however, became 
increasingly difficult. In October 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the 
Republic of China, Great Britain, and France ratified the United Nations Charter. This 
Security Council makeup helped create an impression of Western supremacy in 
global affairs. However, a series of events then followed that destabilized the balance 
of international power. The Soviet Union imposed the Berlin Blockade in June 1948, 
which obstructed the ground transportation of supplies to those sectors of Berlin that 
were under Western control. The Truman administration responded to this challenge 
with the Berlin Airlift (June 1948-September 1949), which shipped in supplies with 
cargo planes.14 Tensions with international communism grew increasingly hostile 
when the Communist Party of China overthrew the Nationalist government in 1949. 
Such tensions enhanced the presence of communism globally, and more evenly 
balanced the membership of the U.N. Security Council between capitalist and 
communist states. It also represented a major defeat to U.S. foreign policy because 
FDR and Truman had propped up China’s Nationalist regime. The loss of Chinese 
allies was shortly followed by the Korean War (June 1950-July 1953). In this conflict, 
the Soviet Union and China backed North Korea while the Western sphere supported 
South Korea. North Korea invaded its neighbor in June 1950, which led Truman to 
direct American military forces to intervene and attempt to contain the spread of 
communism with force. Because the Soviets had detonated their first atomic bomb in 




Troubling news of communist belligerence abroad was compounded by 
sensational front-page headlines that informed the nation of successful Soviet efforts 
to undermine U.S. national security. For example, the Chicago Daily Tribune flashed 
in February 1946, “A-Bomb Secrets Stolen!: Canada Holds 22 for Inquiry on Atom 
Leak” when Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko defected to the West.16 The New York 
Times reported in August 1948 that Whittaker Chambers of Time magazine had also 
told the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) that prominent New 
Dealer Alger Hiss was a Soviet agent in a story titled, “Red ‘Underground’ in Federal 
Posts Alleged by Editor.”17 The early Cold War era was rich with such news stories 
that aligned international tensions with stories of Soviet infiltration of America’s 
security apparatus by Americans.18   
Truman responded to the growing crisis by building up the national security 
state, through post-war national security legislation and international treaties.19 
Passed in July 1947, the National Security Act created the Department of the Air 
Force and merged the Departments of War and Navy into the National Military 
Establishment, which was located under the Secretary of Defense. This agency was 
renamed the Department of Defense when the Act was amended in 1949 to 
subordinate and coordinate all military branches under the secretary. The Act also 
created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). These federal departments offered continuity to clandestine operations after 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was abolished by Truman in October 1945.20 
Furthermore, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in April 




Western European nations. The treaty was specifically drafted to help its members 
defend themselves from military invasion or covert infiltration by the Soviet Union.21  
The emergence of the national security state occurred in conjunction with the 
elevation of Reinhold Niebuhr and his Christian realist perspective. The theologian 
operated at the pinnacle of liberal anti-communism while serving in a number of 
official capacities.22 He advised George Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) in the 
State Department from 1949-1950 where, according to Eyal J. Naveh, he was known 
as the “‘intellectual father’ of US containment policy.”23 Under Niebuhr’s 
advisement, the PPS promoted building up national defense and foreign aid programs 
by cutting spending on domestic social programs.24 Niebuhr even influenced the work 
of his colleague in Americans for Democratic Action, Arthur J. Schlesinger.25  
 Schlesinger helped to translate Niebuhr’s religious philosophy of Christian 
realism into a more secular perspective of political realism. He located liberal anti-
communists between idealists on the far left and Americanists on the far right in The 
Vital Center (1949). His ideological vision fragmented the liberal community and 
abandoned idealists. He observed that an “activist capacity . . . tended to split the left 
between those . . . who regard[ed] liberalism as a practical program to be put into 
effect” and “progressives, who use[d] liberalism as an outlet for private grievances 
and frustrations.” According to Schlesinger, liberal anti-communists comprised the 
center of American politics by accepting the imperfections of the “real world.” 
Conversely, he described idealism as a utopian “accomplice of Communism” because 
it refused to accept that human nature was belligerent. Schlesinger resolved this 




a new form of “individualism” that still valued the New Deal’s emphases on 
“community” and cooperation in a manner that, unlike communism, did not 
“suffocate the individual.”26 The values advanced by Niebuhr and Schlesinger helped 
to realign balances between the individual, the nation, and the world.27     
 Realism, therefore, was an ideology that sought to build consensus by 
restructuring the values of those on the left and the right. While the prospect of 
atomic warfare destabilized the future of Western civilization, liberals and 
conservatives were pushed to reconsider existing relationships between the individual 
and the nation-state, as well as the nation-state and the world. Whereas liberals were 
instructed to accept the supremacy of individualism in domestic affairs, conservatives 
were directed to abandon their impulse toward more traditional forms of militarism. 
The Cold War, argued Niebuhr, was to be waged through propaganda for the 
sympathies of unaligned nations. Niebuhr was far more concerned about the spread of 
the Soviet Union into Europe than the infiltration of the CPUSA into American 
institutions. Nonetheless, Americanists in the post-war world used these ideological 
realignments to resurrect the Fifth Column metaphor in a post-World War II, Cold 
War context.28 Debating the nature of the most significant communist threat as either 
Soviet expansionism (as liberal anti-communists presumed), or as a problem 
compounded by the president’s demilitarization of domestic security (as the 







Red Fascism and Containing the Enemy Within 
 The Truman Doctrine inadvertently opened the door for the president’s rivals 
in the FBI, HUAC, and in the U.S. Senate to expand the philosophy and programming 
of containment into the domestic political arena. Americanists used the 
administration’s public warnings of political subterfuge abroad to help reify the 
alleged Fifth Column at home; both were said to be manifestations of the CPSU’s 
influence.29 The Doctrine announced a shift in American foreign policy away from 
idealism’s commitments to peace through education, good will, and disarmament, 
toward realism’s maintenance of order through military and economic strategizing. 
Hoover and the American Legion supported the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall 
Plan, but argued that more needed to be done to contain the communist threat at 
home. They agreed with the liberal anti-communists that international cooperation 
was the ideal method for combating communism abroad and also agreed that rugged 
individualism, and not collectivism, was the preferred value for guiding federal policy 
domestically. This agreement turned the cultural battle between the New Deal’s spirit 
of cooperation and Americanist preferences for individualism into a partisan contest, 
and molded domestic containment strategies to neutralize New Dealers and Fair 
Dealers. Truman’s critics transformed his Doctrine into a treatise for usurping 
presidential power.       
 The Truman Doctrine address of March 12, 1947, marked an official turning 
point in the White House toward political realism. The president waited nearly two 
years to inform Americans of deteriorating international relations with the Soviet 




toward the Soviets in the interim as he struggled to select between two competing 
visions of U.S. foreign policy planning.30  Denise M. Bostdorff observes that Truman 
attempted in that time to balance his own entrenched commitments to political 
idealism with the apparent necessity of adopting more realistic interpretations of 
Soviet actions. She contends that the administration’s perceptions were constrained 
by a “rhetoric of the past—and the reality that it generated” as the White House 
sought support for aiding Greece and Turkey.31 By imagining the future in terms of 
the past, liberal anti-communists inside and outside of the White House argued that 
military-industrial power was the ultimate currency in international life. This 
perspective empowered American militarism and industrialism, which had been 
promoted by Hoover and other Americanists since before World War II.      
 Truman’s period of presidential reticence (April 1945-March 1947) coincides 
rhetorically with Hoover’s adoption of the Red Fascism analogy in September 1946. 
Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson blame the analogy, which conflated 
communism and Nazism, for making peaceful relations with the Soviet Union 
impossible between 1945 and 1946.32 For example, the Hartford Courant questioned 
as early as March 1945 if “America” rescued “millions of Europeans from under the 
heel of German Nazism only to plunge them back into the slavery of Red fascism?” 
in a letter to the editor that was pointedly titled “Another Munich?”33 Winston 
Churchill warned one year later that “fifth columns” threatened “Christian 
civilization” in his “Sinews of Peace” address at Westminster College in Fulton, 
Missouri.34 In March 1947, Truman signaled his acceptance of the rhetoric of the past 




subterfuges as political infiltration” practiced by “totalitarian regimes” in foreign 
lands.35 Truman encouraged his audiences to conceptualize Soviet Russia as Nazi 
Germany in order to build support for containing Stalin’s expansionism.36 When the 
president broke his silence, he did so in a manner that extended analogies between 
communism and fascism, promoted realism, and consequently emphasized a vision of 
the past that privileged military-industrial power.  
   The director used the Red Fascism analogy to attempt a rhetorical coup 
against the president. Hoover worked to infuse the president’s liberal anti-communist 
vision with his own Americanist perspective. This campaign to shape the exigencies 
of the Cold War was couched in a broader movement that established the FBI as an 
unimpeachable and autonomous force in American political and religious culture. In 
the process, the Bureau was disloyal to the commander-in-chief as it directed public 
opinion against his domestic agenda. Hoover used the communist menace to further 
militarize and insulate the FBI. In the aftermath of FDR’s death, the Bureau gained 
greater autonomy from the White House and showed a growing hostility toward 
Truman's policies and the presidency as a whole. Hoover’s appropriations would 
rebound to $84.4 million in 1953, as his jurisdiction became even more unbounded 
and secretive.37 The sections that follow first examine the analogical function of Red 
Fascism and its reliance on a rhetoric of the past before turning to explore Hoover’s 
perpetuation of the Fifth Column, termite, Trojan horse, and fellow traveler 
metaphors into the post-war era. The analysis then explores how the analogy was 
further used in Hoover’s constructions of the labor and civil rights movements as a 




Metaphors and Analogies in the Rhetoric of the Past 
The cultural division between Americanists and liberal anti-communists 
provided grounds for drastically reorganizing U.S. public life. Political intrigue and 
the politics of anti-communism imposed the realist worldview upon liberals and 
conservatives, which suffocated idealism and discredited liberalism. Anti-communists 
generally sought to build their consensus through a rhetoric of the past; both liberal 
anti-communists and Americanists turned to Red Fascism analogies. Whereas liberal 
anti-communists used the analogy to draw conclusions about international planning, 
Americanists associated the analogy with various metaphors (e.g., Fifth Column, 
termite, Trojan Horse), which diverted containment planning into domestic spaces.38 
Americanists thus drew upon analogies and metaphors directed toward the Soviet 
Union to define the enemies at home.  
President Truman relied on the Nazi-Soviet analogy to promote his liberal 
anti-communist perspective when seeking to sell the Truman Doctrine at home. He 
told the Association of Radio News Analysts in May 1947, for example, that there 
“isn’t any difference in totalitarian states. I don’t care what you call them—you call 
them Nazi, Communist or Fascist, or Franco, or anything else—they are all alike.”39 
His analogy emphasized that both systems were totalitarian by highlighting their 
coercive tactics. Furthermore, Truman stated in a March 1950 press conference that 
there “isn’t any difference between the totalitarian Russian government and the Hitler 
government and the Franco government in Sprain (sic). They are alike. They are 
police governments—police state governments.”40 The analogy helped give rise to the 




Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 appeasement with Hitler helped the Nazis to overtake 
other parts of Europe, appeasing Stalin would only expedite his communist 
expansion.41  
This analogy stemmed from notions of Red Fascism. Former Moscow 
correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor Henry Chamberlin observed in a 
January 1935 New York Times article that there existed a “distinct analogy, in cause 
and in method, between Stalin’s method of meeting a political crisis and the method 
which Hitler employed.”42 Furthermore, he then wrote in the Atlantic Monthly that 
“similarities [were] most vivid and most obvious in such matters as political 
technique, administrative practice, and ruling class psychology.” He added that “[o]ne 
of the most important points of similarity [was] that both Russia and Germany [were] 
ruled by dictatorial parties, which avowedly tolerate[d] no other political 
organizations.”43 Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson observe that the analogy 
reemerged in the early post-war era and was used by “Americans” who “casually and 
deliberately articulated distorted similarities between Nazi and Communist 
ideologies, German and Soviet foreign policies, authoritarian controls, and trade 
practices, and Hitler and Stalin. This popular analogy was a potent and pervasive 
notion that significantly shaped American perception of world events in the cold 
war.”44  
While liberal anti-communists used notions of Red Fascism to help construct 
the Soviet identity, Americanists used this identity to imagine Fifth Column 
strategizing at home. According to California State Senator Jack B. Tenney’s (R) 




“Fascism and Communism” were both “totalitarian” systems of “[m]ilitarism and 
imperialism” that operated “brutal secret police” forces.45 Similarly, Representative 
Everett Dirksen (R-IL) proclaimed in January that the “greatest menacing force to 
freedom in the world” was “red fascism.” He suggested that this was a “more 
impressive and accurate . . . term for Communism.” Dirksen specifically warned of 
communist infiltration into government, the film industry, labor unions, and 
“educational systems.”46 In these regards, the alleged communist threat resembled the 
threat that Hoover reified during the wartime era with the Fifth Column metaphor.47 
Liberal anti-communists used the analogy to highlight similarities in the relationships 
between Hitler, Stalin, and their international strategizing. Concurrently, 
Americanists framed these relationships through the Fifth Column metaphor and 
inferred that America was, in fact, inflicted by a clandestine community of foreign 
loyalists. Pairing the Fifth Column metaphor with the Red Fascism analogy suggested 
that these subversives coordinated with foreign military leadership in ways 
resembling Guenther Rumrich’s coordination with German high command in 1938. 
As in the past, espionage was presumed to precipitate war. 
 The Red Fascism analogy helped Americanists weaken the resolve of the 
Democrat’s commitment to idealism by creating a perceptual need for more realistic 
foreign policy strategizing. This change of perspective was evident shortly after 
Hoover adopted the post-war Red Fascism analogy in his September 1946 speech to 
the American Legion.48 Ray Tucker of the Brooklyn Eagle wrote that the “Republican 
Speaker’s Bureau” regarded Hoover as its “best unpaid spellbinder” because no one 




followed two other speeches delivered by members of the Truman administration that 
month. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes declared in early September that America 
would use its military “power and resources” to protect nations in the Western sphere 
from being forced into totalitarian control (“Restatement of Policy on Germany”).50 
Reporting from Europe, Reinhold Niebuhr announced in Life magazine that this 
speech “won the support of everyone except the Communists.” Byrnes’ realist 
perspective was allegedly regarded by “Europeans” as the sole “guarantee of security 
against Soviet expansion” and “war.”51 This story broke while news of nuclear 
espionage and subversion in the federal government continued to flood the headlines.  
Anti-communism crossed party lines and challenged Truman’s rhetorical 
presidency and complicated his penchant for civil rights. Commerce Secretary Henry 
A. Wallace proclaimed one week later in his speech, “The Way to Peace,” that he had 
presidential approval to promote “peace with Russia” through “cooperation” via the 
“United Nations.” He called upon Christians to enact their “moral principles” by 
addressing “social and economic justice.” This ideal included reducing the military 
and surrendering its nuclear arsenal to the U.N. Moreover, Wallace asked Christians 
to “eliminate racism from our unions, our business organizations, our educational 
institutions, and our employment practices.”52 These principles resonated with 
Truman’s domestic policy planning. For example, the New York Times reported in 
late July that Truman had ordered the DOJ to investigate “lynching” and “other 
crimes of oppression” in the South; this marked the beginning of his movement 
toward civil rights programming.53 Wallace’s address was aligned with the values of 




policy.54 The secretary failed, however, to offer the hardboiled protections that 
Byrnes’ realist perspective promoted. Niebuhr lamented that the “Wallace speech” 
symbolized “confusion in American liberalism” and that the speech “must be 
regarded as catastrophic in the light of the European realities.”55 The president was at 
an ideological crossroad, and his reticence signaled ambivalence in deciding the 
future of American foreign policy.     
 Whereas Byrnes’ realist vision was welcomed by liberal anti-communists and 
Americanists, Wallace’s worldview represented a continuation and amplification of 
Roosevelt’s more idealistic principles. World events made realism the more attractive 
alternative for many. Tucker reported that the “Grand Old Party’s strategists” 
considered the Commerce Secretary’s speech to be an “oratorical asset,” and he 
sarcastically described Wallace’s “apology for Russia” as one of the “most effective 
speeches of the current Congressional campaign.”  Tucker concluded that if the 
“sudden pre-election shift” signified the “death of the New Deal,” then the 
“assassins” included Hoover and Wallace.56 Red Fascism was about to consolidate 
anti-communism and further discredit idealism. The analogy was supported by a 
constellation of ancillary metaphors that helped to transfer beliefs about fascism to 
communism—beliefs that were especially framed in terms of the Fifth Column.  
Red Fascism and the Fifth Column 
  Hoover established rhetorical continuity between the wartime and post-war 
eras, in part, by restructuring the international situation in the terms of a trope used by 
the Roosevelt administration to discredit its critics. The Fifth Column metaphor 




This continuity bolstered the Red Fascism analogy by echoing the same reality that 
governed the wartime era, a reality that grew out of the urban-crime genre. This 
reality was articulated through a rhetoric of force, and then with the help of 
Americanism, the rhetoric of totalitarianism. Hoover again used the Fifth Column 
metaphor to construct more liberal groups as constituent members of a subversive 
international conspiracy. Their very presence evidenced the Americanist argument 
that the Red Fascism analogy should be further extended from the international scene 
into daily public life. The threat of communist Fifth Columns was perpetuated from 
wartime into the post-war era and continued to associate liberal organizations with 
subversion. 
Hoover used the Fifth Column metaphor to align liberal reformers with Soviet 
espionage, which informed the analogy with more Americanist meanings. He 
proclaimed before HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “Communist Party” 
was a “fifth column” and called this new post-war crisis the “menace of Red 
Fascism.” The analogy combined the fears of liberal anti-communism and 
Americanism. Hoover observed, for example, that the “mad march of Red Fascism” 
was observable in the “Canadian spy trials,” which allegedly “revealed” that all 
domestic “Communists and sympathizers” were disloyal. Hoover used the Red 
Fascism analogy to correlate the president’s own strategizing in the international 
crisis with these spies. He claimed that communists mobilized to “exert pressure on 
Congress” after “President Truman called for aid to Greece and Turkey.”57 The 
analogy linked the international Soviet threat that Byrnes alluded to with idealistic 




feared for the “liberal and progressive” who had been “hoodwinked and duped into 
joining hands with the Communists.” Informing the Red Fascism analogy with the 
Fifth Column metaphor, therefore, helped Hoover to resume his assault upon 
idealism.  
 Anti-communists of all stripes were encouraged to view the Soviet Union as 
the head of an international Fifth Column conspiracy that was already engaging in the 
same types of subterfuge in America that Hitler had imposed across Europe. The 
Russian Fifth Column metaphor ultimately elevated Americanism in foreign policy 
planning by fracturing the liberal community between idealism and anti-communism. 
Such discord curbed the expansion of the New Deal and the Fair Deal while Truman 
abandoned his idealism for realism. The metaphor also slandered labor organizers, as 
well as civil liberties and civil rights advocates, with suspicions of disloyalty.  
The post-war logic replicated the anti-New Deal strategizing encouraged by 
the Fifth Column metaphor during war. For example, the New York Times reported in 
a March 1946 story that an “enormous affinity” existed “between communism and 
fascism.” The “Communists,” it paraphrased from Hoover, were attempting to build a 
“united front” so that a few leaders could “influence” a “broad area of American 
affairs.” Hoover used the Fifth Column metaphor to malign organized labor as well as 
civil rights and civil liberties proponents. The Times reported that “Russian fifth 
columnists” allegedly appealed to “workers, to Negroes, to veterans, to young 
peoples, and to ‘progressives’ of every persuasion.”58 These groups were united by 
the Fair Deal and also overlapped with the types of groups that Hoover charged with 




September 1945 to continuing FDR’s “economic bill of rights” and to expanding the 
New Deal in terms of health, housing, education, employment, and catastrophic 
protections.60 Hoover aligned Truman’s agenda with the Communist Party line. He 
told HUAC in March 1947 that “Communists” promoted “old-age security, houses 
for the veterans, child assistance, and a host” of other programs to “conceal their true 
aims and entrap gullible followers.”61 Such constructions perpetuated the realities of 
the Fifth Column metaphor, advantaging Republicans who campaigned against the 
New Deal’s tolerance of what they viewed as radical philosophies (e.g., cultural 
pluralism, social justice, collectivism) and their adherents. Ellen Schrecker observes 
that Hoover’s anti-communist network rose in response to this alleged menace. It 
enlisted the support of religious leaders, labor organizers, journalists, ex-communists, 
bureaucrats, and super-patriotic civic organizations to spread the Americanist 
vision.62  
 Hoover coupled persuasion with coercion as he circulated his ideas while 
seeking to censor his opponents. His program mimicked both the rhetoric of Hitler 
and Lenin. He pioneered his own systems for purging his opposition from 
government and public life by promoting their "extermination." The director further 
informed the Red Fascism analogy with more Americanist meanings by recycling his 
wartime ancillary metaphors. 
 Termites, Trojan Horses, and Fellow Travelers  
 As he did during the war, Hoover used a termite metaphor to construct 
totalitarian and un-American ideologies. Lachlan Strahan observes that the 




by “amalgamating the themes of numerosity and dehumanizing dictatorship.” 
Communists and termites were both thought to burrow deep “into a structure, cloaked 
by darkness and invisible to the eye.” Termites “riddled a building with rottenness 
until it simply disintegrated. Like termites, communists were tireless in their furtive 
destruction of society from within.”63 This metaphor once again helped Hoover to 
brand idealistic reformers and their beliefs as subversive. He further used the 
metaphor to warrant removing idealists from government employment and censuring 
them in public life.  
 For example, the director used the termite metaphor to amplify the scope of 
the communist threat. Hoover wrote in a February 1947 American Magazine article 
titled, “Red Fascism in the United States Today,” that the “Red scourge of 
Communism in America [was] boring its way through our land like a termite.”  As in 
wartime, the termite metaphor implied that the nation needed to fear unseen threats 
that were undetectable. Hoover suggested that the “American Communist” was 
“cloaked in stealth and intrigue,” and operated “behind the protection of false fronts” 
to accomplish a “sinister and vicious program, intent on swindling and robbing 
Americans of their heritage of freedom.”64 The metaphor organized disparate social 
justice movements into a more monolithic threat of un-Americanism. Hoover told the 
Freemasons in May 1950, for example, that a “half million . . . sympathizers ready to 
do the Communist bidding” stood “behind” a “force of traitorous Communists” who 
were “gnawing away like termites at the very foundations of American society.” The 
metaphor enabled Hoover to continue aligning civil liberties and civil rights 




identified as Communists, [were] extremely dangerous to the internal security of this 
Nation, because as hypocrites and moral swindlers they [sought] the protection of the 
freedoms which they constantly seek to destroy.”65 The termite metaphor, thus, 
created the impression of a prolific, invisible network of registered communists and 
their unregistered allies working to undermine society and its sovereignty.   
 Whereas the termite metaphor extended a larger rhetorical project that Hoover 
began during the war, the increased use of the Trojan horse metaphor amplified a 
trope that Hoover had used more sparingly during the war. The Legend of Troy tells 
of a wooden horse deceptively offered in truce to the Trojans. A battalion of Greek 
soldiers hid inside of the presumed gift. These stealthy warriors went on to sack the 
city after the horse was brought inside of Troy’s protective city walls. Hoover once 
used the Trojan horse metaphor in the wartime era to imagine communist 
strategizing. For example, he told the New York Federation of Women’s Clubs in 
May 1940 that “Communists” were engaged in “Trojan Horse’ activities” to shackle 
the FBI so they could “proceed without interference as they go their boring, 
undermining way to overthrow our Government.”66 Even then, the Trojan horse had 
the properties of termites. Writing about the State Department’s response to the 
Kremlin’s South American presence in the 1950s, Jutta Weldes explains that the 
“Trojan horse metaphor implies” that “reform movements are not, in fact, indigenous 
movements, grounded” in the “pursuit of legitimate local aspirations” or 
“spontaneous indigenous responses to structures of oppression.” Instead, the “Trojan 
horse metaphor” constructs reform movements as “weapons wielded by an external, 




Trojan horse and termite metaphors, therefore, worked together to discredit social 
reformers, to amplify the scope of the problem. They also suggested the need to reject 
reform.    
 The director also used the Trojan horse metaphor to distinguish liberal anti-
communism from idealism through a dissociative process that classified the former as 
real and latter as somehow less real or illegitimate.68 He told the Theodore Roosevelt 
Memorial Association in October 1949, for example, that the “Trojan Horses” viewed 
“real liberals” as their “sworn enemies” because they sought to “corrupt liberalism.” 
The metaphor implied that an illegitimate and alien value set was being secretly 
forced upon the republic. Hoover suggested that communists wanted to erode 
America’s “treasured liberties of freedom of speech and religion, habeas corpus, 
[and] trial by jury” by placing the “state above God and men above principles.”69 The 
metaphor also aligned idealism more generally with communism. Hoover relayed in 
the August 1950 edition of U.S. New & World Report, for example, that the “Trojan 
horse of disloyalty” might “mouth sweet words of ‘peace,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘equality,’ 
and flourish gay slogans of ‘international solidarity’ and ‘brotherhood of men,’” but 
wherever the “Trojan horse of Communist fifth columns . . . walked, the indelible 
footprints of Russian imperialism remain[ed] behind.”70 Political idealism was 
depicted as illusory compared to the realism of liberal anti-communism. Hoover’s 
public arguments, therefore, helped him to attack those individuals most associated 
with idealist principles.   
 Hoover, furthermore, used the Trojan horse metaphor to align secularism with 




November 1947 that “secularism” was a “Trojan Horse strategy” to destroy “religion” 
and to establish a “godless, atheistic society.” He traced the source of this strategy to 
liberal Protestantism. For example, he lamented that “secularism” made its 
“advances” because the “social gospel” was espoused “too frequently without the 
Christian Gospel’s coming first.” Similar to its ability to dissociate perspectives of 
liberalism, the Trojan horse metaphor also allowed the dissociation of correct from 
allegedly incorrect traditions of Christianity. He suggested that self-proclaimed 
“Christians” had “too much freedom and too little discipline” because they failed to 
realize the “inevitable consequences of perdition.” The Trojan horse metaphor, 
therefore, preferred the values of Christian fundamentalism to social justice, implying 
that the latter was subversive and illegitimate. Hoover professed to the ministers that 
communists disingenuously supported “idealist” programs for “equal rights, for better 
working conditions, for the abatement of poverty, for the equitable division of the 
products of industry and for the rights of racial groups and political minorities.” 
According to the director, however, such positions were merely a “cover to conceal 
their real aims of undermining democracy.”72 The Trojan horse metaphor thus 
supported the Red Fascism analogy by asserting that communists in the post-war era 
were engaged in the same types of Fifth Column strategizing that they had allegedly 
been conducting during the war. Between World War II and the Cold War, the 
metaphor implied, communists had used the New Deal and the Fair Deal to subvert 
democracy.             
 The Trojan horse metaphor, therefore, cast suspicion on reformers by 




commitments. In promoting tolerance, Hoover argued, they left America vulnerable 
to attack. Following the speeches delivered by Byrnes and Wallace in September 
1946 Hoover told the American Legion, for example, that “[d]uring the past five 
years, American Communists [had] made their deepest inroads upon our national life. 
In our vaunted tolerance for all peoples the Communists [had] found our ‘Achilles’ 
heel.’” Of course, this was another metaphor from the Legend of Troy. Hoover 
framed commitments to tolerance as a proven national weakness to Soviet 
strategizing by perpetuating themes associated with the Fifth Column metaphor. Five 
weeks before the November election, he described “Red Fascism” as a cycle in which 
“Communism . . . bred Fascism and Fascism spawn[ed] Communism.”73 This helped 
to further discredit idealism and to elevate realism by interlocking notions of 
communism and fascism. Hoover’s use of the termite and Trojan horse metaphors 
thus established the properties of the alleged traitors of past and present in 
government.  
 Hoover also used the fellow traveler metaphor to maintain rhetorical 
continuity between his campaigns. Soviet writers used the metaphor to describe those 
individuals who were sympathetic to the communist revolution, but whose 
commitment was still a matter of question.74 Hoover, however, used the metaphor 
during the wartime era to suggest that idealists were actively conspiring against their 
own countrymen to deliver America into Soviet hands. For example, Hoover told the 
Annual New York Herald-Tribune Forum in October 1939 that there was “no place in 
our land for the pinkish ‘fellow traveler,’” who was “steeped in the bloody handed 




War on Crime and World War II.75 Similarly, he complained to the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police in September 1940 of a “‘smear campaign’” that was 
“planned by a group” of “fellow travelers” and “communist termites” to “discredit the 
FBI and wreck public confidence in its mission.”76 Like the Trojan Horse, the fellow 
traveler metaphor was also conceptually related to the termite metaphor, and was also 
extended from the wartime era.  
 The director borrowed the Soviet metaphor to proclaim that social justice 
advocacy and political idealism were treasonous. He told the Roosevelt Memorial 
Association in October 1949, for example, that the “Communist, his sympathizers, 
fellow-travelers, and pseudo-liberals must be recognized for what they are—a ‘fifth 
column,’ if there ever was one, awaiting the Quisling call to arms.” 77 This speech 
represents yet another manifestation of the Red Fascism analogy; the term “Quisling” 
referred to wartime traitors who assisted in the occupation of their own Allied 
nations, such as those from the Vichy movement in France. Hoover assigned this 
Fifth Column identity to social reformers in his Cold War vision.  
 The fellow traveler metaphor suggested that individuals who shared any 
common ground with communists were untrustworthy and unfit for government 
employment. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “recent 
Canadian spy trials revealed the necessity” of “keeping Communists and 
sympathizers out of government services,” referring to the latter as “fellow 
travelers.”78 Hoover asserted that any communist presence in government warranted 
the loyalty program. He wrote in a June 1947 issue of Newsweek magazine, for 




irreparable harm by acts of disloyalty or by indoctrinating others with a Marxian 
philosophy” as ‘“fellow travelers.’”79 The metaphor suggested that such individuals 
were dangerous because of their alleged material support of communism. Hoover 
wrote in the May 1950 issue of U.S. News & World Report, for example, that “fellow 
travelers” represented to the “Communist movement, a source of wealth: financial 
resources; the creation of valuable contacts; levers of social, economic and political 
pressures; [and] recruiting grounds for espionage information and agents.”80 The 
metaphor suggested that social justice advocates represented national security threats. 
The news magazine quoted Hoover in its March 1951 edition as estimating that the 
“most important single menace to our internal security” was the “Communist Party, 
U.S.A., its members, fellow travelers and sympathizers.”81 The fellow traveler 
metaphor thus provided grounds for suspecting liberal members of the federal 
government of disloyalty, while idealism generally was constructed as an intolerable 
and subversive worldview. 
 The Fifth Column and its ancillary termite, Trojan horse, and fellow traveler 
metaphors collectively buttressed the Red Fascism analogy. Americanists asserted 
that liberal Christianity and political liberalism were rhetorical tools wielded by foreign 
propaganda agents to undermine more realistic perspectives of American politics and 
religion. Truman’s loyalty program was established in response to such fears. 
Accusations that the communist Fifth Column was continuing to infiltrate 
government sectors were accompanied by an institutional movement to monitor and 





Instituting the National Security State 
 Metaphorical extensions of the Red Fascism analogy provided a foundation 
for monitoring and regulating the beliefs of the federal workforce and for purging its 
more liberal members from governmental employment. The numerous spy stories that 
dominated the mediascape during Truman’s presidency raised concerns about the 
loyalty of federal employees. The president’s Temporary Commission on Employee 
Loyalty (TCEL) and his administration’s planning for emergency roundups were 
outlined in response to the Gouzenko defection. Canada’s Royal Commission 
concluded that “‘membership in Communist organizations or sympathies toward 
Communist ideologies was the primary force which caused’” Canadian citizens to 
assist the Soviet Union as “‘agents.’” The commission concluded that “‘questions of 
thought and of attitudes took on new importance as factors of safety in the eyes of all 
those concerned with national security.”’82 This cast suspicions upon many social 
reformers in America.   
 In response, Hoover thoroughly involved the FBI in the administration’s 
countersubversive programming. The House Civil Service Committee recommended 
that the president form a committee to investigate espionage matters in the United 
States and address the concerns that were raised in the Canadian report. Following his 
attorney general’s advice, Truman signed Executive Order 9806 in November 1946 
and established the TCEL.83 Truman then made Gus Vanech, a Hoover loyalist from 
the DOJ, its chairman on the recommendation of Attorney General Tom Clark. 
According to Tim Weiner, Clark was a “professional oil lobbyist from Texas who had 




of the Criminal Division.”84 The attorney general informally delegated the 
responsibility for drafting the DOJ’s response to domestic communism to Hoover and 
did not object to the director’s ideological excesses. For example, Hoover clarified to 
the attorney general in September 1946 that he included “‘every convinced and 
dependable member of the Communist Party’” as well as other individuals “‘who 
regard the Soviet Union as the exponent and champion of a superior way of life”’ as 
being suspicious persons. Hoover warned of prominent members of government 
showing “‘sympathy for Communist objectives’” and who therefore “‘might possibly 
serve the Communist Party and/or the Soviet Union should war break out.”’85 This 
proclamation came after Hoover alerted the White House in May 1946 that the 
“political views” of Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the views of Henry 
Wallace were both “pro-Russia in nature.”86 Overall, the attorney general accepted 
Hoover’s questionable standards for reasonable suspicion. 
 The FBI and the attorney general manipulated the Truman administration’s 
review of the communists-in-government issue to amplify the scope of the problem. 
In January 1947, Ladd reported to TCEL that there was a “‘substantial number of 
disloyal persons”’ in government service. The director then recommended to the 
commission that the government should monitor the associations of employees on the 
premise that the Soviet Union was using social reform organizations as front groups 
to manipulate U.S. policy. Clark added in February that any Soviet presence at all 
represented a “‘serious threat”’ to national security.87 The attorney general’s 
statement was bold because Soviet espionage had been present in the United States 




public life was to the chagrin of liberal and conservative Catholics, Jews, and 
Protestants, as well as to civil rights and labor activists. Clark approved of Hoover’s 
Americanist movement, which considered many of these anti-communists to be 
suspicious.  Kenneth O’Reilly observes that Clark sought to “indoctrinate Americans” 
with a countersubversive brand of anti-communism, and that his “efforts intersected 
with President Truman’s efforts to ‘sell’ his containment policies and the FBI’s self-
described educational program.”89 Anti-communists in the Truman administration, 
therefore, worked to establish a more Americanist national security state than the 
president had previously supported. This new apparatus purged employees from 
government service on the grounds of their split loyalties or memberships in reform 
movements.  
 The method for determining employee loyalty was based, in part, on 
membership in organizations listed by the attorney general as being subversive. The 
FBI furnished Clark with his list of subversive organizations, which Hoover had been 
secretly organizing since before former Attorney General Francis Biddle ordered its 
discontinuance in 1943.90 This list was first unveiled in October 1947 and included, in 
part, civil rights, civil liberties, pacifist, anti-fascist, student, academic, international 
relations, consumer, press, film, juridical, labor, international publishing, anti-
lynching, and religious organizations.91 Even the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) was 
briefly considered for inclusion but was ultimately cleared.92 This list implicated the 
core supporters of the New Deal with subversion. Historians debate whether or not 
Truman was briefed on the DOJ’s or the FBI’s emergency planning.93 Clark was 




president. Truman would later tell Merle Miller that Clark was his “biggest mistake.” 
Truman elaborated that Clark was not a “bad man” but was “a dumb son of a bitch.” 
His empowerment of Hoover and failure to protect the president from Hoover’s 
insubordination informed Truman’s reflection that Clark “was no damn good as 
Attorney General.”94 The president, consequently, was rendered institutionally 
vulnerable by the failure of the DOJ to control the FBI.  
The Federal Employee Loyalty Program and Congress 
 Hoover ultimately prevailed at institutionalizing his vision of internal security. 
Truman reluctantly signed Executive Order 9835 on March 21, 1947, and established 
the Federal Employee Loyalty Program (FELP).95 This program was established just 
nine days after the Truman Doctrine address was delivered and five days before 
Hoover spoke to HUAC. Truman advised the Loyalty Review Board to limit the role 
of the FBI in an attempt to prevent witch-hunting.96 The FBI, however, engaged in an 
unfriendly competition with the Civil Service Commission over jurisdiction for 
loyalty investigations. George Elsey, Assistant to Clark Clifford, the Special Counsel 
to the President, noted in May 1947 that Truman felt “very strongly anti-FBI and 
side[d] positively” with the Civil Service Commissioners. He added that Truman 
wanted to “be sure to hold” the “F.B.I. down” because he was “afraid” of building-up 
a “‘Gestapo.’”97 Truman confirmed this view and acknowledged that he feared the 
Americanist excesses of anti-communism. Clifford wrote weeks later to the president 
that Gus Vanech was making “mountains out of molehills” in his successful attempt 
to make the FBI “fully responsible for all investigations in every case in which there 




wrote in the margin of this memo that “J. Edgar will in all probability get this 
backward looking Congress to give him what he wants. It’s dangerous.”98 The 
president was correct. Hoover’s allies in Congress reversed Truman’s planning. 
According to the Church Committee’s 1976 report on Hoover’s strategizing, the 
“administration’s budget request of $16 million for Civil Service and $8.7 million for 
the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations was revised in Congress to allocate $7.4 
million to the FBI and only $3 million to the Civil Service Commission.”99 This 
funding was used to practically double the FBI from 3,559 agents in 1946 to 7,029 
agents by 1952.100   
 The FBI was prone to abusing secret Americanist connections with Congress. 
Though FELP was established in response to well founded concerns that the Soviet 
Union was using the CPUSA to recruit espionage agents, the Church Committee 
suggests that it soon stretched beyond this threat to include more “speculative 
preventative intelligence objectives.” Hoover ultimately co-opted the program and 
used it to insulate and expunge the federal government of New Dealers and their 
idealism. Because Soviet intelligence abandoned the recruitment processes that 
sparked the employee loyalty program shortly thereafter, it became “almost entirely a 
means for monitoring the political background of prospective federal employees.”101 
Hoover, therefore, coupled strategies of propaganda with threats of coercion to shade 
perceptions of the communist threat and to neutralize his opposition’s ability to rebut 
his assertions.   
 The Truman administration’s inability to prevent the FBI from passing 




House and the attorney general. Assistant Press Secretary Eben A. Ayers observed in 
an August 1948 diary entry that Truman “refused” as a “matter of principle” to “give 
the Congress or legislative branch, confidential material from the executive 
departments.” He noted in the same entry that the “President” did not trust Hoover’s 
loyalty. Specifically, he recorded that the “President said that the trouble” with 
“Hoover” was that he was “concerned with his own future.” Truman suggested that 
the “election in November” made it impossible to trust him not to reveal “secret and 
confidential information in the executive department files.”102 The previous month, 
Clark sent a memorandum to Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd threatening to fire 
any member of the FBI caught furnishing the legislative branch with restricted 
information. O’Reilly quotes the attorney general as saying “‘Any S.O.B. that gives 
Congressman (Karl) Mundt (R-SD) any information gets his ass kicked out of this 
building. . . I want you to get the word around that anyone giving information to the 
Committee is out—O-U-T.’”103  
 Syndicated columnist Drew Pearson revealed the FBI/DOJ rift in January 
1949 on his radio program. According to an FBI memo, Pearson told his listeners that 
there was to be a “showdown between the Attorney General and the FBI” because its 
employees were acting insubordinately.104 Assistant Director Louis B. Nichols 
relayed that Pearson’s suggestion that the “Bureau” had “violated regulations” had 
“something to do” with the FBI’s “relations with the Un-American Activities 
Committee and went back before the election.”105 Nichols advised Tolson that the 
Bureau should treat the “leak of information from the Department to Drew Pearson” 




Hoover’s alliance with Americanists in Congress represented an unauthorized transfer 
of power from the executive to the legislative branch.  
 The Red Fascism analogy was instrumental in curbing the New Deal. Ray 
Though hyperbolic, Tucker was somewhat correct when he charged Hoover with 
killing Roosevelt’s signature domestic program.107 Hoover played a leading role in 
creating a rhetorical context in which the Wallace speech seemed to ignore 
international realties and the Truman Doctrine address could, against the president’s 
own wishes, evidence subversive activities within the New Deal and the Fair Deal. 
Truman’s adoption of Nazi-Soviet analogies reinforced the presumed reality of Red 
Fascism, which Hoover tempered with the Fifth Column and its ancillary metaphors. 
The director successfully co-opted the rhetorical presidency by pushing his own 
Americanist agenda on Truman, undermining Truman's foreign policy vision. FBI 
propaganda helped Americanists to more easily slow the growth of idealistic 
domestic programming.  
 
Mimicking the Rhetorical Presidency 
 The Cold War context provided Hoover with the grounds for adopting 
Americanist standards in determining issues of loyalty. The fundamentalist-modernist 
culture war manifested itself in the same conspiratorial paranoia that marked the first 
Red Scare and its tumultuous aftermath. The director combined masquerade, phalanx, 
spotlight, exposure, contagion, and quarantine metaphors in a militarized cluster to 
imagine secret, large, and numerous movements of American citizens working in 




the president’s rhetorical power. It played a leading role in gaining public support for 
expanding the FBI according to antiquated cultural norms and was assisted by the 
president’s own confidants in implementing such ends. Hoover, in many ways, built 
his own bully pulpit to mimic the rhetorical presidency—using it to rival Truman and 
the presidency more generally. Hoover was emboldened by the fact that FDR allowed 
him to assume such political power—a move that ultimately undercut his successor. 
Truman rhetorically stumbled when he concurred with a reporter who characterized 
allegations against Alger Hiss as a “‘red herring,”’ which was used as a means “to 
divert public attention from inflation” in August 1948.108 His statement created a 
rhetorical opportunity. By proving that Hiss was, in fact, guilty, Americanists 
simultaneously legitimized themselves while also discrediting organized labor, liberal 
anti-communism, idealism, and the Truman administration. This rhetorical victory 
occurred through use of the Red Fascism analogy and its ancillary metaphors. 
Therefore, when Hiss was found guilty on two perjury counts in January 1950, a 
rhetorical coup was implemented against the president by Americanists serving in the 
FBI, the American Legion, and Congress.109 This maneuver was an ideational 
overthrow that instructed the nation to fear and reject liberal approaches to U.S. 
foreign and domestic policies generally.   
 The rhetorical presidency was co-opted by an insubordinate member of the 
administration who helped manufacture public opinion to further and continuously 
expand his own power. The FBI’s mission was to purge the government of those with 
political views contrary to the director’s own political positions—people who would 




by undermining liberal ideas and promoting Americanism in their place. The director 
helped to maintain the militarized status of U.S. political culture and further 
militarized the FBI by experimenting with thought control on a more massive scale. 
Hoover’s mimicking of totalitarian police state tactics was attacked by New Dealers, 
but they too were rendered powerless against Hoover's propaganda strategies that 
were strengthened by threats of coercion. 
 Americanists perceived currents of social reform, especially secularism, to be 
evidence of a communist takeover. Idealism was framed as a Soviet plot to weaken 
America’s internal defenses, as both Hoover and George Kennan had warned. 
Individualism, instead, was celebrated for allegedly being the paramount American 
value. FBI Loyalty Program investigations and congressional loyalty review boards 
presumed that perspectives promoting cooperation were subversive; they also 
provided a pretext for disseminating compromising information about prominent 
liberals.  
Hoover’s image of communism was carefully crafted by the Crime Records 
Division to undermine organized labor and liberal Christianity. In February 1946—
just days after Kennan sent his telegram—the FBI Executives Conference suggested 
that “‘educational material’” should be “‘released through available channels”’ to 
develop an “‘informed public opinion”’ about the “‘basically Russian nature of the 
Communist Party in this country.”’110 Learning from Attorney General Palmer’s 
experience during the previous Red Scare, the goal of this program was to circumvent 
a “‘flood of propaganda from Leftists and so-called Liberal sources’” in the “‘event 




the Party was “‘the most reactionary, intolerant and bigoted force in existence.”’ This 
message was supposed to undermine the support of communism “‘from ‘Liberal’ 
sources and from its connections in labor unions”’ as well as from “‘persons 
prominent in religious circles.”’111  
The Executives Conference’s plan was initially implemented on an informal 
basis, but was formalized and expanded upon during the 1950s. For example, Hoover 
established the Responsibilities Program in February 1951, Athan G. Theoharis 
explains, which secretly “coordinated with state governors,” civic officials, “members 
of police departments,” prominent Republicans, and at least twelve different 
congressional committees.112 The historian observes that trusted surrogates covertly 
circulated information from FBI reports about alleged “subversives employed in state 
agencies, in public or private colleges, or as elementary or high school teachers.”113 
According to a memorandum written by Associate Director Tolson in October 1949, 
the FBI’s “dissemination” program spread “derogatory information” about its 
political and cultural opposition that was not “confirmed or verified.”114 This material 
was largely collected through the American Legion Contact Program (ALCP).  
The Bureau attempted to use this propaganda strategizing to take control of 
the nation’s thinking about communism. Hoover also used it to enhance the FBI’s 
stature. In an April 1951 letter, Tolson seemed excited, for example, that members of 
local governments could then safely “remove public school teachers based on 
information furnished by the FBI” without having to fear that such a purge “could be 
twisted by the Communist Party and its sympathizers into an endeavor by the FBI to 




that the “public” was then “educated to the dangers of Communism and that public 
opinion” would then “back up the dissemination of such information by the FBI.”115 
 Hoover’s public opinion management strategizing was intricately coordinated 
with his national security programming. Fears of communist Fifth Columns helped 
Hoover to institutionally militarize the FBI and to undermine unions. According to 
FBI memoranda, Hoover reinstated the “Plant Informant Program” (1940-1945; 
1950-1966) because of a 1949 “Delimitation Agreement” with the “intelligence 
agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.”116 This compromise required the FBI to 
warn these agencies of threats to “vital facilities, vital utilities and critical points of 
communication and transportation.”117 The FBI needed to expand its pool of 
confidential informants to properly manage this mission as well as the Loyalty 
Program.118 The ALCP was an auxiliary plan to the Plant Informant Program, and 
was used in wartime for populating the FBI’s informant pool. This program was also 
central to shading Roosevelt’s views against his anti-interventionist critics. Hoover 
suspended the Plant Informant and the Legion programs together in 1945, while 
instructing his agents to “retain the continued support” of the “American Legion” by 
maintaining their already activated contacts.119 Once the ALCP was reinstated in July 
1950, the director pressured his agents to always be expanding their Legion contacts 
because, as he reminded, the “American Legion” had “almost three million members” 
with “varied nationality backgrounds” who were “employed in practically every type 
of industrial, communications, transportation, and utilities facilities.”120 Ladd 
observed that the Legion was uniquely qualified to dominate the informant pool 




mission to “combat Communism and subversive activities.”121 Theoharis suggests 
that that the FBI valued the American Legion’s support immensely because of an 
“ideological affinity between Legion officers and FBI officials” that was marked by 
“extremely conservative political views.”122 The FBI also used other organizations to 
populate its informant pool as well, but to a remarkably lesser extent.123  
 Americanists in the American Legion and the FBI rallied to undermine 
organized labor. In August 1950, Hoover directed that “members of the Legion” 
should be “selected” as confidential informants for their “employment in important 
national defense facilities.”124 The FBI coordinated this operation through the 
Legion’s Americanism Commission.125 The Legion had already been condemning the 
“slave system” of “Soviet dictatorship.” The commission blamed communism for 
American “labor trouble” and charged that the CPUSA was an “agency of Moscow.” 
It warned that “Russia” would “eventually attack the United States” and advocated 
building-up a strong “national defense program.” The commission also launched an 
information campaign in April  1948, according to Roscoe Baker, to “bolster faith in 
American ideals and institutions against the inroads of Communism.”126 The 
American Legion’s program combined the fears of Americanists and liberal anti-
communists by making labor disruptions appear to be the result of Soviet Fifth 
Column strategizing. The platform directed both groups to support Americanism in 
national security planning.      
 Hoover’s program helped him poison the well of strategic information with 
Americanism, and thereby drew a wedge between the FBI and the Truman 




especially helpful as confidential informants, suggests Theoharis, because they 
reliably supported a “particular conservative ideology” and supplied Hoover with 
“political espionage” to undermine what Hoover called the ‘“kicking”’ of “‘labor 
organizations.”’ The plan was kept secret from the Office of the Attorney General 
(OAG), the president, and Congress, which contributed to the “permanent growth of 
the role and independence of the FBI,” observes Theoharis.127 The Bureau’s files 
swelled with what executives termed “considerable derogatory information” that was 
“not the subject of verification” and could never be confirmed.128 Theoharis explains 
that the material had little value for law enforcement or national security because the 
informers failed to discover any “information that could legitimately be described as 
national security intelligence or involving statutory violations.” Nonetheless, this 
material was secretly furnished to a variety of Americanists in Congress, especially 
those serving in HUAC and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security (SIS) as 
well as to Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI).129 The ALCP, thus, ensured that the FBI 
could continually furnish congressional channels with confidential information that 
reliably supported Americanism. 
 The FBI strategically circulated unconfirmed and derogatory information to 
Americanists serving in local government offices. Assistant Director Allan H. 
Belmont successfully argued in February 1951 that the FBI had a “responsibility” to 
share its files with those “responsible” for protecting vital “facilities.” He noted that 
the FBI’s “responsibility” was to “the people” which could allegedly best be served 
by confidentially furnishing information to the “state or local government or police 




carefully select the “channel utilized” to ensure that only FBI-friendly and discreet 
members of local governments received the derogatory information.130 Hoover then 
proclaimed to his field agents that “information should be furnished to responsible 
local authorities” regarding “subversive activities in public utilities.”131 Such 
targeting lent Hoover justification for monitoring members of organized labor.  
 Beyond the industrial sectors, the FBI also focused its circulation of material 
against educators. The FBI Executives Conference observed in April 1950 that the 
“educational field” was “considered a prime target by the Communist Party” because 
it reached the “youth of our nation.” It warned that the “daily contact of teachers with 
pupils form[ed] close association and enable[d] the teachers to effectively control the 
thinking of the pupils and thus insidiously instill into the minds of children the 
Communist Party line.” Therefore, the FBI allegedly had a “responsibility to advise 
local officials of the identities of Communists in the schools.” The conference, 
however, also encouraged restraint because the “educational field” was one of the 
“most controversial and independent fields in existence.” It warned that “any attempt 
to remove public school teachers based on information furnished by the FBI” could 
serve as evidence that the FBI sought to “control the thinking in the educational 
field.” The Executives Conference ultimately encouraged Hoover to make a 
“calculated risk” by minimizing potential “flare-backs” through “careful selection of 
the responsible officials to whom this information would be given on a confidential 
basis.”132  
 The FBI established an additional safeguard to protect its planning. Belmont 




before contacting any employee, professor, or student of a university with a view to 
developing him as an informant.” Furthermore, he insisted that “[c]ontacts with these 
individuals who [were] located on the actual campuses of colleges or universities 
should be held to an absolute minimum.”133 By then, Hoover had already ordered his 
agents to “furnish information concerning teachers and employees of public schools 
to the proper authorities” as well as to “consider furnishing information to State 
Governors concerning subversive individuals” who were “connected with state-
operated colleges and universities.”134 Ellen Schrecker observes that “over a hundred 
college teachers lost their jobs and were barred from new ones” because of this 
programming.135 The FBI, thus, secretly established liaisons in local government 
offices through which it disseminated unverified, derogatory, and confidential 
information about organized labor, public employees, and academics. This program 
was an invisible and coercive extension of the Loyalty Program and its mission to 
contain communism domestically.     
 Accusations circulated in the press that Hoover had co-opted the Loyalty 
Program to advance an Americanist agenda. Former Interior Secretary Harold Ickes 
adroitly observed in the July 1949 issue of the New Republic, for example, that 
Hoover’s definition of “improprieties” had “not been regarded as such since the 
Victorian age” (1837-1901). 136 Identifying the FBI director with nineteenth-century 
norms set him squarely at odds with the New Deal and the Fair Deal. The New 
Republic charged in December 1947, for example, that Hoover was a “politically and 
ideologically unsophisticated cop” who sought to enforce his vision of 




from wealthy and conservative citizens.137 His Cold War propaganda strategizing and 
manipulation of the rhetorical presidency had helped move the nation to fear and 
reject liberal philosophies. The New Republic observed in May 1948, for example, 
that Hoover’s belief that “all liberals [were] radicals, that all radicals [were] 
Communists, that all Communists [were] bomb throwers and should be deported or 
jailed—ha[d] taken root.”  Accordingly, the news magazine suggested that the 
domestic implications of the Truman Doctrine had come to mean the rejection of all 
that was not “orthodox and generally accepted.” The writer warned that this “subtle 
change in thought” was taking “place throughout the country.”138 This issue of neo-
orthodoxy was at the core of his plans to create an anti-communist consensus. The 
Yale Law Journal charged in December 1948, for example, that the “readiness by the 
chief of the FBI to identify (what [was] to him) unorthodox views with Communist 
views” revealed the “atmosphere” in which the FBI operated.139 Former Federal 
Communications Commissioner (1941-1948) and National Lawyers Guild (NLG) 
President Clifford R. Durr (1949-1950) described this worldview in the Chicago Law 
Review as one that tended to “force all political, economic, and social thinking into 
orthodox patterns” by creating an “atmosphere hostile to reason, an atmosphere in 
which” the nation could be “dangerously misled into rejecting information of vital 
importance solely because it appears to conflict with accepted beliefs of what is 
so.”140 The FBI’s critics, thus, charged that the Soviet threat was being used as an 





 The Loyalty Program even raised concerns among some liberals that the FBI 
was moving into the realm of thought control by policing ideas. Eleanor Roosevelt 
wrote in a March 1947 issue of the Washington Daily News, for example, that she 
feared that the Loyalty Program made it “possible to declare” any group “subversive” 
that opposed the “thinking of certain powerful groups.”141 The FBI was accused of 
being too prone to adopting the methods of the Axis powers and of undermining the 
nation’s political traditions. Syndicated columnist Marquis Childs speculated in a 
November 1947 issue of the Washington Post, for example, that the program could 
“destroy” America’s “heritage of free thought,” and that the FBI’s attempt to do so 
signified that it was becoming a “‘thought police’” in the tradition of “Japanese war 
lords.”142 Observers were quick to identify Hoover’s own Americanist worldview as 
the standard by which all others were being judged. The director of the Jefferson 
School of Sciences warned in December  1947, for example, that the DOJ was 
becoming a “‘thought police”’ that “‘labeled”’ all “‘ideological heresies”’ that 
challenged the “‘beliefs of J. Edgar Hoover”’ as “‘subversive.”’143 The FBI’s critics 
warned their audiences that democracy could not be preserved by undemocratic 
methods. Durr sarcastically observed in a January 1948 speech to the American 
Political Science Association (APSA), for example, that the administration was 
attempting to “‘to safeguard our liberties by giving our secret police the power of 
surveillance over the speech, writings, affiliations, and even the social life of our 
citizens.”’144 The FBI’s critics rightfully informed their audiences that the practice of 
thought policing was spreading beyond the Loyalty Program to include all quarters of 




1951.145 Prominent civil liberties activist Alan Barth warned the American 
Association of University Professors the following month, for example, that Hoover’s 
“inquisition” had “permeated our schools and our institutions of higher learning” as 
well as “State governments” and “professional associations and even into private 
industry” as a form of  “thought control” that was predicated on “political belief and 
affiliation.”146 Hoover’s critics, therefore, recognized his association of idealism with 
the communist penetration of U.S. institutions to promote a realist approach to U.S. 
foreign policy.    
  Prominent liberals objected to the FBI’s Cold War era strategizing on 
religious grounds. A group of Episcopal bishops proclaimed in November 1947, for 
example, that the Loyalty Program encouraged an “offense against God’s 
commandment, ‘Thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbor’” by offering 
immunity to confidential informants.147 Liberal Christians especially found the use of 
confidential informants to be a violation of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Durr 
observed in his January 1948 speech to APSA that the Loyalty Program celebrated 
“‘informers, stool pigeons, and gossips, a class which since the days of Leviticus we 
have been taught to regard with suspicion and scorn.”’148 He further observed in the 
winter of 1949 issue of the Chicago Law Review that the program defied “basic 
religious teachings by giving protection and power to a group against which we are 
repeatedly warned in both the Old and New Testaments.” This occurred, he 
suggested, through the FBI’s insistence that it had the privilege to deny the due 
process of law by concealing the identities of its informants.149 Liberal resistance to 




when a federal judge ordered the FBI to enter various confidential files into the court 
record which revealed its extensive and illegal reliance upon wiretapping.150 This, 
too, was opposed on religious grounds by New Dealers. Former Chairman of the 
Federal Communications Commission James L. Fly (1939-1944) wrote in the 
February 1950 issue of the New Republic, for example, that FBI wire-tappers violated 
“every sacred relation established by God and protected by law: husband and wife; 
parent and child; minister and parishioner; doctor and patient; lawyer and client.”151 
The liberal Christian foundation for civil liberties challenged Hoover’s crusade. He 
would publicly target such voices to censor them to mold American religion 
according to his planning.     
 Some socialists and liberals identified Hoover as a fascist and called his anti-
communism a repressive campaign against liberalism and organized labor. For 
example, the Morning Freiheit—a New York daily Marxist newspaper—compared 
the “red-baiting activities” of Hoover to those of Joseph “Goebbels” in January 1947. 
It observed that the director and “Hitler” both waged an “incitement campaign” 
against liberals, and in so doing, formed alliances with “reactionaries” and 
“monopolists” to undermine organized labor.152 The national security state was 
described as a subtle form of totalitarianism and Hoover was cast as its leading tyrant. 
The New Republic printed in December 1947 that although America’s resemblance to 
“Nazi Germany” as a “police state” was negligible, it did allow this “super-cop” to 
“seriously harm almost anyone” irrespective of due process.153 Hoover’s critics 
complained that the Loyalty Program had become a source of coercive power that 




in the  Chicago Law Review, for instance, that the program disempowered agency 
heads in selecting their personnel and gave the FBI a “dictatorial power over 
government employment policies.”154 Hoover’s vision of Americanism was identified 
as a brand of fascism. Henry Steele Commager observed in the September 1947 issue 
of Harper’s Magazine, for example, that a new “definition of Americanism” was 
being advanced that insisted upon “conformity” and “acceptance” of America’s 
traditional hierarchies.155 Durr complimented Alan Barth in the March 1951 issue of 
the New Republic for recently coining the term “‘Americanists”’ to describe this new 
ideological menace.156 Hoover’s Americanism, therefore, had successfully constituted 
Cold War political and social realities by 1951. This new world order was structured 
around a key constellation of militant metaphors.       
 The director responded to his vast array of critics with a variety of metaphors, 
including the masquerade trope. Mira Morgenstern observes that “masquerade” 
serves metaphorically to represent “intrigue” through the act of “pretending to be 
what one is not . . . culminating in disguise.”157 Hoover used the metaphor to 
punctuate a dissociation between reality and appearance by accusing the advocates of 
political liberalism and liberal Christianity with subversive strategizing. Hoover wrote 
in the May 1950 issue of the Educational Forum, for example, that the “Communist 
masquerader” deceitfully promoted “the victory of reason over prejudice, the 
supremacy of free thought, the freeing of the individual from restraints of the state.” 
According to Hoover, liberal perspectives were actually communism in disguise. The 
communists allegedly compounded this deceit by “masquerading” behind the values 




with “Marxist-Leninist philosophy.”158  Whereas the first two concepts belonged to 
the civic realm, all three were encouraged by Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount.159 
Therefore, according to Hoover, communists disingenuously presented values that 
were appealing to political liberals and liberal Christians to secretly promote 
communist dogma.  
 Hoover claimed that educators mistook the nature of the communist threat and 
failed to grasp its significance. He further lamented in the Educational Forum, for 
example, that “befuddled intellectuals” asserted that “Communism” was “not a 
danger” by arguing that it “really [did] not exist” or by claiming that it was an 
“abstract economic and philosophical theory.” Belittling the intellectual community, 
he suggested that this signified an “intellectual blindness” in “contemporary 
American thought.” Hoover constructed communism in terms of its totalitarian 
tactics, which resembled many of the developing themes of his own organization. For 
example, he wrote that the “Communists,” in practice, were attempting to “create a 
totalitarian man, a man whose fawning servility would be matched only by his 
intellectual imbecility,” which threatened the “very existence of democratic 
education.” 160 This counterargument deflected charges of thought control by 
resorting to the same allegation against the FBI’s critics. The masquerade metaphor 
helped Hoover to countercharge New Dealers with accusations of communist thought 
control and intellectual dishonesty, which balanced their own criticisms of the FBI. 
Additionally, the metaphor provided grounds for discrediting the liberal value of free 
inquiry, and the more liberal perspectives that it generated, as a ploy to advance 




 Hoover’s critics accused him of forming a militarized and secret police force, 
just as they had complained of him doing during the war. The Yale Law Journal 
described Hoover’s loyalty procedures in December 1948 as a “militant 
investigation” that qualified the “collection of gossip, rumor, and data on private 
affairs” as “tangible results.” It warned that the FBI was operating on a “completely 
independent basis” that acknowledged “little or no responsibility to anyone outside of 
its own organization.” This “secret police” force, it argued, would inevitably adopt 
“militant police methods” and become a “grave and ruthless menace to democratic 
processes.” The journal acknowledged that Hoover’s operation was “moving 
dangerously in this direction.”161 Indeed, the FBI did work secretly to undermine the 
oversight of its operation. For example, one FBI official insisted in an October 1949 
memo to field agents that “‘no mention must be made in any investigative report 
relating to the classifications of top functionaries or key figures, nor the Detcom or 
Comsab Programs, nor the Security Index or the Communist Index.”’ These 
“investigative procedures and administrative aids” were considered “confidential” 
and were “not to be known to any outside agency.”’ While the attorney general was 
familiar with the Security Index and relied upon it for the Loyalty Program, he was 
kept in the dark about a program for prioritizing the detentions of high-value targets 
in the event of war (Detcom), a program that targeted Americans who were 
considered potential saboteurs (Comsab), and a program to detain Americans for 
whom the FBI did not have, in its own words, “‘sufficient disloyal information”’ 
(Communist Index). All of these suspects were added to the Security Index and thus 




operational independence—and that he used such latitude to further militarize 
domestic policing in peacetime—were well founded.  
 Hoover used militant metaphors to identify how the labor and religious 
communities should comport themselves toward public life. John P. Crank observes 
that gun metaphors are infused in “police mythology” and that they “evoke a heroic 
cop image, a lone actor on the metaphorical street, protecting citizens and stopping 
bad guys.”163 Hoover used such imagery to encourage labor to identify itself as being 
a militant defender of America’s heritage. He wrote in the September 1951 issue of 
the American Federationalist, for example, that it was the “job” of every “labor union 
member” to “keep the fortress well guarded” by focusing their “gunsights” on 
communists and, thereby, defending the “traditions of our forefathers.” 164 Hoover 
combined offensive and defensive tactics. Intellectual homogeneity through militant 
drilling was his endgame. Rebecca Ard Boone explains that the phalanx metaphor 
conveys a sense of collectivity in which risk is equally shared, thus inspiring 
meanings of “social cohesion.”165 Hoover relied on this metaphor to encourage the 
religious community to expel and discredit less orthodox perspectives and ultimately 
establish a more Americanist society. He told the Methodist ministers in November 
1947, for example, that clergy members and national security planners should begin 
“tightening up the ranks” so they could “present a solid phalanx through which 
secularism [could] not penetrate.” 166 Hoover thus militarized the very locations in 
which the FBI feared liberal obstructionism, turning some of its weaknesses into 




 Hoover constructed the FBI as a militarized policing organization and 
encouraged the militarization of public life in peacetime. He used the conflation of 
communism and Nazism with liberalism to suggest that all three were militant threats, 
and used this vision as a blueprint for remodeling American religious, civic, and 
political life. He constructed communism as an armed and militant revolutionary 
movement inside the United States. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, 
that American communists were “planning” a “revolution” in which they would 
receive “[m]ilitary aid and assistance” as well as “[p]lenty of guns and ammunition.” 
They would use these resources, he suggested, to exterminate the “police” and to 
seize control of communication and transportation channels.167 This notion of foreign 
military coordination comprised the core fear of Fifth Column strategizing. When 
fascist general Emilio Mola prepared for his invasion of Madrid in October 1936, the 
New York Times paraphrased him as saying in a radio broadcast that he “was counting 
on four columns of troops outside Madrid and another column of persons hiding 
within the city who would join the invaders as soon as they entered the capital.”168 
The Times then reported that “[s]everal hundred thousand adults in Madrid” who 
voted for the “Right in the last election” represented the “potential . . .‘fifth column’” 
threat.169 Hoover used this fear of internal political dissidents coordinating with 
external military forces to justify militant Americanism.  
 Focusing on the relationship between secularism and liberalism, the director 
proclaimed that liberalism was an anti-religious and dangerous ideology that required 
a militant response. He told the Methodist ministers in November 1947, for example, 




also needed to be “organized and militant” to stand against such “forces which 
threaten the security of America.”170 Hoover encouraged the religious community to 
launch a militant and evangelical crusade against liberals. He wrote in the February 
1949 issue of Redbook, for example, that just as the “zeal of early Christians stamped 
out paganism in Rome,” the “churches of America” then needed to “recapture the 
militant spirit of Paul” to “convert godless Communism.”171 Hoover discredited labor 
by claiming that militant communists remained in organized labor after it claimed to 
have purged communists from its ranks in 1949-1950. Hoover wrote in the September 
1951 issue of the American Federationalist, for example, that the “strength” of 
communism was its “militant” nature  and that people who suffered from “little faith, 
lack of knowledge or evil intentions” advanced a “philosophy” of  “‘[l]ive and let 
live’” to assist the “Communist gauleiter.” The gauleiter was a Nazi political 
operative; Hoover’s statement, thus, further reinforced the Red Fascism analogy by 
presenting industrial agitation as militant and radical.172 Hoover did so with the use of 
the spotlight, exposure, contagion, and quarantine metaphors.     
 Hoover used the spotlight metaphor to incite fear of people and organizations 
that disagreed with his worldview. Dorian Wiszniewski and Richard Coyne observe 
that the spotlight metaphor “operates through the relationship between the 
background field of darkness and the roving concentration of illumination.”173  It 
suggests that a preexistent truth awaits revelation by the movement of attention to the 
object of interest. Hoover reinforced his rhetorical continuity with the wartime era 
with this metaphor. For example, he first told the IACP in August 1943 that the 




of discontent and discord, always alert to seize upon racial differences, economic 
stresses and political difficulties to advance their selfish and vile purposes.”174 
Extending the spotlight metaphor into the post-war era helped him to encourage the 
containment tactics that he introduced during the war. For example, Hoover wrote in 
the December 1946 issue of Washington News Digest that “[a]ll”’ those who stood 
for the “American way of life” must focus the “spotlight of public opinion” upon 
“Red Fascism in America” to build up “barriers” through which it could not 
“penetrate.”175 He also used the metaphor to charge liberal organizations with 
subversion.  Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “spotlight of 
truth” would leave the “deceit, the trickery, and the lies of the American Communists 
. . . exposed” for public scrutiny.  The metaphor suggested that all groups that did not 
support his vision of Americanism were disloyal. He told the committee, for example, 
that it should begin “spotlighting existing front organizations” that supported the 
“cause of Soviet Russia” rather than the “cause of Americanism.” The metaphor 
aligned liberal anti-communism with loyalty and political idealism with disloyalty. 
Hoover directed HUAC to focus its “spotlight” on any “organization” that espoused 
“liberal progressive causes” while denouncing “well-known honest patriotic liberals,” 
especially if the organization did not “have a consistent record of supporting the 
American viewpoint over the years.”176 The metaphor, thus, aligned his worldview 
with truth and its challengers with deceit, and thereby encouraged the censuring of 
more idealist groups and his critics. Accordingly, HUAC incorrectly identified Durr’s 




 Communist hunting in domestic spaces was encouraged through a rhetoric of 
exposure.  Hoover used the metaphor as an entailment of the spotlight metaphor. That 
which was identified by a spotlight was then also exposed for public scrutiny. Hoover 
used the metaphor to suggest that alleged American traitors harbored secrets against 
the nation’s safety that required public examination. This allegation was used to 
justify the Loyalty Program’s investigation into the ideas of federal employees, as 
well as the investigations launched by HUAC, McCarthy, and a host of other 
Americanists in Congress. 
 Hoover used the exposure metaphor to re-imagine the relationship between 
the citizen and the state in mainstream anti-communist political culture. The metaphor 
relied upon an appearance-reality dissociation to invent divisions between liberal anti-
communism and idealism. Hoover wrote in the June 1947 issue of Newsweek, for 
example, that the “first step in the fight to preserve the American way of life [was] 
the exposure of the true aims of Communism and then a contrast of them with our 
American way of life.”178 The exposure metaphor’s dissociation between real and un-
real forms of liberalism encouraged conflict between liberal anti-communists and 
idealists. Hoover told HUAC in March 1947, for example, that the “sincere liberal” 
was “anxious” to “drive out of the ranks . . . . Communists who ha[d] infiltrated” 
“liberal organizations.” This even cast suspicions on liberal anti-communists who 
supported social justice efforts like Reinhold Niebuhr.179 The metaphor’s dualism 
asserted that Americanists had the authority to appraise the legitimacy of their 
cultural opposition. Hoover further observed in Newsweek three months later, for 




through the “exposure of Un-American forces” and was thus “worthy of the support 
of loyal, patriotic Americans.”180 The metaphor helped Hoover to perpetuate his 
institutional arrangements with the American Legion into peacetime. The director 
launched the FBI’s Red Fascism campaign following the speeches from Byrnes and 
Wallace in September 1946. He then proposed to the Legion that it should continue to 
work in conjunction with the FBI to achieve the “exposure and denunciation of every 
force which weakens America.”181 The metaphor suggested that communist witch-
hunting was a democratically legitimate activity. He proclaimed to the Roosevelt 
Memorial Association in October 1949, for example, that “[w]e must meet and 
expose Communism for what it actually is on all levels, educational, political, 
economic, social, religious and when necessary in the field of law enforcement,” 
which would allegedly “make our democracy more effective.”182 The exposure 
metaphor, thus, implied that the ideological differences among liberals proved that 
some liberal ideology was illegitimate.  Once suspects were exposed, they then 
needed to be contained.  
 Hoover returned to his longtime use of the contagion metaphor and its 
entailments to advance the containment strategies of political realism. Such rhetorical 
continuity suggested that as America’s security threats continued to grow, so too did 
the nation’s need to expand the FBI. Paul A. Chilton observes that if “communism is 
viewed as a cancer or some other disease, it follows metaphorically that its spread 
needs to be ‘contained.’”183 The director constructed communism as a contagion that 
sought to contaminate the body politic. He wrote in the November 1950 issue of the 




ideology” called “Communism” were “attempting to infect the blood stream of 
American life.” The contagion metaphor insisted upon the need for detection. He 
wrote that the “physicians of America” should render their services in this 
“ideological fight” because “[m]edical science” was “interested” in “detection of 
specific symptoms and the prescribing of cures which will eliminate the cause of the 
malady.” Hoover relied on the contagion metaphor to justify hardboiled Americanist 
containment strategizing. His discourse, again, mimicked both Hitler and Lenin and 
their emphasis on strength by purity. He wrote, for example, that it was then 
“America’s task” to “kill these Communist germs and to increase the strength and 
vigor of American resistance.”184 The communist threat of un-Americanism, thus, 
was supposed to be met with the American solution of deadly force. 
 Hoover rolled over his use of the quarantine metaphor from the wartime era to 
remind his audiences how such power could be applied. Halford Ryan observes that 
“‘quarantine’ denotes action toward isolating a sick person for the community’s 
benefit.”185 Hoover relied upon the metaphor to encourage vigilantism. He wrote in 
the June 1947 issue of Newsweek, for example, that once the nation worked to 
“[u]ncover” and “expose” communist “activities,” the “American people will do the 
rest—quarantine them from effectively weakening our country.”186 These Americans 
were a part of a secret and nationwide Americanist movement that operated through 
the nation’s civic institutions to remove liberals from public employment and thereby 
end the New Deal. Indeed, it looked very much like the Fifth Column threat that was 
supposedly attacking the nation.  Hoover told HUAC in March 1947 that “once 




quarantining them so they [could] do no harm.” This was allegedly necessary, 
according to Hoover, because “Communism” was “akin to disease that spreads like 
an epidemic and like an epidemic a quarantine [was] necessary to keep it from 
infecting the Nation.”187 The contagion metaphor thus suggested that communism 
was communicable like a disease, and that its adherents, therefore, deserved to be 
publicly scrutinized, shamed, and discredited. Preferred members of the citizenry 
could then prevent the further spread of the alleged infection.    
 Hoover’s ideological containment strategizing elevated the value of 
individualism in American political and religious culture. He traced the paramount 
importance of individualism to the founding moment of the nation. The director wrote 
in the November 1952 issue of The Rotarian, for example, that the “builders of the 
American republic had indomitable faith” and “believed in the individual.” 
Accordingly, Hoover suggested, “they projected a concept of government based upon 
individual responsibility” in the “Constitution.” Additionally, he used such rhetoric to 
trace the value of individualism to the founding moment of Christianity. Hoover 
encouraged his readers to “not minimize spiritual values,” but to recognize that the 
“Founding Fathers” laid the nation’s “foundation in a philosophy set forth almost 
2,000 years ago” that “granted the individual a dignity never before accorded to 
mankind.”188 Hoover used notions of individualism to set liberty against communism. 
He wrote in the September 1951 issue of the American Federationalist, for example, 
that “[e]very patriotic American” who was “dedicated to the advancement of liberty, 
justice and the happiness of the individual, must fight” against “Communism.”189 The 




Hoover’s rhetorical commitment to individualism, therefore, elevated Americanism 
over idealism, political liberalism, and liberal Christianity.  
 The anti-communist political discourses of exposure and containment helped 
to further substitute realism for idealism. O’Reilly observes that by 1950 a movement 
of prominent “Cold War liberals” that included Schlesinger, Niebuhr, and the 
leadership of the American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP, and the CIO, among 
others, had “rejected” the “traditional tenets” of idealism, especially its “belief in 
progress, popular democracy, and man’s inherent goodness and perfectibility.” 
Instead, they then accepted a more Christian fundamentalist “creed that stressed 
man’s corruptibility, the inevitability of conflict among nations, and the dangers of 
democratic rule.” The historian notes that liberal, social justice, and idealist values 
eroded, in part, because many liberals believed that Hoover was aligned with the 
“responsible anticommunism of the Truman administration.” These liberals rejected 
Americanism in Congress. They, however, mistakenly supported Americanism in the 
FBI as they presumed that Hoover was loyal to Truman. In so doing, many liberal 
anti-communists failed to recognize that they were ultimately supporting 
McCarthyism and the Red Scare.190  
 The damage done to liberal values was evident in Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson’s response to Alger Hiss’s five-year prison sentence for perjury. The New 
York Times reported that Acheson pledged to continue his unflinching support of Hiss 
at a January 1950 press conference. The secretary of state was then being “criticized 
by various members of Congress for his past associations and comments about Hiss.” 




Hiss’s guilt were “‘stated on the Mount of Olives’” and could be found in the 
“‘Twenty-fifth Chapter of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, beginning at Verse 
34.’”191 In this passage, Jesus identified just action as feeding the hungry, comforting 
those in need, sheltering immigrants, clothing the naked, tending to the infirmed, 
nurturing the imprisoned, and declared “[i]n as much as ye have done [it] unto one of 
the least of these my brethren, ye have done [it] unto me.”192 Whereas these social 
justice principles undergirded the New Deal and political idealism, the rhetorical 
constraints placed on the presidency by FBI propaganda favored fundamentalism and 
its Americanist agenda. This influenced the American value structure, the reality that 
it constructed, and the corresponding roles that it placed upon federal institutions. 
 The rhetorical dimensions of J. Edgar Hoover’s national security 
programming advanced his Americanist agenda and challenged presidential control 
over the executive branch. Durr wrote to Truman in June 1949 and again in January 
1950 as President of the NLG. He complained that “FBI employees” exhibited 
“intellectual limitations” that were manifest in their “investigations of the social, 
economic and political views and associations of private citizens.” Such thought 
policing, Durr charged, occurred in “almost complete secrecy and obscurity.” He 
suggested that Hoover used this power to investigate “Americans suspected of no 
criminal activity,” which marked a “dangerous tendency toward a police state.” 
Accordingly, the lawyer called upon the “executive branch of government” to 
examine the “extent to which the FBI” had become a “dangerous political secret 
police.”193 Durr’s attempt to use presidential power to curb Hoover, however, failed 




memo to Tolson in July 1949 summarizing Hoover’s power grab of the presidency. 
The public relations specialist relayed a private conversation between Truman and 
one of his advisors about the emerging police state. He wrote that the “President had 
made up his mind to let the Director go” but the advisor encouraged Truman to “face 
certain facts, namely the Director [was] tremendously popular throughout the country 
and that if the President did anything which would cause the Director to leave, it 
would reflect adversely on the elections in 1950 and 1952.” Truman admitted that he 
knew “this was so” and decided not to act.194 Hoover built his thought police force by 
pressuring the president into silence, thus forcing Truman to tacitly endorse Hoover’s 
leadership in the field of domestic security. The president’s failure to control the FBI 
enabled Hoover, HUAC, McCarthy, and other Americanists to purge traces of 
idealism from the government and public life more generally. This intellectual purge 
was also the function and the purpose of McCarthyism. In this way, the rhetorical 
presidency was exploited by a subordinate through his institutional connection to the 
nation’s highest office.    
 Hoover was not the only Cold Warrior to battle against Truman, and the 
president certainly was not without his own political agency. Yet, Hoover did 
dominate Truman in the realm of domestic security. President Truman launched his 
own overt and covert propaganda programs in 1948 and 1950, respectively, to 
advance his liberal anti-communist “foreign policy agenda.” Shawn J. Parry-Giles 
observes that Truman’s use of propaganda signified an “appreciation for the power of 
persuasion,” bolstered the power of his office, targeted “larger publics,” and lessened 




crisis” also raised concerns about communism among national and international 
audiences, which further emboldened Americanist accusations that the New and Fair 
Deals were manifestations of communism. 195 By associating the CPUSA and the 
CPSU, many arguments invented by the administration to justify containing foreign 
communist leaders (the mission of liberal anti-communism) evidenced the importance 
of containing their domestic counterparts (the Americanist vision). Richard Gid 
Powers observes that once “Hoover had broken with the administration over the 
loyalty issue” when he appeared before HUAC in March 1947, “the popular press 
looked to him for authoritative official statements on the Communist menace. Truman 
could still use the presidency to define the foreign threat, but he lost the ability to 
control the domestic security agenda.”196  
 
Public Opinion, Propaganda, and the Rhetorical Presidency 
 Freshman Congressman Richard M. Nixon (R-CA) attended Hoover’s speech 
to HUAC in March 1947; he was a committee member and would soon become an 
FBI surrogate.197 In the question and answer session, Nixon asserted that “a 
considerable amount of opposition” had “arisen to the President’s” recent “order” 
regarding “Communists in the Government service.” He suggested that criticisms of 
the Loyalty Program were based “on the grounds that proper safeguards for persons 
who [were] accused of being disloyal [were] not set up in the order.” Nixon reminded 
Hoover that the FBI had a “great deal to do with furnishing the information,” which 
critics opposed because the “accused” then did not “have the opportunity to be 




Hoover responded by arguing that his information program was a “matter affecting 
the security of the country. Obviously we would not . . . disclose the identity of a 
confidant . . . because it would prevent usefulness in the future, and might endanger 
his life.” However, these concerns were not worthy of consideration anyway, 
suggested Hoover, because they had been raised only to “force a disclosure of sources 
of information by elements that [were] particularly un-American who still may be in 
the Government service.” Hoover added that he suspected that such “shouts and 
screams” were from that “source particularly.”198 
 Truman’s and Hoover’s speeches and the executive order combined to 
legitimize the concerns of Americanists. Truman warned of “such subterfuges as 
political infiltration” on March 12, and then nine days later he ordered the FBI to 
investigate the loyalty of federal employees. The boundaries of Americanism and 
liberal anti-communism began to blur. Many liberals began supporting Hoover 
because they presumed that he was aligned with Truman. In a nationally broadcasted 
speech, Hoover essentially told the president’s opposition in Congress that civil 
liberties advocacy was a communist plot that should be ignored and discredited. 
Truman’s rhetorical power was virtually hijacked. The president complained to  
Miller in the latter years of his life that Hoover “was, still is inclined to take on, to try 
to take on more than his job was, and he made quite a few too many speeches to my 
mind, and he very often spoke of things that, strictly speaking, weren’t any of his 
business.”199 Truman’s reflection highlights Hoover’s on-going expansionist 
tendencies as director of the FBI and his propaganda programming to accomplish 




 In the midst of Hoover’s rhetorical coup, fear of communist subversion 
overcame objections to his illegal methods. Nixon could “express complete 
confidence” in Hoover’s “service” on behalf of the “House of Representatives” in 
June 1949 when the FBI’s ideological strategizing had recently been revealed.200 
Similarly, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) reassured one of his constituents in 
February 1950 that Hoover would not “encounter any loss of confidence either from 
the general public or the Congress” regardless of what his critics might say about 
him.201 The anti-communist consensus that Hoover sought to establish simultaneously 
cemented his premier status in American political culture. McCarthy made this 
evident when he sycophantically gushed in a July 1952 letter to the director that the 
“FBI” stood as a “monument” to “J. Edgar Hoover” and that this would “always be” 
so.202 Public opinion polling backed this perspective. The Gallup Poll recorded in 
January 1950, for example, that 82 percent of respondents felt that Hoover had “done 
a good job as head of the F.B.I.” while only 2 percent reported that he had done a 
“poor job.”203  
 Hoover’s discourse thus fostered a political climate that was more receptive to 
an expanded and militarized FBI in peacetime. Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson 
credit the “Red-fascist image” (or the “Nazi-Soviet analogy”) for helping to reshape 
the “reasoning” of U.S. policy planners when “possibilities for accommodation” with 
the Soviet Union were still tangible in 1945-1946.204 Hoover’s propaganda activities 
at home expedited the crystallization of the anti-communist consensus, promoted his 





 FDR emboldened Hoover and gave him the latitude to engage in coercive 
strategies that ultimately helped the director to build up the FBI. This power also set 
up Hoover to undermine Truman and assume control of the public pulpit for his own 
political gain. His propaganda strategies were empowered by his coercive acts that 
ranged from censorship, intimidation, job termination, and alienation in public life to 
jailing, torturing, and expulsion from the country. For example, Max Lowenthal—
former member of the Wickersham Commission, former assistant to Senators Burton 
K. Wheeler (D-MT) and George W. Norris (Independent from Nebraska), member of 
the NLG, and close friend of Harry S Truman—reminded his readers that Hoover had 
long relied on torture as a law enforcement tactic.205 He wrote in The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (1950) that “FBI practices” in this area were “summed up in March 
1940 by a Senate Committee” report. According to Lowenthal, Senator Harry S 
Truman (D-MS) and other committee members concluded that the “FBI had, in 1939 
and 1940, engaged in many illegalities suggestive of the years 1919 to 1924.” These 
criminal activities included “‘degrading and ‘third degree’ treatment.”’206 The 
Wickersham Commission defined the “third-degree” nine years earlier as a “secret 
and illegal practice” that employed “methods which inflict[ed] suffering, physical or 
mental, upon a person, in order to obtain from that person information about a 
crime.”207 Combined with his other tactics, these actions were Hoover’s equivalent to 
the roundups, purges, political denunciations, book-burnings, and other programs for 
thought control, physical imprisonment, and abuse that had taken place in Germany 
and the U.S.S.R. To that end, just as Hoover repudiated the twin enemies of fascism 




police power tactics to expand the FBI and his own political power. FDR’s 
experiment with coercion and persuasion, therefore, allowed Hoover to build up the 
domestic side of the national security state in a manner that undercut the New Deal 
and the Fair Deal.  
 Within the totalitarian paradigm, Hoover contributed to a broader Americanist 
movement that mimicked the rhetorical framework of Nazism. Kenneth Burke 
observed in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle” (1939) that the dictator offered a “trinity 
of government” that interlocked “popularity of the leader, force to back the 
popularity, and popularity and force maintained together long enough to become 
backed by a tradition.”208 He further noted that “Hitler appeal[ed]” to his audiences 
“by relying upon a bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought.” He 
suggested that “religion” did not require a “fascist state,” but that “much in religion” 
could be “misused” to create “a fascist state.” Burke concluded that “politicians of his 
kind” were also “in America” and that such “corruptors of religion” constituted a 
“major menace to the world” because they gave the “profound patterns of religious 
thought a crude and sinister distortion.”209 Hoover’s information campaign mimicked 
Hitler’s rhetorical strategizing in terms of the Americanist tradition that he 
continuously and metaphorically extended throughout his public campaigns. The 
director combined such tactics with his manipulation of American religion. This 
strategy established and promoted a worldview that was appropriated from the urban-
crime genre. The ideology celebrated force and violence as forms of political 
expression, tactics also practiced by Hitler. The rhetoric of Americanism thus 




 The FBI helped to create a context in which any rhetorical choices made by 
the liberal, anti-communist president came to increasingly reflect the Americanist 
worldview. While idealistic remarks about the Soviet Union or other efforts to create 
international peace like those made by Wallace could be framed as disloyal or too 
friendly towards communism, more realist  remarks like the Truman Doctrine speech 
were treated as proof of domestic subversion. Rhetorical scholars have repeatedly 
found disfavor with Truman’s address, sometimes blaming it for precipitating the rise 
of McCarthyism and the Red Scare.210 Truman stumbled when he      invoked the 
Nazi-Soviet analogy to justify his policy decisions in May 1947 and March 1950. 
However, Denise Bostdorff observes that the rhetoric of the past—and therefore the 
Munich and Red Fascism analogies—was rhetorically prominent at the time the 
White House began drafting the address in March 1947. This timing was already 
more than a year after the FBI decided to disburse its “‘educational material.’”211 The 
FBI’s information campaign dovetailed with Kennan’s private and public messages 
about the international communist threat. Combined, their discourses contributed to 
the intellectual and ideological contexts in which Truman spoke, and led most 
interpretations of his speech away from the liberal anti-communist worldview and 
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 Hoover’s public campaigns from 1933 to 1953 borrowed from political 
idealism and political realism, but exploited the rhetoric of the former to promote the 
values of the latter. Hoover used such combinations to embolden and manipulate 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s rhetorical reach and to challenge and undermine Harry S 
Truman’s rhetorical power. The FBI director adapted his rhetorical strategies to the 
idealistic and secular norms of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management technique 
during the War on Crime. Hoover’s rhetoric was increasingly steeped in the values of 
Christian realism and Christian fundamentalism by wartime. And this realist 
framework shaded the Cold War era with many of fundamentalism’s more neo-
orthodox presumptions. 
 The War on Crime (1933-1939) offered Hoover a foundation that grounded 
his realist conjectures in more idealistic language. FDR began rebuilding the Bureau 
in this era as he reclaimed the rhetorical power of propaganda that was pioneered by 
presidents like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Hoover had been 
rehearsing such rhetorical practices since 1925 when he imagined an “endless war 
against crime” that combined police cooperation and scientific management.1 
Attorney General Homer S. Cummings promoted this mixture of idealism and realism 
when he announced the War on Crime in 1933. The idealistic value of science was in 
turn used as a basis to strengthen Hoover’s rhetorical power. Hoover combined a 
rhetoric of science and a rhetoric of war in his construction of law enforcement. The 
vermin metaphor helped the director to frame his militant vision in terms of the 




 When promulgating the War on Crime through popular entertainment, Hoover 
promoted his Machine Gun School of Criminology by circulating spectacular stories 
and metaphors that invoked his scientific expertise. In this urban-crime drama, 
violence was a well established method for solving political problems. The realist 
themes of anarchy and power sprouted from pulp fiction texts and grew into a larger 
system of political thought. 
 The popularization of Christian realism made the rhetoric of power politics 
even more available to the director. The rise of Adolph Hitler and fascist belligerence 
abroad provided the director with grounds for discussing totalitarianism more broadly 
(1939-1945). Hoover orchestrated the vermin and Fifth Column campaigns with 
FDR’s backing and consent. The director’s ancillary contagion, termite, parasite, 
Trojan horse, and fellow traveler metaphors all promoted notions of stealthy intruders 
who infiltrated the nation’s institutions and necessitated an even more expanded law 
enforcement apparatus to exterminate the threats.  
 In the process, Hoover used the presidency as a key dimension of his 
rhetorical movements to strengthen his own power and the force of the FBI. 
Roosevelt empowered Hoover to police his administration’s critics as well as the 
director’s own political opposition. Moreover, Roosevelt called for the 
“extermination” of criminals and he used the Fifth Column and Trojan horse 
metaphors to undermine his adversaries. Hoover betrayed President Roosevelt and 
used this framework to conceal the implicit anti-New Deal partisanship that would 
become foundational to Hoover's anti-communist rhetoric. Roosevelt initially 




undermined FDR’s domestic agenda, especially during President Truman’s 
administration. 
  The early Cold War era (1945-1953) was marked by an amplification of 
political realism in the executive branch. Hoover helped to build a post-war rhetorical 
context that perpetuated the cold war exigencies and its realist presumptions. With 
this paradigm, Hoover undermined President Truman’s support for a liberal anti-
communist approach in U.S. foreign policy and promoted his own Americanist vision 
in the process.  
Hoover’s ability to seamlessly transition from a secular-scientific crime chaser 
to a militant Christian activist illustrated his ability to adapt to and exploit the 
political world  he inhabited. Courtney Ryley Cooper and Reinhold Niebuhr provided 
Hoover with a bridge between the realms of science and religion. Hoover combined 
Cooper’s urban-crime ideology with Niebuhr’s theology to merge the worlds of pulp 
fiction and international relations. Niebuhr’s support of violence to accomplish moral 
ends lent Hoover’s crackdowns against alleged criminals and communists intellectual 
support. The director’s promotion of neo-orthodoxy helped him to bring together 
realists and fundamentalists. His Americanist discourses outlined his parameters of 
American citizenship, which strongly favored whites, conservatives, and the rich.  
Hoover’s realist planning during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations 
resembled Hitler’s strategy for building-up the Nazi infrastructure in Germany. Both 
Hitler and Hoover concurrently relied upon vermin, parasite, and contagion 
metaphors to convey threats to internal security. They both politicized state-




propaganda campaigns announced the existence of invisible threats to the nation that 
required a more centralized and militant response by the nation's militaries and the 
nation's law enforcement agencies. And, they both relied on the advancements of 
science in their administration of law enforcement. Their rhetorics of contamination 
justified displays of power that boldly as well as surreptitiously chilled dissent.   
 
The Rhetorical Trajectory of Hoover’s Federal Justice 
 Hoover relied heavily on metaphors to construct the lurking public threats 
facing the nation. Such metaphors in turn helped build support for the federal 
expansion of law enforcement and justified his strategies of coercion. The director 
was also able to exert militant force against his opposition by creating an aura of fear 
associated with his metaphorical references to vermin, the Fifth Column, and Red 
Fascism. Such fear gave him enhanced latitude to engage in acts of secrecy that 
helped exploit democratic processes and conceal his coercive tactics. In the end, the 
director’s propaganda campaigns camouflaged his subversion of the very institutions 
(e.g., the presidency) that he claimed to serve and protect.   
 The director continued his reliance on metaphorical frameworks throughout 
the 1960s and into the 1970s. For example, Hoover told the American Legion while 
John F. Kennedy was president that “‘[c]rime [was] a parasite, feeding upon public 
disinterest and moral lethargy.”’2 He described “[o]rganized crime” as a “cancer in 
our society” when he was a member of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration.3 
Similarly, he identified members of “organized crime” as “parasites” during the 




that allegedly afflicted “America.”5 The rhetorical framework first constituted by 
President Roosevelt and FBI Director Hoover remained in effect for the next three 
decades.    
 What began as a strategy for FDR to defend his own policies against the 
policies of his opponents, ended with an FBI director using the power of the 
presidency to promote his own rhetorical clout and political agenda. Such a strategy 
would embolden one president and undermine the next. As the power of the rhetorical 
presidency expanded, the bully pulpit became a platform for other political leaders 
like Hoover to exploit for their own political gain. Students of the rhetorical 
presidency typically focus upon the biography of the president and the rhetorical 
power of the Oval Office. However, the authority of the rhetorical presidency 
cascades from the White House down to cabinet officers and flows to various 
department heads and bureau directors and their assistants. Many of these individuals 
are charged with speaking publicly on the president’s behalf and with the president’s 
consent. This study demonstrates how a president can lose control over such 
subordinates who engage in acts of rhetorical subterfuge. The presidency does not 
have the power to fully control what is said by such presidential surrogates. Even 
more problematic, presidents cannot be certain that members of the various executive 
agencies will be more loyal to the presidency than to their own ideological 
presumptions. The ideologies of executive leaders, therefore, can influence the 
meanings and complexities of the rhetorical presidency. This substratum of 
presidential meaning includes unwanted rhetorical surrogacy that ranges from 




constrain, obscure, or even hijack the future rhetorical actions made by the 
commander-in-chief. Hoover demonstrated how presidents, therefore, would have to 
guard against rhetorical poachers embedded in the executive offices of the federal 
government, who relied upon institutional authority to appropriate and at times  
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